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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, I examine how a reading of the later philosophy of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein can be of use to the reflective practitioner of literary translation. 
Wittgenstein, whilst a key figure in twentieth-century philosophy, remains peripheral 
to the field of translation studies and I argue that his later work, because it deals with 
the nature of language and meaning, is potentially of great significance: the story that 
Wittgenstein tells can change the field. It can rid translators of pictures of translation 
that are detrimental to literary translation and can also offer tools that will facilitate 
the task of literary translation, such as: the language-game; the form of life; the 
surveyable representation. 
In Chapter 1, I discuss the relation between philosophy and translation 
studies, presenting the later work of Wittgenstein, in particular the 1953 
Philosophical Investigations. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I relate Wittgenstein’s work to 
translation by examining respectively: the reading for translation of the source text; 
the writing of the target text; the theorising of the target text. In Chapter 5, I draw 
conclusions. In the central three chapters, I offer case studies of the translation of the 
poetry of Eduard Mörike and of the New Testament to illustrate my arguments. My 
aim is that the thesis will form the basis for a greater concern for Wittgenstein in 
translation studies than has previously been the case. 
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PREFACE 
 
My own interest in Wittgenstein began some twenty years ago. He was 
initially recommended to me by Michael Finnissy, who informed me in conversation 
that Wittgenstein had been inspirational to him in his work as a composer. My 
intellectual position at that time was Thomist, following the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas. Friends in the Dominican Order, of which I was for a time a member, later 
recommended reading Wittgenstein as a way of approaching Aquinas’s thought and I 
was influenced by my reading of Fergus Kerr (1988) and Gareth Moore (1998). 
When my professional interests turned to translation, I used my reading of 
Wittgenstein as a way of approaching the texts on which I was working, for example, 
in my translations from Martin Luther (Gledhill and Wilson, 2007), where I sought 
to play the same language-games in my translations that I found in Luther’s sermons. 
My motivation for researching translation after Wittgenstein can therefore be seen as 
a coming together of my philosophical and professional interests. I would no longer 
call myself a Thomist, but I continue to turn to the writings of Wittgenstein. I owe to 
John Gledhill the notion of linking Wittgenstein to translation: my thesis 
‘Translation after Wittgenstein’ is in many ways an application of an insight he 
expresses in his book on translating Thomas Mann (2007) and a continuation of a 
dialogue that has gone on for more than forty years. 
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A NOTE ON REFERENCING 
 
1. Works are referred to by author, year and (where relevant) page, e.g. ‘Adair 
(1995:5)’. 
2. I follow practice in philosophical scholarship by referring to the works of 
Wittgenstein by title and section or page, and by referring to the works of 
Plato by section, e.g. ‘Wittgenstein (PI 1)’; ‘Wittgenstein (CV p.5)’; ‘Plato 
(514a)’. 
3. I follow practice in theological scholarship by referring to the Bible by 
chapter and verse, while making clear which edition is being used when 
relevant, e.g. ‘King James Bible, John 1:1’. 
4. If a translation is being discussed, then the translator is given as the author in 
the main text and in the Bibliography, e.g. ‘Constantine, D. (tr) (2005) 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Faust Part I, London: Penguin’. No translator 
is given for group translations of the Bible. 
5. Where a translated text is considered in its own right, the translator is 
credited in the Bibliography but the text is given under the name of the 
source text author, e.g. ‘Tolstoy, L. (1997) The Gospel in Brief, tr. by F.A. 
Flowers III, Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press’. 
6. Internet references in the Bibliography include the full date on which a 
website was viewed, e.g. ‘AQA (9 May 2010) http://store.aqa.org.uk’. In the 
text, reference is by year only, e.g. ‘AQA (2010)’. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
     
 
 
 
In the beginning was the Deed! 
 
Goethe (1972:44)
1
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 My translation. 
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1.1  Aim  
The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is the subject of 
a poem by Herbert Lomas (2009:41), which is given as (1). Lomas addresses the 
concern with meaning associated with the later work of Wittgenstein. 
 
(1) 
NOTES ON WITTGENSTEIN 
What does it mean to say I hear? 
The piano, the air, the ear, the player? 
 
What does it mean to say I hope? 
Is hope a feeling? How long can I hope you come? 
 
And what does it mean to say I love? 
Your skin, your boots, your smell, your world? 
 
No one says No. That wasn’t true pain. 
True pain wouldn’t have faded – or faded so quickly. 
 
Is it you I love or myself?  
And are roses red in the dark? 
 
 
 
The poem exemplifies the influence Wittgenstein has exerted outside the field of 
philosophy. As Terry Eagleton (1994:153) notes: ‘Frege is a philosopher’s 
philosopher, Sartre the media’s idea of an intellectual, and Bertrand Russell every 
shopkeeper’s image of the sage. … But Wittgenstein is the philosopher of poets and 
composers, playwrights and novelists.’ Eagleton’s assertion is easily supported: 
Wittgenstein’s early work has been set to music by M.A. Numminen (1987); Derek 
Jarman has made a film of his life (1993); Tom Stoppard’s play Dogg’s Hamlet, 
Cahoots Macbeth (1980) is derived from his later philosophy; he is the protagonist 
of Bruce Duffy’s novel The World As I Found It (1987); his eyes stare out at the 
reader at the start of W.G. Sebald’s prose fiction Austerlitz (2001:3); Wolfgang 
Huemer (2004:2) records that Wittgenstein’s centenary was celebrated in Vienna by 
an exhibition of works of art influenced by his philosophy. In addition, 
Wittgenstein’s work has been used by literary critics: The Literary Wittgenstein, for 
example, is a collection of essays addressing the implications of his writings for 
13 
 
literature (Gibson & Huemer, 2004). His work therefore ought to be of interest to 
those engaged with the translation of poems, plays and novels.  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relevance to literary translation of 
the later Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations (PI), first published 
posthumously in 1953 in an edition including Wittgenstein’s German text with a 
facing English translation by Elizabeth Anscombe; I use the 2009 revised edition by 
Peter Hacker and Joachim Schulte that modifies but generally maintains Anscombe’s 
translation. I hold the PI to be representative of the thought of the later Wittgenstein 
in its ‘attempt to produce an overall shift in how we approach philosophical 
questions or the desire for understanding that they express’ (McGinn 2008:30). It 
deals with the philosophy of language and the philosophy of psychology in two 
parts, formerly known as PI I and PI II, now re-titled by Hacker and Schulte as PI 
and Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment (PPF) respectively. The central 
contention of the PI is that what are commonly held to be philosophical confusions 
originate in grammatical confusions. My choice of basing discussion primarily on 
the PI is considered in 1.3. All quotations from Wittgenstein are in English from 
published translations unless the translation itself is being discussed, in which case a 
glossed ST is used. 
I address Wittgenstein from the point of view of translation studies rather 
than of philosophy. Wittgenstein did not address the topic of translation directly at 
any length. I hope that my thesis will show, however, that his work can be used in 
describing the translation process and that it is also of potential value to the 
practising translator. By ‘translation’ I refer to ‘literary translation’, in the sense that 
this term is usually understood in translation studies (Hermans, 2007a:77), that is, 
translation with respect to a certain kind of text that in turn demands a certain type of 
strategy. Willis Barnstone (1993:4) distinguishes literary translation from routine 
information transfer. Literary translation deals with texts that have been valued as 
literature by individual cultures, and produces texts that themselves aim to be literary 
in nature. Examples of literary translation examined in this thesis are: the translation 
of the poetry of Eduard Mörike (1975) in 2.5 and 3.5; the translation of the New 
Testament (NT) (Aland et al., 1963) in 2.5 and 4.5. ‘Literature’ is itself a highly 
contested term (Attridge, 2004; Eagleton, 1996). An advertisement for a car, for 
instance, is unlikely to be set for critical commentary in a GCSE English Literature 
poetry examination, but its translation may tax the most experienced literary 
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translator, because it may involve word play, cultural background, intertextual 
referencing etc. (Boase-Beier, 2011:21). What is at issue is the literariness of the text 
being examined (Eagleton, 2007:3), as discussed in 2.1.  
My overall strategy is heavily influenced by Fergus Kerr, whose primary 
purpose (1988:vii) is ‘to show students of theology that they have much more to gain 
from reading Wittgenstein’s later writings than is commonly supposed’. Kerr’s book 
is entitled Theology after Wittgenstein. My thesis, ‘Translation after Wittgenstein’, 
aims to show that the same point can be made to students of translation. I write as a 
translation theorist, but also as a translation theorist who translates. In this sense, I 
am a reflective practitioner, defining this term following Donald Schön (1987:4) as 
the practitioner who ‘selects things for attention and organises them, guided by an 
appreciation of the situation that gives it coherence and sets a direction for action’. In 
my own translation work, I have found Wittgenstein to be inspirational and I follow 
the approach of Rupert Read (2007a:3): ‘The true test of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
the test of its vitality, of its reach, of its being more than a set of observations which 
are of use in the areas where he made them, is to apply his methods where he did not 
much apply them’. I owe the notion of linking Wittgenstein to translation studies to 
John Gledhill (2007:5), whose remark on applying Wittgenstein to translation is 
discussed in 3.2. 
 Wittgenstein is regarded as one of the most significant figures in the history 
of philosophy. David Edmonds and John Eidinow (2001:231) refer to his reputation 
being ‘unsurpassed … he has joined the philosophical canon’. He occupies a 
marginal position in translation studies, however. Anthony Pym (2007:36) makes 
only one oblique reference to Wittgenstein in his essay on philosophy and 
translation; Andrew Benjamin (1989), Rosemary Arrojo (2010) and Kirsten 
Malmkjaer (2010) make none at all in their surveys of translation and philosophy. 
Overviews of translation studies by Susan Bassnett (2003) and Jeremy Munday 
(2001) similarly ignore Wittgenstein.  
Wittgenstein may be a peripheral figure for translation studies because, as 
mentioned above, he did not address translation at any significant length, whereas 
many philosophers have been very interested in translation. Jacques Derrida (1995), 
for example, produced detailed philosophical considerations of the problems 
involved in translating, and has been very influential in the field (Bassnett, 2003:9). 
Martin Heidegger (1996) addressed translation issues directly in his writings, so that 
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‘it cannot be denied that there is a coherent, if not systematic, teaching about the 
nature of translation’ in his works (Groth, 2004:7). By contrast, while it is possible to 
survey Wittgenstein’s work in order to garner statements about translation, Dinda 
Gorlée (1994:88) notes that ‘many of these references are not meant to discuss 
translation for its own sake, as the actual linguistic activity in its own right, but 
rather as a heuristic device aimed at clarifying by analogy some of the fundamental 
topics discussed by Wittgenstein throughout his intellectual career’. My interest in 
Wittgenstein is motivated precisely by the fact that he did not address translation 
directly, by the fact that his later writings are about language, and that translation is 
rooted in language. The aim of this thesis will therefore be to apply Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy to the area of translation, not to use Wittgenstein’s statements on 
translation to illuminate the phenomenon of translation, although some of these 
statements will be referenced and will prove very useful. 
The peripheral status of Wittgenstein within translation studies could also be 
because Wittgenstein has often been perceived as a vatic writer whose work has 
accordingly become ‘the esoteric preoccupation of a clique’ (Read, 2007a:4), 
occupying intellectual heights far removed from such a practical activity as 
translating and generating a whole industry of exegesis (cf. Kahane et al., 2007). In a 
letter in 1944 to Norman Malcolm (McGuinness 2008:320), however, Wittgenstein 
asks Malcolm what is the use of studying philosophy ‘if all that it does for you is to 
enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic etc., 
& if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday 
life’. Translation, in my opinion, is one of these important questions of everyday life 
and the contention of my thesis is that a reading of Wittgenstein can improve our 
thinking about translation, even though the topic is not central to his work. Martin 
Klebes (2006:47), writing on Wittgenstein and the novel, notes that it may be 
precisely the fact that Wittgenstein did not map out an aesthetic grid that makes him 
inspirational to novelists and literary theorists, because he does not present a doctrine 
but a method, not a set of instructions but an approach to practice. The same could be 
true for translation. What is this method? 
The project of the later Wittgenstein is concerned with making us see things 
differently. As Ray Monk (1990:533) asserts: ‘Wittgenstein’s remark about 
philosophy – that it “leaves everything as it is” [PI 124] – is often quoted, but it is 
less often realized that, in seeking to change nothing but the way we look at things, 
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Wittgenstein was attempting to change everything’.2 Hence Read (2007a:1) describes 
the PI as ‘a philosophical self-help book’ that can help its audience ‘to cease to be 
tortured by various intellectual delusions’ through its focus on the circumstances of 
ordinary lives. To view Wittgenstein in this way can set him free for the translator as 
reflective practitioner, so that – again to refer to Read (2007a:4) – instead of being 
‘the esoteric preoccupation of a clique’, Wittgenstein’s work can become ‘the 
valuable activity of a growing cultural force’, which means that philosophy after 
Wittgenstein is ‘something that we practise rather than recite’. The same may be true 
of translation after Wittgenstein. 
However, there has been some significant work done on Wittgenstein within 
translation studies, on which I build and which opens the possibility for further 
integration of his methods. To give three examples: Wittgenstein has been cited by 
Gideon Toury (1980:17-18) as an inspiration for Descriptive Translation Studies 
(DTS) (discussed in 4.2); Maria Tymoczko (2007:83-90) uses Wittgenstein’s 
approach to meaning in order to come to a view of translation as a ‘cluster concept’ 
(discussed in 4.1 and elsewhere); Marjorie Perloff (2004) uses Wittgenstein to 
examine the notion of poetic translatability (discussed in 1.5.3). In her survey of the 
many turns that have occurred in the short history of translation studies, Mary Snell-
Hornby (2006:172) lists the ‘sociological turn’ as the most recent. It is time for a 
philosophical turn. George Steiner’s work on translation, After Babel (1998), is an 
example of a literary survey of translation that has taken this philosophical turn and 
that frequently references Wittgenstein. What is needed now is an application from 
the point of view of the reflective practitioner in order to build on work already done 
and move Wittgenstein from the periphery to the centre. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 An example of this happening within translation studies is how Friedrich Schleiermacher’s remarks 
on the nature of translation have consequences for the field, i.e. in introducing a foreignising approach 
(2004). 
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1.2 Translation studies and philosophy 
It is useful to examine the relationship between philosophy and translation 
studies, between one of the oldest intellectual practices known to humanity and a 
recent discipline, sometimes considered to have been formalised by a 1972 paper by 
James Holmes (2004). To turn to a discipline outside his or her own is a useful 
strategy for any theorist in the humanities. I follow the distinction made by 
Wolfgang Iser (2006:5) between soft theory in the humanities and hard-core theory 
in the sciences, between mapping and predicting respectively. Iser (2006:9) asserts 
that soft theories in the humanities ‘derive their components from sources outside 
themselves, thus obtaining a more reliable basis than the contrived speculations of 
aesthetics could ever provide’. An example is the examination of literary theory by 
Eagleton (1996), where the theories chosen for discussion come from outside 
literature. Eagleton (1996:151-155), for example, uses ideas drawn from 
Freudianism to drive a psychoanalytical reading of D.H. Lawrence’s novel Sons and 
Lovers, interpreting the various family conflicts in that book by reference to concepts 
such as the Oedipus complex, which allows him to develop what he refers to as a 
‘“sub-text” for the work – a text which runs within it … which we as readers are able 
to “write” even if the novel itself does not’. Writing this particular sub-text for Sons 
and Lovers is a possibility only for the reader who knows his or her psychoanalysis, 
and Eagleton (1996:153) stresses that other readings (such as a social reading) are 
available to readers who look to other theories (such as Marxism). With respect to 
translation, Jean Boase-Beier (2008) has similarly argued that the sort of theory that 
might be used to drive a translation is one that is peripheral to translation studies 
rather than a theory about translation as such and (2006a) uses relevance theory 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995) – a theory about meaning, not translation – to drive and 
explain her own translation of an Ernst Meister poem. By looking to another field, 
the theorist can establish whether his or her way of proceeding is sound, though this 
raises the question of whether the theory used is in turn a sound one. Emma Wagner, 
for example, rejects Derrida, offered by Andrew Chesterman as a possible 
inspiration for translation, because she sees his theory of meaning as nonsensical 
(Chesterman & Wagner, 2002:24-25). I think that the presentation of Derrida given 
by Chesterman is over-simplified, but Wagner is right to refuse to use a theory that 
she does not see as sound.  
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The same need to look outside a discipline can be found with respect to the 
creative process. The composer Michael Finnissy (Brougham et al., 1977:2) cites as 
a major influence on his work the Pedagogical Sketchbook by Paul Klee (1988), not 
a musical textbook but a manual of instruction for the Bauhaus, a school of 
functional architecture and design that flourished in Weimar Germany. Such outside 
influence can be crucial for artistic development. The poet Gerard Manley Hopkins 
found inspiration in the work of the philosopher and theologian Duns Scotus, whose 
notion of haeccitas
3
 showed Hopkins a way of looking at the world that helped him 
to release his own creative energy by developing the concept of ‘inscape’ (Martin 
1991:133). If translation, as has often been noted, is a creative act rather than a 
mechanical transference of meaning for which good dictionary skills are the primary 
requisite (Weinberger & Paz, 1987:43), then the practising translator might also 
benefit by looking sidewards.  
Philosophy is a discipline to which a writer in the humanities might turn in 
order to support his or her work. The novels of Iris Murdoch, for example, such as 
The Black Prince (1993), draw heavily on Plato’s philosophy, and she also uses 
Plato in her aesthetic writings (1997) to give her a context in which to work out her 
own theory of art: even where she disagrees with Plato’s dismissal of representative 
art, her framework of reference remains Platonic. Pym (2007:24) describes 
philosophy ‘as a set of discourses that do not ostensibly borrow authority from 
external disciplines’. In this, philosophy differs from other fields of study in the 
humanities, and may be said to be a foundational subject in its unaided quest for 
truth, giving rise to a number of sub-disciplines that attempt to elucidate other fields, 
such as: the philosophy of language; the philosophy of law; the philosophy of 
mathematics; the philosophy of science etc.  
Translation studies, by contrast, is an interdisciplinary field, what Tymoczko 
(2007:52) describes as an ‘interdiscipline’, which of necessity looks to other fields 
for support. The essays in Piotr Kuhiwczak and Karin Littau’s guide to key 
approaches in translation studies (2007) indicate this. Chapters are devoted to the 
relationship between translation and the following (in chapter order): culture; 
philosophy; linguistics; history; literature; gender; politics. In the relationship 
between translation studies and philosophy, translation studies is a ‘client discipline’ 
                                                 
3
 Latin: ‘thisness’.  
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(Pym 2007:4), with the direction of authority being primarily from philosophy to 
translation studies. 
Pym (ibid.) asserts that there are three ways in which philosophy and 
translation are linked. These are quoted as (2). 
 
(2) 
(1) Philosophers of various kinds have used translation as a case study or metaphor 
for issues of more general application. 
 
(2) Translation theorists and practitioners have referred to philosophical discourses 
for support and authority for their ideas. 
 
(3) Philosophers, scholars and translators have commented on the translation of 
philosophical discourses. 
 
 
 
Examples of these three ways are, respectively: Friedrich Nietzsche’s statement on 
translation and power (2004); Steiner’s use of Wittgenstein (1998:169 ff.); Lawrence 
Venuti’s discussion of the translation of philosophical texts (1998:106-123). In this 
thesis, I, as a reflective practitioner, shall address the second connection noted by 
Pym. Wittgenstein, as philosopher, can be seen to exemplify Pym’s first link. 
 Christopher Norris (2007:1) asserts that the relationship between philosophy 
and literary theory (of which part of translation studies can be considered a sub-
discipline) is problematic, owing to the ‘tendency of literary theorists to advance far-
reaching speculative claims on a frankly inadequate philosophic basis’. I assume that 
translation is a process that is an interface of various disciplines. To translate a poem, 
for example, involves a writer in a process that is simultaneously literary, cultural, 
linguistic etc. I ask what philosophy (in particular the philosophy of Wittgenstein) 
can tell me about this process. My approach will mean that I can hope to avoid 
advancing the far-reaching speculative claims identified by Norris, because I shall be 
writing descriptively rather than as a modern sage. My thesis is addressed to the 
specialist in translation studies rather than to the philosopher but it is my hope that 
my engagement with philosophy will not be inadequate. 
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1.3 Why Wittgenstein? 
Twentieth-century philosophy is often described in terms of two major 
trends: the analytic (Anglo-American) and the continental (what Pym (2007:42) calls 
‘the hermeneutic-deconstructive complex’). Whilst these are contested terms, the 
two trends can be defined, following Simon Critchley (2001:i-vii), as follows. 
Analytic philosophy is concerned with questions of logic and language, for example, 
whether the sentence ‘The King of France is bald’ is true or false or meaningless. 
Continental philosophy is concerned with existential questions, for example, whether 
history can be said to progress. Philosophers such as A.J. Ayer and Bertrand Russell 
are categorised as working within the analytic tradition. Philosophers such as Derrida 
and Heidegger are categorised as working within the continental tradition. The split 
has been seen by many writers to have had harmful effects in philosophy: Pym 
(2007:42) notes ‘not just a lack of dialogue but serious misunderstandings’.  
  Wittgenstein can resolve this dilemma, because the traditional categorisation 
of his work as analytic does not, according to Critchley (2001:11), explain his 
appeal, which ‘might be said to be based on the way philosophical truth comes 
together with a certain conception of existential meaning, indeed a certain way of 
life’. Like Immanuel Kant, Wittgenstein is a thinker who encompasses both the 
analytic and the continental traditions (Critchley, 2001:iii). His contention in 
Philosophical Remarks (PR) 3 is that inquiry has to be about language as we find it 
and his discussions of language in the PI are based on practical examples and stories, 
on ordinary life, everyday language and everyday activities.  
The translator must likewise deal with language as it is found in the text 
being translated, not with an ideal language. Wittgenstein’s insistence on language as 
it is used in ordinary life supports the approach to translation studies suggested by  
Benjamin (1989:86) of shifting the emphasis ‘to the text itself’, a move with which 
Pym (2007:44) is in agreement, concluding that a ‘bottom-up’ approach is needed 
that would not miss ‘the logics of the more everyday activities’. I shall also argue 
that Wittgenstein can provide a corrective to the non-literary ways in which many 
literary translators have dealt with the text to be translated (Chapter 3). My thesis 
examines various conceptual problems that face the translation theorist and the 
translator, and will suggest how a reading of Wittgenstein can enable these problems 
to be solved. The ultimate aim of Wittgenstein’s project, as Kerr (1988) stresses, is 
clarity, a new way of seeing. As Boase-Beier asserts (2006b:147), knowledge of 
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theory ‘is another possible tool, a way of broadening the mind, an added 
perspective’, a way in which theory and practice can be improved in translation.  
 It is important to be clear about the term ‘theory’, which is used in ways that 
differ according to context, and is thus a potential source of confusion. Iser (2006:5) 
makes the distinction between soft and hard-core theory precisely because he 
believes that the term ‘theory’ is used in different ways in the humanities and the 
sciences, so that he is attempting to clear away confusion. For Wittgensteinian 
scholarship, the problem of how to understand ‘theory’ is acute because of 
Wittgenstein’s insistence in the PI that ‘we may not advance any kind of theory’ (PI 
109).  
Boase-Beier (2010c:26) argues that a theory of the pavement is necessary to 
walk down a street in icy weather, in order to avoid slipping over in unforeseen 
conditions. A theory of the pavement is in this sense a view of the pavement. Charlie 
Louth (1998:56) uses the term analogously when describing Friedrich Hölderlin’s 
translation of Sophocles from Greek to German: ‘a kind of intense reading … a kind 
of theory in practice, where the root sense of the Greek θεωρία [theôria], a viewing, 
a contemplation, intimates the process’. To be a functional human being involves 
having theories in the sense of having viewpoints, angles we take on things to get us 
through the day. It can be argued that Wittgenstein does write theoretically about 
language, because he inevitably has a viewpoint. Anthony Kenny (2006:126), for 
example, concludes that Wittgenstein’s contention that meaning is use is a theory. 
What Wittgenstein does not do, however, is to offer a theory in the sense of a 
systematisation, in the way that the Marxist theory of history, for example, is a 
systemised view (Marx & Engels, 1970). In Culture and Value (CV) p.26, 
Wittgenstein expresses admiration for Copernicus and Darwin not for discovering 
theories but for providing fertile new points of view. A useful term to introduce here 
is ‘doctrine’, to indicate a formalised teaching of some kind. Thus I could refer to the 
‘Catholic doctrine on the incarnation’, if I wanted to discuss the ontological status 
attributed to Jesus of Nazareth by the magisterium of the Catholic Church within 
systematic theology. In this sense, it is clear that Wittgenstein offers no doctrines; as 
Marie McGinn (2008:10) states, ‘it is a method or style of thought, rather than 
doctrines, that characterises his later philosophy’. McGinn’s view contrasts with 
what some interpreters of Wittgenstein have done with his later work. William 
Lycan (2008:85), for example, presents what he calls the ‘Wittgensteinian “use 
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theory”’ that he places among the theories of language catalogued in his overview, 
such as ‘truth condition theories’ (2008:109). Such an approach fails to take any 
account of Wittgenstein’s insistence throughout the PI that he is not putting forward 
a theory (PI 109), that the task of philosophy is description and not explanation (PI 
126), that the emphasis must always be on the particular case (PI 66) and goes, I 
think, too far, because it aligns Wittgenstein’s insights with very different sorts of 
theory. Wittgenstein (CV p.30) criticises beginning with a preconception of how 
things must be as an example of ‘the dogmatism into which philosophy can so easily 
degenerate’. 
 I follow in addition standard practice in using the term ‘theory’ to categorise 
those phenomena categorised as such in the humanities, which attempt to explain 
other phenomena. Skopos
4
 theory, for example (Reiss & Vermeer, 1984), looks at 
finished translations in the light of the function or functions that they fulfil, so that 
the style of one translation of the Bible might be explained by it being aimed at 
children, whilst another could be explained by it being aimed at an Anglican 
audience etc. The notion of theory will be further examined in Chapter 4 and in the 
Conclusion. 
 Given that I hold that there is no Wittgensteinian doctrine of language to be 
extracted from the PI, my intention is not to offer what I could call a 
‘Wittgensteinian theory of translation’, to be placed alongside skopos theory, 
postcolonial theory, equivalence theory etc. on courses in translation studies. My aim 
is to show how a reading of Wittgenstein may be of benefit to the translation theorist 
and to the practising translator. There will be no set of instructions in the Conclusion 
about how to translate, although I do believe that there are Wittgensteinian 
approaches to translating, just as there are Wittgensteinian approaches to philosophy. 
I am not referring to a methodology, but to a set of methods: ‘There is not a single 
philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, different therapies, as it 
were’ (PI 133). 
 I note, as I read what I have written, that I have made many statements in the 
first person singular, making no attempt to keep myself out of the argument, in a way 
that is very different from educational research that I carried out for the University of 
Leicester between 1997-1999 as a reflective practitioner of education, when I was 
                                                 
4
 Greek: ‘purpose’.  
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advised to write in the third person impersonal singular at all times in order to 
maintain objectivity. Ten years later I am influenced by the assertion of Mona Baker 
(2008:xiii) that research ‘now firmly acknowledges and engages with the role of the 
researcher’s subjectivity in shaping the course and outcome of research’. Here 
Wittgenstein is a model: the first person singular is used frequently in the PI, at 
times in dialogue with an imagined reader, as in text (3) (PI 35), which is quoted by 
way of an illustration of a method that is reminiscent of the dialogue approach used 
by Plato, and that begins with a question from an interlocutor, who is perhaps the 
reader or perhaps the early Wittgenstein. 
 
(3) 
 
Can I say ‘bububu’ and mean ‘If it doesn’t rain, I shall go for a walk?’ – It is only in 
a language that I can mean something by something. This shows clearly that the 
grammar of ‘to mean’ does not resemble that of the expression ‘to imagine’ and the 
like. 
  
 
Philosophy is a dialogical undertaking for Wittgenstein. Research in translation 
studies can also be dialogical, and there is indeed a trend of bringing the researcher 
into the research. Paschalis Nikolaou and Maria-Venetia Kyritsi (2008:7) refer to this 
as the ‘inward turn’ in the discipline, which involves ‘theorists themselves 
embarking on more personal journeys of self-discovery’.  
 In this thesis, I shall be in dialogue with both Wittgenstein and my reader, 
and the overall result will be part of a personal journey of self-discovery, which is 
why examples used will include my own translations of Mörike (in 3.5.2) written 
specially for this thesis.  
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 1.4 The later Wittgenstein 
 In their book on understanding philosophy through jokes (2007:136), 
Thomas Cathcart and Daniel Klein reproduce a cartoon in which an annoyed man is 
making this comment to an annoyed woman: ‘I never said, “I love you”. I said, “I 
love ya”. Big difference.’ Cathcart and Klein (2007:137) interpret this scene as 
Wittgenstein talking to a more traditional philosopher, who finds the expressions ‘I 
love you’ and ‘I love ya’ equivalent. Wittgenstein corrects her by explaining how the 
meaning of a word is determined by its use, so that, because the two expressions in 
question are used differently, they have ‘very different social implications’: ‘I love 
ya’ is a declaration of affection at best, not of love, despite the dictionary meaning of 
the words ‘I love ya’ being the same as ‘I love you’. Here, in a vignette, is the 
essence of the later Wittgenstein (cf. PI 43).  
 Introducing Wittgenstein’s philosophy through a joke is appropriate, for he 
once said that ‘a serious and good philosophical work could be written in jokes 
(without being facetious)’ (Malcolm, 1958:27). It can be said to be in the spirit of 
Wittgenstein. Monk (2002:11) asserts that literature on Wittgenstein often fails 
because it misses the spirit in which Wittgenstein wrote, a spirit that Monk defines as 
the linking of the search to become a decent person with the search for clarity, as 
epitomised in the story of Russell asking Wittgenstein whether he was thinking of 
logic or of his sins and receiving the answer that Wittgenstein was thinking about 
both (2002:14). Eagleton (2008) similarly seeks to capture the idiosyncratic nature of 
Wittgenstein’s thought by describing him as ‘an arresting combination of monk, 
mystic and mechanic … a high European intellectual who yearned for a Tolstoyan 
holiness and simplicity of life, a philosophical giant with scant respect for 
philosophy’. In what follows, I make numerous biographical references to 
Wittgenstein, following Monk’s philosophical biography (1990). 
As mentioned in 1.3, Wittgenstein in the PI is often in dialogue, arguably 
with his younger self, the author of the 1921 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TL-P), 
a book that stands in continuity with work done in formal logic by his Cambridge 
mentor Russell (Russell & Whitehead, 1927). The TL-P and the PI represent the 
work of the early Wittgenstein and the later Wittgenstein respectively. So different 
are the approaches of the two works (Crary & Read, 2000) that it can easily seem 
that there are two philosophers of the same name. There is controversy about how far 
any continuity can be asserted between the early and the later work, with self-styled 
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New Wittgensteinian philosophers such as Alice Crary and Read (2000) asserting 
that there is no break, in contrast to what Guy Kahane, Edward Kanterian and Oskari 
Kuusela (2007:2) call the orthodox interpretation, as exemplified by Hacker (2004), 
which treats the later and the early work separately. I avoid this controversy by 
concentrating on the PI, with reference to other later writings, but my sympathy lies 
with the orthodox interpretation, based on the reference by Wittgenstein (PI p.4) to 
the ‘grave mistakes’ made in the TL-P. There seems to be no reason not to take him 
at his word here. As Hans-Johann Glock (2008:46) comments: ‘In Wittgenstein’s 
case … we have two powerful philosophical visions, distinct and self-contained, 
except that the later work evolves partly out of sharp and explicit criticisms of the 
early work’. It is accordingly necessary to give some attention to the TL-P in order 
fully to understand the PI. 
 Central to the TL-P is Wittgenstein’s aim of constructing a theory of how 
language pictures the world, for example, remarks 2.1 and 2.161, quoted as (4) and 
(5) respectively. 
 
(4) 
We make to ourselves pictures of facts. 
 
(5) 
 
In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the 
one can be a picture of the other at all. 
 
 
 
In Notebooks 1914-1916 (NB) p.7, Wittgenstein refers to a report he had read in a 
magazine of a French lawsuit about a road accident while working on the T-LP, in 
which a model had been used in court to represent what had happened, a toy car 
representing a real car, dolls representing people etc. The picture theory of language 
(NB p.55) maintains that we similarly form pictures that correspond to possible states 
of affairs, so that propositions are atomic and foundational. 
The picture theory implies that translation is a mechanical process, e.g. TL-P 
3.343: ‘Definitions are rules for the translation of one language into another. Every 
correct symbolism must be translatable into every other according to such rules. It is 
this which all have in common’. Such a mechanical view of translation follows from 
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the book’s concern with logical symbolism, the way that ordinary language 
sentences can be given symbolic form through propositional calculus, to which truth 
values can be applied. Thus, following the picture theory of language, the sentence in 
(6) can be rendered as (7), where A stands for ‘Anna is in the house’, B stands for 
‘Ben has eaten her shoes’ and C stands for ‘Chris has taken Ben for a walk’, while 
the logical constants ‘-’, ‘v’ and ‘&’ represent ‘not’, ‘or’ and ‘and’ respectively 
(following Copi & Cohen, 1994).  
  
 (6) 
 Either Anna is not in the house or else Ben has eaten her shoes and Chris has  
taken him for a walk. 
 
(7) 
 
-A v (B&C) 
 
 
 
Similarly, the meaning of the constant ‘v’ can be defined by the truth table in (8), 
using ‘T’ to signify ‘true’ and ‘F’ to signify ‘false’. The table shows that the only 
situation in which the relation (p v q) can be false is when both p and q are false. 
(The symbol ‘v’ is understood to be inclusive, i.e. to signify ‘either … or … or 
both’.) 
 
 
(8)  
 
p v q 
 
T T T 
T T F 
F T T 
F F F 
 
 
If (6) translates into (7), it ought to be possible to translate (7) into, say, German, 
without too much trouble, for we have discovered an ideal way of mapping language 
(Glock, 2008:39). For the early Wittgenstein, ‘I love you’ and ‘I love ya’ would be 
the same proposition.  
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 The work of the later Wittgenstein tells a different story about language and 
it is this story that is relevant to the theory and practice of translation. The approach 
of the later work is foreshadowed in the second and final book Wittgenstein 
published in his lifetime, the 1926 Wörterbuch für Volksschulen (WFV) (‘Dictionary 
for Elementary Schools’), which he designed to facilitate independent learning by 
providing a reference work for Austrian pupils who needed to check the spelling of a 
word. Most items accordingly appear without definition, so that the text has the 
appearance of a vocabulary list. The choice of words is governed by pragmatic 
considerations. In his Preface
5
 (WFV p.XXXIII), Wittgenstein stresses that he did not 
include many good German words because they were not current in Austria, e.g. 
abgefeimt (‘cunning’). Similarly, dialectal items that are part of the educated 
language are included: an example he gives is Häferl, which he defines by the High 
German synonym Töpfchen (‘little pot’). The ordering of words in the WFV is 
similarly pragmatic, so that strict alphabetical order is not always followed, as in (9) 
(WFV p.1). To avoid giving Wittgenstein’s text the appearance of a bilingual 
dictionary, I gloss it separately, in (10).  
 
(9)  
 
       alt,  älter,  am ältesten, ältlich,  das Alter, altern 
der  Altar, Altäre 
das  Altertum, -tümer, altertümlich 
(10)  
       alt,  älter,  am ältesten, ältlich,  das Alter, altern 
       old  older  oldest           elderly  the age    to-age 
der  Altar, Altäre 
the  altar    altars 
das Altertum, -tümer, altertümlich 
the  antiquity   -ties      ancient    
 
 
Here, as Wittgenstein comments (WFV p.XXXIV), the noun das Alter (‘the age’) is 
placed before der Altar (‘the altar’) to make it easier for pupils to look up the word, 
by placing it on the same line as the root adjective alt (‘old’), even though this puts it 
out of alphabetical order: ‘each instance of clinging to a dogmatic principle tends to 
                                                 
5
 Omitted in the 1926 edition but included in the second edition of 1977, aimed at Wittgenstein 
scholars. 
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an arrangement that does not suit our purpose and has to be abandoned’. The 
dictionary is an example of the abandonment of doctrine that characterises 
Wittgenstein’s later work. It is also the work of an educator. Wittgenstein’s time in 
the classroom should be remembered when reading the PI, just as his training as an 
engineer may explain the mechanical view of translation taken by the T-LP.  
 Wittgenstein, who had abandoned philosophy for teaching after the First 
World War, returned in 1929 to Cambridge and to academic philosophy, convinced 
that he had been mistaken to believe that he had solved the problems of philosophy 
in the TL-P. He had come to realise in dialogue with the philosopher of mathematics 
Frank Ramsey that certain propositions are mutually exclusive. A point in a visual 
field that is red cannot also be yellow, and this is because of the laws of physics 
rather than the laws of logic. This simple realisation destroyed the whole crystalline 
purity of logic for Wittgenstein. In PI 107, he describes the world of the TL-P as one 
of ice, where there was no friction and where consequently it was easy to fall; the 
new work would represent a move ‘to the rough ground’, where walking is difficult 
but at least possible. To give an example of the limitations of the approach of the T-
LP, the sentence in (11) admits of two radically different readings.
 6
 
 
(11) 
I saw her duck under the table.  
 
Did the narrator watch as a female dived beneath the table or did the narrator observe 
a female’s pet bird beneath the table? In the first reading, ‘her’ is a possessive 
adjective and ‘duck’ is a noun. In the second, ‘her’ is a direct object and ‘duck’ is a 
verb. The context is crucial. Without knowing the context, it is not possible to offer a 
single translation into, say, German, nor a satisfactory symbolisation. 
 The PI is a very unusual book. It proceeds in numbered paragraphs, referred 
to by Wittgenstein (PI p.3) as ‘philosophical remarks’, without chapters and without 
titles or headings. Paragraphs may or may not be related to what has immediately 
gone before. Topics come and go and return. Questions are raised but not answered. 
In contrast to the TL-P, the PI has an approach that Monk (1990:261) characterises 
                                                 
6
 Thanks to David Cockburn for this example. 
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as ‘anthropological’, in the sense that it is set in the world of people, using examples, 
stories, dialogue, concrete instances of the use of words: the ‘stream of life which 
gives linguistic utterances their meaning’. Symbolism and truth tables are absent: the 
PI, unlike the TL-P, is not the work of Russell’s successor. Whereas the anecdote of 
the modelled accident is held to have inspired the TL-P, a gesture by the Italian 
economist Piero Sraffa is similarly held to have instigated the new approach. Sraffa 
had brushed his chin with his fingertips (a Neapolitan sign of dismissal) and asked: 
‘What is the logical form of that?’ For Wittgenstein this was a revelation: 
communication depends on many phenomena – such as body language, tone of 
voice, context etc. – that cannot be pictured by propositional calculus. An entirely 
new approach to philosophy was the result. 
 Wittgenstein (PI p.3) writes of how the nature of his philosophical 
investigations ‘compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wide field of 
thought’, so that the book ‘is really only an album’. The style of the PI is essential to 
Wittgenstein’s purpose and has evoked ‘both high praise and widespread alarm’ 
because of its confessional nature (Cavell, 2000:55). It is the nearest thing possible 
to sitting in a tutorial with Wittgenstein and it makes great demands on its reader, not 
least because Wittgenstein is clearly struggling with problems and refuses to give 
easy solutions, for example, at one point (PI 153) he states: ‘I am in a muddle’. 
Precisely because of the way the PI is written, it is a dangerous practice to quote 
from it out of context. To use Plato as a counter-example, whilst the Republic, for 
instance, debates a number of issues and allows different points of view to be heard, 
Socrates, the central character, advances definite doctrines at certain points: for 
example, the view that society should be ruled by philosopher-kings (471 ff.); 
individual sentences can be taken from this section to express what Socrates is trying 
to teach about authority. Wittgenstein, by contrast, offers a way of doing philosophy. 
As James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (1993:viii) assert, much of Wittgenstein’s 
later writing ‘appears to exemplify philosophy conceived as an unceasing activity 
rather than the elaboration of a doctrine’. Perhaps the importance of the style is 
another reason why Wittgenstein has been read by poets and novelists. Cavell 
(2001:250) maintains that the style of the PI is not ornamental but essential, as there 
is no ‘aesthetic concern of the text that is separate from its central work’, so that the 
reader needs to make a matching aesthetic effort in order to understand the book. 
The later work of Wittgenstein accordingly has more affinity with the Vienna in 
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which Wittgenstein grew up, of the dramatist Johann Nestroy and the literary satirist 
Karl Kraus, than it has with the Cambridge of the logician Russell, which is the 
conclusion of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin in Wittgenstein’s Vienna (1973). As 
Beth Savickey (1999:35) asserts, it is possible to see Wittgenstein’s later writings 
beginning where Kraus’s writings leave off, in the stress on how language is used in 
everyday life. 
Does the PI, then, offer a different theory of language from the TL-P? It 
offers no theory at all, which, as McGinn (1997:31) comments, makes the work both 
difficult to understand and difficult to write about, so that my own discussion of 
Wittgenstein’s thinking in the PI will be developed throughout the thesis rather than 
being summed up here in the Introduction. In Cambridge lectures given after 1926 
when he was at work on what would become the PI, Wittgenstein constantly stressed 
to his students that he was not offering a philosophical theory but rather the means to 
escape from theory. The distinction between saying and showing that was made in 
the TL-P is taken to its logical conclusion. The PI does not tell the reader anything. It 
shows.
7
 
It is a book that offers therapy to its reader, the same sort of therapy that 
Wittgenstein had gone through since realising that the TL-P was flawed. There is 
keen debate about how central the therapy is in the PI. Crary (2000a) sees it as 
essential, and reads Wittgenstein as not putting forward any point of view, but as 
expressing nonsense in order to make the reader realise that he or she is expressing 
nonsense. Hacker (2007b), on the other hand, sees therapy as an aspect of 
Wittgenstein’s style, which I also find to be the case. The orthodox interpretation of 
Hacker and others (Kahane et al., 2007:2) allows the reader to engage with the views 
put forward by Wittgenstein, rather than being a passive recipient of treatment. 
Three analogies can illustrate the therapeutic aspect. Wittgenstein’s approach 
firstly resembles the psychoanalytic approach of Sigmund Freud (1999), which aims 
to show the patient exactly what is going on in his or her mind, as a means to the end 
of curing neurosis or psychosis. Secondly, it is like the approach of the Jesus 
presented by the synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark and Luke), whom Don Cupitt 
and Peter Armstrong (1977:66) describe as not promoting a metaphysic but as using 
language in such a way that the hearer is brought to an understanding of his or her 
                                                 
7
 Such an approach is often seen as fundamental to the art of storytelling (Benjamin, 1999:89). 
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real situation: ‘The reader has understood his teaching when he has been changed by 
it’. A third analogy comes from considering Wittgenstein’s style of writing in the PI, 
as described in CV p.28: ‘philosophy ought really to be written only as one writes a 
poem’. The analogy is that of the poet, who makes the reader work hard to meet him 
or her halfway. Poems tend to inspire a variety of readings, because like stories they 
show rather than tell (Mitchell, 1992:56), which may explain why there are so many 
radically different readings of Wittgenstein (Kahane et al., 2007). To translate 
Wittgenstein would similarly involve translating him as if he were a poet. Venuti 
(1998:107) comments that this is the approach of Anscombe in her rendering of the 
PI, which will be discussed in 3.4. The PI is more reminiscent of the Spiritual 
Exercises of Ignatius Loyola (2005), a sixteenth-century meditation manual, than of 
works by Wittgenstein’s philosophical contemporaries such as the Logical Positivists 
(Ayer, 1990). It is an approach adopted in modern philosophy in the seventeenth 
century by René Descartes in his Meditations (1968) (whom Kerr compares to 
Ignatius, 1998:50). Other modern philosophers who have written in a similar way 
include: Søren Kierkegaard (2004); Georg Lichtenberg (1984); Nietzsche (2001); 
Blaise Pascal (1982). 
There are many other later writings by Wittgenstein now available, which 
address other topics, such as knowledge in On Certainty (OC), or the philosophy of 
mathematics in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM), as well as the 
sort of concerns found in the PI, for example PR. Yet the PI occupies the central 
place in Wittgenstein’s oeuvre. It is the book chiefly studied by philosophy 
undergraduates and that attracts the most commentary among the published work. As 
Klagge and Nordmann (1993:ix) assert: ‘To understand Wittgenstein as he would 
want to be understood, we should focus on the works that come closest to passing 
muster with him’. The PI was the work that he intended to be published after his 
death to represent his later thinking, which had entered philosophical debate 
informally through his Cambridge lectures. Can it be applied to other areas of 
inquiry, such as translation?  
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1.5 Applying Wittgenstein 
 In Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Faust (1972:44), a retelling of the legend 
of the scholar who sells his soul to the devil, Faust undertakes the translation of the 
NT into German, beginning with John 1:1. No source language (SL) is specified by 
Goethe, but in (12) I give the Hellenistic Greek (HG) of the ST, with transliteration 
and gloss.
8
 The usual translation of this sentence into English is, ‘In the beginning 
was the Word’ (cf. New Jerusalem Bible). 
  
(12) 
Ἐν   ἀρχῇ       ἦν   ὁ    λόγος 
En  archê        ên    ho  logos. 
in   beginning was the  word 
 
 
 
Faust, clearly a translator who can see beyond linguistic meaning (defined by Boase-
Beier and Lodge (2003:12-13) as that which is found in a dictionary) renders the 
notoriously difficult Greek word λόγος [logos]9 in three ways before arriving at the 
translation that consoles him, which I give as (13). 
 
 
(13) 
 
Im       Anfang     war die T a t! 
in-the beginning  was the deed 
 
 
He rejects the linguistic meaning – Wort (‘word’) – as well as the more creative 
renderings Sinn (‘sense’) and Kraft (‘power’), settling on Tat (‘deed’), a concept that 
is emblematic of the striving central to Goethe’s dramatic poem, where virtue is 
identified with ceaseless activity, so that it is fitting to identify the Word of God with 
the Deed of God. 
 ‘Im Anfang war die Tat’ (‘In the beginning was the deed’) is quoted by 
Wittgenstein in OC 402
10
 and Monk (1990:579) claims that it can stand as the motto 
not just of OC but of the whole of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, where language is 
                                                 
8
 All NT quotations are from Aland et al. (1968).  
9
 See Green et al. (1992:481-484) for a discussion of the philosophical and religious connotations of 
the term in the first century when John was writing.  
10
 Wittgenstein misquotes Goethe by not highlighting Tat and omitting the exclamation mark. 
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seen as an activity, a practice open to investigation, something that human beings do; 
‘Words are also deeds’ (PI 546). Language is dynamic rather than static, it makes 
things happen, it produces effects in the real world. It has more to do with brushing 
your chin with your hand than with writing a truth table to analyse a proposition. 
Faust is performing, through his translation of John, what Wittgenstein (PI 116) 
identifies as the primary task of the philosopher: to bring back words ‘from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use’. I have accordingly used Goethe’s phrase as the 
motto for this Introduction. How is everyday use to be investigated? 
Wittgenstein (PI 90) remarks: ‘Our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one’. It 
is through the grammatical investigation that the philosopher restores the everyday. 
The grammatical investigation will be analysed further in 2.4 and 4.4, but here an 
example of the method can be given: how Wittgenstein (PI 66 ff.) looks at the 
concept of a game in order to show that there is no metaphysical common 
denominator linking the phenomena that we categorise as games. Any search for one 
runs into difficulties. If (to use my own references) I claim that a game involves a 
team (such as rugby or cricket), then tennis singles does not fit this category. If I 
claim that a game is about winning or losing, then the co-operative board game Star 
Trek: Expeditions has not been included in the definition. If I claim that a game 
needs set rules, then this does not make sense of the child playing a game in which 
he or she makes up the rules as he or she goes along. Wittgenstein uses the concept 
of ‘family resemblance’ to describe games. All games have some feature in common 
with at least one other game, but ‘it would be foolish to say that all these activities 
are part of one supergame’, as Peter Winch (2008:18) comments. The situation is 
therefore analogous to that of a family, where the members share various physical 
characteristics but are not identical. (One member has the same-shaped nose as 
another, but completely different eyes, which are the same colour and shape as those 
of a third family member, etc.) Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigation shows that 
the concept of a game is one with ‘blurred edges’ (PI 71). Confusion is replaced by 
clarity. 
If Wittgenstein is offering philosophy as a tool, a means of solving puzzles 
that does not interfere with the use of language but describes it (PI 124), then it is 
possible to apply this philosophical method to other areas of inquiry, which would 
not be possible with a philosophical theory. The philosopher Charles Taylor, for 
example, expresses a theory when he relates how we live now to the ‘affirmation of 
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ordinary life’ characteristic of the Reformation (1998:211-223). The reader who is 
convinced by Taylor’s argument cannot go out and affirm ordinary life in his or her 
existence by applying Taylor’s theory, because that is to misunderstand what is a 
descriptive project. With Wittgenstein, the situation is different, because the PI, as 
argued in 1.3, does not advance a theory as doctrine. Rather it instantiates a number 
of methods, which can be applied (viewing application as the use of a general 
framework to aid a particular purpose). Grammatical investigations, in 
Wittgenstein’s sense, can form the basis for applying Wittgenstein to fields outside 
philosophy. The procedure can be illustrated through an example from a detective 
story by Arthur Conan Doyle (2005:39), quoted as text (14). The narrator is Doctor 
Watson and the other speaker is the detective Sherlock Holmes. 
 
(14) 
 
‘What is your theory, then, as to these footmarks?’ I asked eagerly, when we had 
regained the lower room once more. 
 
‘My dear Watson, try a little analysis yourself,’ said he, with a touch of impatience. 
‘You know my methods. Apply them, and it will be instructive to compare results.’ 
 
 
If Holmes were to reveal to Watson his own view of the matter, Watson would not 
be able to apply it, although he would be able to do tests to show whether his 
mentor’s theory was sound or not. Holmes is asking Watson to try to look at the 
evidence after the manner of Holmes (considering all possibilities, eliminating the 
impossible, attempting to see things from the point of view of another etc.) in order 
to come up with a theory of his own. 
 In the three examples of applying Wittgenstein I now discuss, changing the 
way we look at things has potentially radical conclusions for the field in question. In 
1.5.1, I describe an episode from Wittgenstein’s life when he was involved in 
medical research, using Monk (1990:449-453), in order to show one specific 
application of Wittgenstein’s methods; in 1.5.2, I examine how Gareth Moore has 
applied Wittgenstein’s methods to theology; in 1.5.3, I look at how Perloff has used 
Wittgenstein to investigate the translatability of poetry. There are many other areas 
in the humanities where Wittgenstein is now being applied, such as: human rights 
(Holt, 1997); law (Patterson, 2004); politics (Lavery & Read, 2009). The three 
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examples used below have been chosen for these reasons: looking at Wittgenstein’s 
life (1.5.1) helps to understand the spirit of his work; theology (1.5.2) is an area in 
which Wittgenstein has been influential; the use of Wittgenstein in translation 
studies (1.5.3) makes a suitable bridge into the main body of the thesis. 
 
1.5.1 Wittgenstein’s work in medical research 
During World War Two, Wittgenstein’s work as a laboratory assistant took 
him to a research unit run by Doctors Grant and Reeve in Newcastle, where he 
played an active role in the investigation of the ‘shock’ from which many 
servicemen were diagnosed as suffering. Reeve would comment later that he was 
influenced by Wittgenstein in two ways: keeping in mind that things are as they are; 
seeking illuminating comparisons to gain such an understanding. These are both 
central themes of the PI: Wittgenstein aims to free his reader from misleading 
pictures by looking at how terms are used in ordinary life, for example, the analysis 
of pain (PI 281 ff.); and he often uses analogies, for example, the investigation of 
games referred to above becomes an illustration of how language works as a whole 
(PI 77). 
The final report issued by the unit asserted that to use the term ‘shock’ at all 
was a misguided strategy, because it was of no practical help as a blanket term. A 
doctor, called to a wounded person who had been diagnosed with shock, might find a 
wide variety of symptoms in that patient. Two patients, who had both been 
diagnosed with shock, might have significantly different symptoms and might need 
different treatments. An interpretation, as opposed to a description, was being made 
about a wounded patient by the doctor doing the initial diagnosis. It would be like 
saying that somebody is suffering from shock and neglecting to mention that he or 
she has a badly cut hand. The situation is reminiscent of the current use of ‘stress’ as 
a term to cover a multitude of problems, ranging from depression to overwork, so 
that ‘stress’ effectively becomes useless as an indicator of what is wrong with an 
individual (Patmore, 2006). 
The conclusions of the report were that what was needed was a clear 
description of a patient’s symptoms and that the term ‘shock’ should be dropped. 
The Medical Research Council’s report for 1939-45, commenting on the unit’s work, 
asserted that it ‘threw grave doubt upon the value of attacking the “shock” problem 
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as if wound “shock” were a single and pathological entity’ (Monk, 1990:452). The 
unit was thus able to turn to detailed observations of injuries sustained in warfare, in 
an attempt to be able to provide clearer diagnoses.  
The Wittgensteinian search for clarity had two practical effects. Firstly, it 
closed down misguided lines of research, in line with the contention of Wittgenstein 
(PI 339) that an inappropriate expression ‘is a sure means of remaining stuck in 
confusion’. Secondly, it opened up more positive paths, in line with the emphasis 
laid by Wittgenstein (PI 115) on ‘the value of the discovery’ that a picture is holding 
us captive, so that better ways forward can be found. The search for clarity, 
involving the rejection of misleading interpretations and the search for correct 
description, can also be seen in those philosophers of religion who look to 
Wittgenstein for inspiration, for example, Moore. 
 
 
1.5.2 Moore’s theological investigations 
In Believing in God (1998), Moore takes what Howard Robinson (2003:353) 
calls a radically Wittgensteinian approach to the existence of God, for he does not 
look at theism as a revealed religion but examines the way in which believers in God 
use language. Moore undertakes a grammatical investigation of God-talk, ‘a sketch 
towards a philosophical understanding of Christianity’ (1998:ix). Of the ten works in 
his bibliography (1998:288), seven are by Wittgenstein, whose methods Moore 
applies throughout the text. His analysis shows how, for example, the propositions 
(15) and (16) (my examples) seem to have the same grammatical form, with the 
pattern of [subject – verb – direct object] in the past tense.  
 
(15) 
Anna made the table. 
(16) 
God made the world. 
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Reflection on the way that these sentences are used, however, shows they are very 
different.
11
 Anna, the subject of (15), is a young woman with a talent for making 
tables. In (16), the term ‘God’ does not refer to a person in the world (even the world 
of the imagination) in the same way, for God is held by theists to be the reason why 
there exists anything at all. Moore (1998:34 ff.) calls this ‘the logical “oddity” of 
God’ and compares God to the term ‘equator’. The equator, most people would say, 
does exist, but not in the way that Anna exists. I can neither touch it nor label it. If I 
see a sign saying ‘EQUATOR’ then what I am seeing is only a sign for the equator, 
not the equator itself. It does, however, make perfect sense to say that I flew over the 
equator, because of the way that the term ‘equator’ is used in the language as a 
whole. Similarly, when I talk of God, my philosophical grammar is different from 
when I talk of Anna, because God is not a person. Theists do not believe that there is 
one more thing in the world than atheists think there is (Moore, 1998:20), which 
means that (16) can be rewritten as (17), which I imagine would be an astonishing 
conclusion for many practising Christians. 
 
(17) 
Nobody made the world. 
 
It reflects the ‘negative way’ found in Christian theology, for example, in Pseudo-
Dionysius (1986), who sees religion as an apophatic stripping of metaphysical 
concepts. It also allows Moore to stress the role of practice in the Christian life 
(1998:35 ff.) in a way that leads back to the practical ethics of the NT and which 
avoids the identification of Christianity with the epistemic. Moore takes the concept 
of serving God, for example, to mean that the Christian should serve nobody, i.e. 
observe a total freedom (1998:133 ff.). 
Moore’s conclusion (1998:287) is that people ‘do not discover religious 
truths, they make them’, which is reminiscent of the position on the philosophy of 
mathematics that Wittgenstein defended against the mathematician Alan Turing in a 
series of Cambridge lectures, Wittgenstein insisting that mathematical truths were 
invented, Turing that they were discovered. Moore’s is a revisionist theology, a 
                                                 
11
 Wittgenstein’s notions of surface and depth grammar – see 2.4 – would be helpful here, but Moore 
does not use them. 
38 
 
consistent if controversial position argued from a grammatical investigation of 
religious language, one which offers the possibility of a non-supernatural religion.  
The same objection can be made to Moore that was made by Ayer (1985:92) 
to the use of Wittgenstein by philosophers of religion: ‘I am not myself a religious 
believer but if I were I doubt if I should be content to be told that I was playing a 
game in accordance with a canonical set of rules. Rather, I should wish for some 
assurance that my beliefs were true.’ For Ayer, applying Wittgenstein to religion is 
an application too far. Ayer’s conception of belief is that it is something that has to 
be ultimately testable. He and Moore effectively refer to different things by the 
concept of faith. Such an objection, whether well-founded or not, cannot be made to 
the application of Wittgenstein to translation: Wittgenstein is (among other things) a 
philosopher of language and translation is (among other things) a linguistic 
undertaking where empirical research is possible.  
An important way in which Moore is Wittgensteinian is that he does not 
constantly refer to Wittgenstein as he writes. Moore moves on from Wittgenstein by 
applying his methods. I am writing an academic thesis, the text-type of which 
demands frequent referencing of the subject of my investigation, i.e. Wittgenstein, 
but it is important to note that Wittgenstein’s aim is for his readers to move beyond 
what he himself wrote. In PI p.4, he asserts: ‘I should not like my writing to spare 
other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to 
thoughts of his own.’ This later position is reminiscent of the way in which at the 
end of the TL-P (6.54) he speaks of the need for the reader to throw away the ladder 
after having climbed it, and the application of Wittgenstein to translation can in its 
turn be a ladder, allowing translation to be seen more clearly and its practice to be 
improved, which are the aims of translation studies according to Venuti (2004:13). 
 
1.5.3 Perloff on Wittgenstein and poetic translatability  
Perloff references PI 215 in the full title of her essay – ‘But isn’t the same at  
least the same?”: Wittgenstein and the question of poetic translatability’ – and I give 
Wittgenstein’s remark as (18), in the revised translation. 
 
 (18) 
 But isn’t at least the same the same? 
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For identity we seem to have an infallible paradigm: namely, in the identity of a 
thing with itself. I feel like saying: ‘Here at any rate there can’t be different 
interpretations. If someone sees a thing, he sees identity too.’ 
 
Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to 
apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things? 
 
 
 
Perloff (2004:34) examines various English translations of the opening line of the 
first of the German Duineser Elegien (Duino Elegies) by Rainer Maria Rilke, finding 
them unsatisfactory and asserting that the poetic is that which cannot be fully 
translated. An analysis follows (2004:35-36) of part of Robert Lowell’s poem 
‘Skunk Hour’ and its German translation by Manuel Pfister. Perloff considers that 
Pfister has lost Lowell’s tone and concludes that translation ‘inevitably involves … 
slippage of meaning, especially in the case of poetry’ (2004:36), though the 
relationship between tone and meaning is not made clear. For those engaged with the 
translation of poetry, this might be a depressing conclusion, reminiscent of Robert 
Frost’s supposed dictum12 that poetry is what is lost in translation, a phrase Perloff 
herself uses (without referencing Frost) when she claims that Rilke’s ‘dense sonic 
network is inevitably lost in translation’ (2004:35). 
 Perloff’s use of Wittgenstein does little to improve matters. David Antin’s 
contention (1998:163) is quoted, that Wittgenstein ‘is not a poet of the German 
language or of the English language; he is a poet of thinking through language … a 
poet of nearly pure cognition’, and Wittgenstein’s own assertion (CV p.24) that his 
philosophy is written as a form of poetic composition is interpreted as Wittgenstein 
aiming to provoke awe in his readers (2004:42), rather than as a comment upon the 
style of his writing. Perloff (2004:37) contrasts denotative language and connotative 
language: the former is used for establishing meaningful propositions, the latter 
exhibits literary features, such as rhythmic or sonic qualities. Denotative language is 
translatable: Perloff refers to Wittgenstein, who in her opinion uses denotative 
language and who has been successfully translated into many languages. 
Connotative language is not translatable, which is why poetry is usually lost in 
translation. Some poems, such as Quelque chose noir (Something Black) by Jacques 
Roubaud do use denotative language, and therefore here the same can be the same. 
                                                 
12
 David Bellos (2011:52) notes that nobody has ever found this phrase in Frost’s work, but that it is 
very commonly used in debates on poetry and translation, with over 15,000 internet references 
recorded in 2011. 
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Rilke cannot be translated, but Roubaud can, for example in the renderings by 
Rosmarie Waldrop that Perloff examines (2004:51). 
 Perloff does make good points about how Wittgenstein may be used for 
translation: she notes, for example, that ‘meaning can only be established by 
studying each word group or sentence in the larger context in which it appears’ 
(2004:52) and I refer in 3.2 to her illuminating comments on Georges Perec and his 
translator Gilbert Adair. Her attempt to apply Wittgenstein, however, seems to me to 
be nothing short of disastrous. Firstly, Perloff’s use of Wittgenstein is chiefly 
confined to the notebook material collected in CV. Use of the PI is minimal. It is 
mentioned but not applied, so that the article becomes an instance of what John 
Searle (Magee, 1987:342) complains about when he notes that ‘most of the 
references to Wittgenstein in fields outside philosophy are really a kind of 
philosophical name-dropping’. There is no problem in referring to CV to expand our 
knowledge of what Wittgenstein thought about his work, but it seems to me to be a 
shaky foundation for a theory of how Wittgenstein’s philosophy relates to poetic 
translatability. Secondly, Perloff’s division of poetry into either the denotative or the 
connotative exhibits the essentialism and the dualism against which Wittgenstein’s 
later work fights (Kerr, 1998). The concept (from Antin) of Wittgenstein being a 
poet of pure cognition is contradicted by the stress in the PI that form and content 
cannot be divorced: in PI 568 meaning is seen as a physiognomy, because thought 
cannot be extracted from the form of life in which it is expressed. Thirdly, Perloff’s 
contention that the translation of poetry inevitably involves slippage must be 
weighed against those translated poems that are held by scholars not to have lost the 
tone of the ST author, even when the ST is written in highly literary language. 
Phyllis Gaffney, for example, analyses renderings of Hopkins into French by Pierre 
Leyris and concludes that Leyris’s translation ‘not only says what the original poem 
says, but does what the original poem does’ (1999:57). And yet this does not mean 
that the same is here the same: ST and TT remain different texts. Close attention to 
PI 215 (which Perloff does not give in full and does not analyse) shows that 
Wittgenstein is questioning the notion of essentialism, the fact that we impose unity 
on phenomena when we ought to be describing them. Perloff begins with the 
conviction that poetry cannot be translated. The need is not to think, but to look, 
which is the topic of Chapter 2. 
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1.6 Conclusions 
Read (2007a:4) stresses that ‘what matters is whether Wittgenstein’s chosen 
methods work … whether we can learn to go on’. In the following chapters, I go on 
by examining the phenomenon of translation, asking how it can be illuminated by 
the story told by Wittgenstein. Chapter 2 examines the reading of the source text 
(ST) for translation; Chapter 3 examines the writing of the target text (TT); Chapter 
4 examines the theorising of the TT. These three aspects reflect the way that a 
translator must deal with a work that is to be translated, such as a novel: the novel is 
read for translation, then translated, finally theorised (for example, by an 
introduction or notes, or by a translation scholar). These stages are not necessarily 
consecutive. A translator will read and re-read constantly while translating and may 
form a view of a text, i.e. a theory, during the process of reading for translation. My 
thesis therefore does not prescribe an order of events, but presents an album where 
many of the considerations on translation will go criss-cross, as Wittgenstein 
describes his project (PI p.4). In this sense at least it will resemble Wittgenstein’s 
later work, with its turn to the rough ground (PI 107). As Wittgenstein (CV p.7) 
notes about his writing: ‘Each of the sentences I write is trying to say the whole 
thing, i.e. the same thing over and over again; it is as though they were all simply 
views of one object seen from different angles’. 
John Kay (2011:176) argues that good decision making is best done 
obliquely, relying on ‘a toolkit of models and narratives rather than any single 
account’. The research question of this thesis is whether Wittgenstein can provide 
such a toolkit of models and narratives. 
I mentioned in 1.4 the different readings of Wittgenstein that are available. In 
‘Translation after Wittgenstein’, I offer my own reading with respect to translation, 
based on extensive reference to the PI. To adapt what Kerr says in Theology after 
Wittgenstein (1998:190): the reader will be immersed in an anthology of 
Wittgenstein’s texts, many of which will stay in the memory, whatever is to happen, 
after Wittgenstein, to the practice of translation. 
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2 READING THE SOURCE TEXT FOR 
TRANSLATION 
     
 
 
 
I’ll teach you differences. 
 
Shakespeare (1972:81) 
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2.1 On not thinking but looking 
Wittgenstein (Teichmann, 2008:1) considered using a quotation from King 
Lear (Shakespeare, 1972:81) as a motto to the PI: ‘I’ll teach you differences’. I have 
chosen to use it as a motto to this chapter – on reading the ST for translation – 
because it illustrates a basic contention of my thesis, i.e. that translation involves 
looking at the features of a literary work and that Wittgenstein can help us to do this. 
He can teach us differences by showing us how to look. In PI 66, in a discussion of 
games in reference to the way we use language to describe phenomena, he offers this 
advice to his reader: ‘don’t think, but look!’ James Guetti (1993:1) argues that the 
reason why Wittgenstein provides a valuable access to literary questions – which 
would include literary translation – is because his philosophy ‘privileges nothing 
above language’. The PI, whilst it has great implications for other issues in 
philosophy (as I discuss in Chapter 3), is primarily an investigation of language. 
 Reading is a linguistic practice, related to the status of the human being as a 
linguistic animal. A dog seems to have emotions, longings, intentions and can be 
happy or sad, but not, as Wittgenstein (PPF 363) notes, either hypocritical or 
sincere. A dog cannot speak and cannot express any regret for past misdemeanours 
or for the fact that the climate of the world is changing. Nor does a dog sit down and 
peruse a novel before dinner. To read a text is to engage in a peculiarly human 
undertaking, an everyday activity that forms part of the stream of life investigated by 
Wittgenstein in his later work. 
 It is trivially true that nobody can translate the ST that he or she has not read. 
Parallel to physical necessity is aesthetic necessity, however, because the translator 
must make decisions in reading about how he or she will render the work. Clive 
Scott (2008:18) asserts that the translator ‘who does not integrate [his/her] reading 
into his/her version of the text is betraying his/her value and destiny as a reader’, 
whilst Michel Deguy (2008) goes as far as to describe his translation of a Seamus 
Heaney poem as a reading of that poem: ‘Pylos: Poème lu par Michel Deguy’ 
(‘Pylos: poem read by Michel Deguy’). In PI 164, Wittgenstein shows how the term 
‘reading’ is used for ‘a family of cases’ so that we are led by the use of the word 
‘reading’ into thinking that the same thing is going on when, say, reading silently or 
reading aloud, whereas very different criteria apply. As Boase-Beier (2006b:24) 
points out, ‘reading for translation’ differs from other types of reading, such as 
reading for pleasure or reading for information: to sit down and read, say, a poem by 
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Goethe with a view to translating it may lead to the translator noting how certain 
aspects of the poem might be maintained in his or her translation, such as an image 
or the rhyme scheme. The formulation of a rendering becomes part of the reading 
process.  
The PI offers a series of exercises that can be used by the literary translator to 
this end. In PI 336, for example, Wittgenstein tells the story of a French politician 
(probably Louis Le Laboureur, 1669:174) who failed to look outside the constraints 
of his own language. The remark is given as (19). 
 
(19) 
[The case when] someone imagines that one could not think a sentence with the 
curious word order of German or Latin just as it stands. One first has to think it, and 
then one arranges the words in that strange order. (A French politician once wrote 
that it was a peculiarity of the French language that in it words occur in the order in 
which one thinks them.) 
 
 
 
A speaker of French may find it ‘curious’ that in German the main verb is in terminal 
position in subordinate clauses. The error here is to fail to realise that what we have 
is a different way of using language, not an encryption of a French pattern. Germans, 
similarly, are surprised that in French the predicative adjective agrees with the 
substantive in gender, which it does not in German (PI 538). The French politician 
has made the error of seeing French as a language that corresponds precisely to the 
language of thought
13
, an essentialist view that fails to note how language is a 
dynamic system that can be used in different ways (Lodge, 1998). Seventeenth-
century French, for example, is very different from the French of the Middle Ages. 
Wittgenstein satirises the view that French is the norm, i.e. the one and only 
language in which it is not necessary first to think the words and then to arrange 
them into the curious word order of the language in question. That in the end 
Wittgenstein chose to preface the PI with a motto from the satirist Nestroy is a clue 
that satire is one of his intentions (PI p.2).
14
 To adopt the French politician’s view of 
languages would be to adopt a theory of language that is far too complicated. It is 
hard to believe that Goethe, say, first thought some words and then re-arranged them 
                                                 
13
 See Carruthers (2006) for an account of the language of thought. 
14
 The significance of the motto is further discussed in 5.3. 
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mentally according to a number of pre-given rules before speaking them or writing 
them. Through this story Wittgenstein portrays the tendency that human beings have 
to see linguistic matters wrongly. German is not a faulty version of French, but a 
different language. The point seems a trivial one, but corrects a tendency in how we 
think. An example from literary translation can show how Wittgenstein’s point 
matters.  
Helen Lowe-Porter, the first translator of Thomas Mann’s German novels 
into English, believed that the way that Mann wrote German was because of the 
nature of the German language, rather than because of any particular stylistic genius 
on his part: for example, she refers to the way that German has longer sentences than 
English, which must therefore be broken up in English translation so as ‘not to 
produce clumsy English’ (Thirlwell, 1966:199), failing to see that Mann’s long 
sentences were a result of choice, and that it is possible to imitate such long 
sentences in English. Anthea Bell (2011:213), for example, describes how she 
maintains a sentence of nine pages in her translation of a Sebald text, in order to 
preserve the way the sentence conveys the mindless haste of a concentration camp 
being given the appearance of a holiday camp. Lowe-Porter’s view, which parallels 
that attributed by Wittgenstein to the French politician, may help to explain why her 
translations have been criticised for failing to represent Mann’s style (Gledhill, 
2007:57). 
It is necessary to look at how speakers and writers choose to speak or to 
write, rather than to begin with a theory of how language directs its speakers, and it 
is the possibility of choosing to work creatively with language that makes literature 
possible (Boase-Beier, 2006b:1). In Zettel
15
 (Z) 160, Wittgenstein remarks that a 
poem is not about giving information, even though it appears to be written in the 
language of giving information, which is an important lesson to learn. As Severin 
Schroeder (2001:210) notes, much twentieth-century literary theory, such as Marxist 
theory, has been ruled by the view that what matters in a work of literature is the 
message that it is intended to convey, which misrepresents the literary work. A 
reading of Wittgenstein shows why the trend to look for information has been so 
dominant: we mistake what goes on in certain cases for what must go on in all cases. 
Thus, we note that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1970), for example, use the 
                                                 
15
 German: Fragments. 
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language of information to set out their critique of other Young Hegelians, and we 
(correctly) view their book as a polemical exercise in conveying this message. We 
then assume that a poem must similarly fulfil an informative function and fail to note 
that there is a difference. Derek Attridge
16
 (2004:26) argues against the tendency by 
stating that a literary work does not have a function. In Wittgensteinian terms, a 
poem (and by implication other literary works) is not about conveying information. 
It is wrong-headed to sit down to read, say, one of Shakespeare’s histories to learn 
about English history. Attridge uses the concept of the ‘singularity’ of literature to 
describe this lack of function. From the point of view of literary translation, it is 
crucial to see the literary text as literary. Attridge (2004:96) argues that it is possible 
to read George Eliot’s novel Middlemarch, an established text in the canon of 
English Literature, as fiction ‘without at the same time reading it as literature’, 
although it is not possible to read it as literature without reading it as fiction. To read 
Middlemarch as fiction would involve, perhaps, following the story to see what 
happens to the characters; whereas to read it as literature might involve responding 
to the style (as further discussed below). Two translators, both competent linguists, 
might both translate Eliot’s novel into the same TL. In one case, where Middlemarch 
has not been read as literature, the TT is unlikely to be a literary translation; in the 
second case, where it has been read as literature, it may be a literary translation (as 
further discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). 
Thus Wittgenstein (PI 531) can speak of understanding a sentence in terms of 
replacement but points out that such an understanding does not apply to the literary. 
The remark is given as (20).  
 
(20) 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by 
another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by 
any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.) 
 
In the one case, the thought in the sentence is what is common to different 
sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these 
positions. (Understanding a poem.) 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Attridge (2004:143) states that his views are influenced by his reading of the later Wittgenstein. 
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In the four examples
17
 (21)-(24), various replacements can be made in terms of 
getting a point over. 
 
 
(21) 
I can walk. 
(22) 
I am able to walk. 
(23) 
I have recovered from the operation on my legs. 
(24) 
I don’t want a lift, thank you. 
 
The imagined context is a speaker recently recovered from an operation on her legs, 
and who can replace (21) with (22) in order to communicate this fact. If offered a 
lift, which she does not want, she could use any of the four statements to convey her 
meaning. In other contexts, such as being asked by a visitor how she is, it would 
make no sense to replace (21) by (24), however. Replacement here is context-
dependent, but it can be satisfactorily made. The situation is without clear 
boundaries. However, the two lines from the sonnet ‘The Windhover’ by Hopkins 
(1985:30), given as (25) cannot be replaced by the text I have written as (26), not 
because (26) does not represent the content of (25), but for the same reason why one 
theme by Ludwig van Beethoven cannot be replaced by another. 
 
(25) 
 I caught this morning morning’s minion, king- 
       dom of daylight’s dauphin, dapple-dawn-drawn falcon … 
 
(26) 
 This morning I saw a falcon announcing day, 
       silhouetted against the patchy sky of dawn. 
                                                 
17
 Thanks to Marie McGinn for these examples. 
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It cannot be replaced at all; otherwise a different event would take place, such as 
explicating the poem to a student. The work of art, as Wittgenstein stresses, ‘does 
not aim to convey something else, just itself’ (CV p.67). To replace (25) with (26) is 
a replacement too far. 
 (Such a position raises the question of whether it is possible to replace a 
literary text with a translation, which I discuss in 5.2. For the moment I note 
Wittgenstein’s comment in Z 155 that a poet’s words ‘can pierce us’ because of ‘the 
use that they have in our life’, which suggests that to replace the ST by its TT would 
mean preserving the use it has in our life. If I substitute one theme by Beethoven for 
another, I have changed the use, just as if I substitute one poem by Shakespeare for 
another. But, given that I do not speak Russian, the only way in which I can use a 
Russian poem in my life will be through a translation. How this might be done is the 
subject of Chapter 3.) 
If I read Goethe’s Faust (1972) as a warning not to sell my soul to the devil, 
then I miss the point, even though this work is about a man who sells his soul to the 
devil with disastrous consequences. The literary work cannot be divided arbitrarily 
into content and form, something shown by the depiction by Raymond Queneau 
(1947) of an incident on a bus in ninety-nine different styles, ranging from 
Alexandrines to an official letter. Matt Madden, discussing his own graphic imitation 
of Queneau, in which a domestic story is told in ninety-nine different drawings, 
concludes that the debate needs to be moved away from the eternal battle between 
form and content or style and substance to a new model: ‘form as content, and 
substance inseparable from style’ (2006:1). Wittgenstein (PI 568) asserts that 
meaning is ‘a physiognomy’. If I want to know what somebody is feeling, then it is a 
good idea to look at his or her face. David Cockburn (2009:128) notes how much ‘of 
what we learn about others we learn through their emotional expression’. If I want to 
know what a Hopkins sonnet means, then I similarly need to look at its 
physiognomy. Thus the poetry of Hopkins differs markedly in style from that of 
G.K. Chesterton (1994), although both poets share the same Catholic ideology. The 
physiognomies, i.e. the styles, differ. I need to learn how to read them. 
 Wittgenstein sees reading as a set of practices that can be taught, in 
accordance with the general contention of the PI that the mastery of a language is the 
mastery of a technique (PI 199). Eagleton (2007) devotes a whole book to how to 
read a poem, stressing that reading a poem is an art, like ‘thatching or clog-dancing’ 
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(2007:1), and Schulte (2004:156) notes, in an essay on a how a reading of 
Wittgenstein can deepen an appreciation of poetry, that the fact ‘that one can take 
trouble to get the tone exactly right shows that there is something one can try to do 
well, something which one may fail to do well’, which suggests that getting it right is 
something that can be learned. Instead of seeing a series of lines that are 
unconventionally aligned when I look at The Windhover, I may come to see a poem. 
It remains of course true that many poems are left-aligned. Students need to learn 
that this is only a part of what they are: as Eagleton (2007:3) asserts, it is not the case 
that the computer got stuck. Wittgenstein notes (PI 156) how the verb ‘read’ is 
applied differently in the case of the beginner and what he calls the ‘practised 
reader’: there has been a change in behaviour.  
Wittgenstein can therefore be used in the training of literary translators. 
Boase-Beier (1998), addressing how literary translators can be trained, stipulates that 
attention must be placed on the way in which literary translators read the ST and not 
on the way in which they translate. She concludes (1998:41): ‘What training of 
translators involves is showing them how language works, above all how literary 
language works, so that in any individual case they will have at their disposal the 
means for understanding how the particular text works’. Her method, which is seen 
in the course structure of the MA in Literary Translation at UEA (2010:np), is to 
offer students training in stylistics. Not only would Wittgenstein offer support for 
such a stylistic approach to translation – in CV p.80, he analogously stresses that to 
learn how to appreciate music begins with learning how music works – but the PI 
forms a set of exercises on the understanding of how language works that students 
could work through. To read one of its stories, such as the builders who 
communicate using only four words (PI 2 ff.), is to be invited to see language in a 
different way and to deepen one’s understanding of it, hence illumining the reading 
for translation of the ST. In his dramatisation of Wittgenstein’s builders, Stoppard 
(1980:74) has one of the characters realise that language is caught and not taught, for 
example. 
 Human beings bring many preconceptions to the understanding of what goes 
on in reading. If I pick up a piece of paper covered in symbols and read an account 
written by somebody whom I have never met, detailing events of which I could have 
had no prior knowledge, then this appears to be very like breaking a code, and the 
code model of communication, defined by Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson (1995:2) 
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as the belief that ‘communication is achieved by encoding and decoding messages’, 
has been very influential in views on reading. It was held by Roman Jakobson 
(1959), for example, and seems to represent a natural way of viewing language: to 
read (or to listen, or to translate) is to decode. The young Jude, in Thomas Hardy’s 
Jude the Obscure (2007), has such a code model in his head when he forms the 
desire to learn Latin and Greek, a task that seems to him to be straightforward: ‘He 
concluded that a grammar of the required tongue would contain, primarily, a rule, a 
prescription, or clue of the nature of a secret cipher, which, once known, would 
enable him, by merely applying it, to change at will all words of his own speech into 
those of the foreign one’ (2007:28). Jude’s ‘childish idea’ is to assume that there is a 
‘law of transmutation’ (2007:29) and he is devastated to learn that this is not so and 
that he will have to learn the necessary vocabulary and grammar. 
Jude has a false picture of language. He is freed from it by his research into 
the classics, but his idea remains emblematic of the human tendency to see meaning 
in terms of cryptography, by which the reader with a key can crack the code and can 
find the solution to what was formerly unintelligible (Piper & Murphy, 2002:2). 
Language certainly does have a code aspect: to teach a child to read English, it 
would be necessary to show how certain letters relate to certain sounds, for example, 
so that the letter ‘b’ at the beginning of a word is the signal for a bilabial voiced 
plosive, as in ‘Ben’ or ‘butter’. But, as Sperber and Wilson (1995:2) argue, a code 
model is not sufficient to explain human communication, for it ignores context. To 
use Wittgenstein’s own encoded notebooks as an example: there is only one correct 
way of decoding these, but different ways of understanding them (Monk, 1990:581-
586). Sperber and Wilson (1995:2) suggest combining the code model with the 
‘inferential model’, which holds that ‘communication is achieved by producing and 
interpreting evidence’. Decoding may be a necessary condition of communication, 
but it is not a sufficient one. To decode a word is possible in the sense of knowing 
how to pronounce it or spell it or look it up in a dictionary, but decoding is only 
about intension. Meaning, as Sperber and Wilson stress, has an extensional aspect 
and this is where the reading of Wittgenstein is of profit to the translator, because it 
is a philosophical investigation that broadens our understanding of meaning: we stop 
looking at language as a code, as a calculus, as a denotation, and see that it is a 
human practice, which parallels the Wittgensteinian approach to language. 
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The code model is not held by contemporary linguists, though writers who 
did use it, such as Jakobson, still have an influence on contemporary work. It might 
therefore seem that to turn to Wittgenstein as a way of freeing oneself from the code 
model is to use the philosopher to fight against a straw man. This is not the case, 
however, because to see language as a calculus is a psychological rather than a 
logical compulsion (Bellos, 2011:258), a point made by Wittgenstein in PI 140, and 
the compulsion has not gone away because of developments in linguistics. Modern 
manuals on translation therefore still find it necessary to point out to their readers 
that translation is not about decoding. Douglas Robinson (2003:148), for example, 
states: ‘What we do not do is sit down with a comprehensive set of rules for 
linguistic equivalence and create a text that conforms to them. That is the image 
projected by traditional linguists when they have studied translation; the image does 
not correspond to reality’. The code model lives on as a cognitive tendency that must 
be resisted. It is alive and well in current writings on literary translation. Franck 
Miroux, for example, makes the following assertions in an inquiry into verse 
translation: that poetry relies on a ‘highly codified language’ (2010:97); that ‘poetry 
and prose rely on different codes’ (2010:98); that decoding and recoding is one 
possible option for the translator of poetry (2010:100). From a Wittgensteinian point 
of view, this represents a failure in how literature is to be read. It is not that the 
decoding model is a possible one that can be rejected as part of a strategy, but that 
the decoding model is wrong per se, by being too narrow and by failing to do justice 
to what people can do with language. Robinson, following Wittgenstein, stresses that 
translators ‘don’t translate words; they translate what people do with words’ 
(2003:142). The PI is a set of exercises that can lead a translator to this conclusion. 
Again and again Wittgenstein shows our tendency to see language as a code. Again 
and again he seeks to undermine this tendency, through sustained use of parables, 
stories, dialogues, analogies etc. in order to change his reader’s way of thinking, by 
encouraging his reader to look. 
My thesis is concerned with the translation of literature, the reading of which 
must also be about more than cryptography. To describe a reading of the long 
fantasy epic The Lord of the Rings by J. R.R. Tolkien (1968), for example, as an act 
of decoding misses the point. If a reader were to decode the text as a synopsis of 
twenty pages and give this to a friend to read, then the friend is missing out on 
something. Such a synopsis might be of use to those who wanted to see the film or 
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who were tired of being left out when in the company of Tolkien fanatics, but for the 
enthusiastic reader of the book, its length is actually an advantage. Readers of 
Tolkien exult in the words in their hands. Rob Pope (2005:137), writing about 
creation myths, stresses that ‘it is never sufficient merely to “decode” a myth, as 
though it has some “message” embedded within that is simply waiting to be 
extracted’. His point holds, I think, for all literature, and it is therefore worth looking 
at the functions of literature within human life. 
Literature is not generally read to gain information (Pilkington 2000:161). 
Somebody who wants to learn about a certain period in history would usually be 
better advised to read a work of history than a historical play.
18
 Many people read for 
entertainment or diversion. A glance at an airport bookshop shows the continued 
popularity of the so-called ‘airport novel’, designed to help passengers overcome the 
fear of flying by offering them lengthy stories about danger and sex. Such novels do 
not often make it into the literary canon, the body of texts studied as literature (for 
example, by students taking university courses). For the purpose of this thesis, I hold 
only those texts to be literary that exhibit literariness, defined by Eagleton (2007:48), 
following the Russian formalists, as ‘language which is peculiarly conscious of 
itself: that has been “made strange”, so that it becomes newly perceptible to the 
reader or listener’. Eagleton stresses how such ‘foregrounding’ is not restricted to 
literary works such as novels and can be found in tabloid headlines as well as in the 
works of George Orwell. The headline for page one of the Daily Mirror of 23 June 
2009, for example, is given as (27). 
 
(27) 
OUT OF JORDER 
 
The subsequent article describes offensive behaviour by the model and novelist 
Jordan (Katie Price). The headline signals this behaviour by blending her name with 
the noun ‘order’ to form the neologism ‘JORDER’, whilst the phase ‘OUT OF 
JORDER’ mirrors the phrase ‘out of order’, an expression that was formerly used 
only of malfunctioning machines but that in contemporary use can designate a 
                                                 
18
 Historians may turn to literature for information about an era, of course. 
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person behaving badly. The anonymous writer of this headline is trying to do more 
than simply impart information about Jordan’s behaviour: by coining a phrase that is 
unique to her, the writer also satirises Jordan and indicates that this is abnormal 
behaviour for her. It is an example of literary language, even if not constitutive of a 
literary text. Literariness is a necessary condition for the literary, if not a sufficient 
one (Attridge, 2004). Texts seen as literary similarly ask us to attend to the manner 
of their telling, as asserted by John Mullan (2011), who views Wolf Hall by Hilary 
Mantel as a literary novel because of the way in which it is told. 
In view of recent developments in cognitive theory, Eagleton’s definition of 
literariness in terms of literary language can be extended to include the effects that 
such language has on the reader. Adrian Pilkington (2000:189) concludes that 
literariness can be defined ‘in terms of cognitive events triggered in minds/brains by 
linguistic stimuli’. The question for the critic or the translator then arises of how 
literary authors are able to write in such a way – for example, by using the sort of 
foregrounded language that Eagleton describes – as to trigger these poetic effects. 
The temptation is to give in to what Susan Sontag (1996:653) calls ‘the odd vision 
by which something we have learned to call “form” is separated off from something 
we have learned to call “content”’. Eagleton (2007:2) makes this point about poetry, 
but it holds for all language that exhibits literariness: ‘People sometimes talk about 
digging out the ideas “behind” the poem’s language, but this spatial metaphor is 
misleading … the language of the poem is constitutive of its ideas.’ A poem is not a 
translation from some language of ideas that exists in spiritual purity like one of the 
Platonic forms and happens to have been instantiated in a particular set of verses, 
even though there seems to be a natural tendency to believe that this is the case, as 
Wittgenstein shows. This topic is further discussed in 3.1. 
Eagleton (2007) uses the work of formalist critics such as Jakobson to 
support his points about literariness, which raises an important question: why should 
we bother with Wittgenstein if other authorities are available? There are certainly 
important similarities between Wittgenstein and the formalists, such as the stress on 
what Wittgenstein would call a physiognomy and the formalists would call style, but 
Jon Cook and Read (2010:473) ask whether there are any differences that make 
using the Wittgensteinian philosophical investigation worthwhile and conclude that 
the project is worthwhile because Wittgenstein’s work can offer ‘a phenomenology 
of the experience of reading literature’. Such a phenomenology would run parallel to 
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other approaches to literature, such as the linguistic or the literary, rather than 
replacing them, because it is a philosophical inquiry. One way in which a 
Wittgensteinian approach is valuable is because it avoids the polarities and strict 
divisions associated with many writings on translation. Jakobson (1959:233), for 
example, asserts that there are three kinds of translation: intralingual translation or 
rewording; interlingual translation or translation proper; intersemiotic translation or 
transmutation. While this is a helpful classification, it makes no allowance for the 
case where more than one thing is going on. An adaptation of a Leo Tolstoy novel 
for an English-speaking audience, for example, would be both interlingual and 
intersemiotic. Beginning with a theoretical perspective, as Jakobson does, can be a 
straightjacket, running the risk of offering an ‘impoverished account’ of what it is 
like to read or to encounter literature (Cook & Read, 2010:473). Similarly, many 
translation theorists view translation in terms of polarities (Pym, 2010:33), which 
can lead to black-and-white thinking, whereas Wittgenstein’s account of language 
allows the literary phenomenon to be seen from many different angles. (I further 
discuss the way in which theory tends towards polarisation in 4.1.)  
It is because of the rich phenomenological experience that they offer that 
literary works can matter to their readers. Jenefer Robinson (2005:143) asks how it is 
possible for her to feel compassion for Tolstoy’s heroine Anna Karenina (who 
throws herself under a train when she feels her life to be intolerable), given that she 
never existed. There is a difference between this case and feeling compassion for the 
sufferings of, say, the dying Wittgenstein, while reading about his life, given that 
Wittgenstein’s existence was instantiated, and he did die from cancer. But to shed 
tears for Anna Karenina, or for Shakespeare’s Romeo, or for Goethe’s Werther: this 
seems analogous to getting depressed because there are no unicorns to be seen in the 
local park. Nevertheless, this is what people do. There are even reports of eighteenth-
century young men dressing like Werther and taking a pistol to their own head, so 
moved were they by his story: Danielle Moyal-Sharrock (2009:180) notes how the 
term the ‘Werther effect’ has been invented to designate such copycat suicides and in 
answering Robinson’s question uses Wittgenstein’s notion of the surveyable 
representation (2009:165).  
The term ‘surveyable representation’ (PI 122) renders a German expression 
that has caused some difficulties for translators, i.e. ‘übersichtliche Darstellung’ 
(‘overseeing representation’), which Wittgenstein describes as the attempt to form an 
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overview in which one is enabled to see connections. Anscombe (2001) translates it 
as ‘perspicuous representation’; Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White translate it 
as ‘bird’s eye view’ in PR 5; Wittgenstein himself spoke of a ‘synoptic 
representation’ in his Cambridge lectures (Ambrose, 1979:43). Much of the 
secondary literature on Wittgenstein in English uses Anscombe’s rendering, as does 
Moyal-Sharrock, but I shall use the translation ‘surveyable representation’ by Hacker 
and Schulte in their revision of Anscombe’s translation, because I follow their 
edition as the most scholarly available in English and because I accept their 
argument that ‘surveyable representation’ preserves ‘the reference to view and survey 
in translating Übersicht [overview] and its cognates’ (PI, p.252). (I further explore 
the notion of the surveyable representation in 4.3.) Moyal-Sharrock’s response is that 
literature is able to engage our emotions through its surveyable representations of 
emotional (and other) concepts and the cognitive pleasure that such representations 
evoke.  
It is important for the translator as reader to identify the key elements of a 
surveyable representation by not seeing the text as something to be decoded. To read 
for translation involves accounting for the vividness of the text by paying attention to 
its stylistic elements, as Moyal-Sharrock (2009:171) notes. In Table 1, I sum up her 
discussion of how a writer can evoke vividness in the writing of a literary text. 
 
TABLE 1: STYLISTIC EFFECTS ACCORDING TO MOYAL-SHARROCK 
STYLISTIC FEATURES EXAMPLES 
Presentation of material Dialogue, narrative, description, meditation, 
stream of consciousness 
 
Literary devices used Metaphor, symbolism, vocabulary, syntax, 
tone, cadence, silence 
 
Other elements Irony, suggestion, psychological acuity, 
action, timing, juxtaposition, tension, mood, 
plot 
 
 
Moyal-Sharrock takes the view that it is this vividness that enables the reader to 
engage with a text, so that he or she may come to shed tears for a woman who never 
existed. Literature is something more than an expression of the intellect. It is 
something physical, something that affects the mind, something suitable for the 
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linguistic animal that reads. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (2000:xx-xxi), 
commenting on their translation of Anna Karenina, state that to apply ‘general 
notions of natural, idiomatic English and good prose style to Tolstoy’s writing is to 
risk blunting the sharpness of its internal dialogisation’; previous translations of the 
novel have frequently toned down narratorial interventions, or omitted them, a 
strategy that Pevear and Volokhonsky reject. Narratorial interventions are one of the 
ways in which Tolstoy presents his material in order to give a surveyable 
representation of the story of Anna Karenina.  
Wittgenstein, in PPF 118, introduces the concept of ‘the dawning of an 
aspect’ which can be helpful in analysing how people may approach the literary. He 
distinguishes the dawning of an aspect from ‘the continuous seeing of an aspect’ and 
uses Robert Jastrow’s ‘duck-rabbit’ as an illustration, to show the difference between 
‘seeing’ and ‘seeing as’. The duck-rabbit is reproduced as Figure 1.  
 
FIGURE 1: THE DUCK-RABBIT 
 
 
It is an image that may be consistently described as a duck or as a rabbit. Somebody 
may see the figure as a duck, until suddenly a new aspect dawns and he or she sees it 
as a rabbit. Neither view of the duck-rabbit is exclusively correct, hence its blended 
name. 
The experience of seeing things differently is a common one. Anna may 
perceive a cloud as a castle and describe it as such to Chris, who is unable to see 
what Anna is talking about, until he suddenly says, ‘Oh yes!’ With respect to the 
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duck-rabbit, Wittgenstein stresses that it is not a question of interpretation but of 
reporting what one sees: ‘I should simply have described my perception’. On a walk, 
I may see a passing rabbit and think what a great pet it would make, while my dog 
thinks it would be a tasty snack. Catholics believe that bread and wine are 
transubstantiated into the real presence of Christ during the Mass, and will show this 
by bowing, genuflecting etc., which can be puzzling behaviour to a guest who knows 
nothing of Eucharistic theology. Similarly, somebody may come to see a page of 
what were once meaningless symbols in a new way, if he or she learns Greek, and 
may come to see a poem in a new way if he or she is taught about metaphor and 
other such devices as those listed in Table 1. Failure to see other aspects is referred 
to by Wittgenstein as ‘aspect-blindness’, akin to the lack of a musical ear (PPF 260) 
and the project of the PI can be described as an attempt to overcome aspect-
blindness. Wittgenstein (PPF 263) describes a code that uses the word ‘tower’ to 
mean ‘bank’, so that a command to go to the tower can be de-coded as a command to 
go to the bank: this, he argues, would be felt by somebody to be strange, because he 
or she would not yet have absorbed the meaning. The term ‘tower’ is being used 
artificially, outside the way that a native speaker will have learned it. By contrast 
(PPF 264), it is possible to be trained to read a poem with feeling, by paying 
particular attention to the intonation, so that the poem is being read in a different way 
from how it would be read if scanned for information. The reading of a poem with 
feeling is a practice: ‘I can also give a word an intonation which makes its meaning 
stand out from the rest, almost as if the word were a portrait of the whole thing’. 
 Hopkins (1985:xv) referred to the obscure elements in his poems ‘exploding 
into meaning’ to a sensitive reader prepared to spend time with the verse. The writer 
creates a text that is completed by the reader. Wittgenstein, in Lectures and 
Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (LA) p.4, uses his own 
reading of the German poet Friedrich Klopstock (who wrote unrhymed verse with 
intricate metrical patterns) to illustrate the phenomenon, describing how, when he 
finally read Klopstock with a stress on the metre, he was able to say, ‘A-ha, now I 
know why he did this’. Such an experience, what Wittgenstein refers to as ‘A-ha’, is 
the coming to be aware of the style, of seeing that form and content are inseparable. 
Previously Wittgenstein had felt bored by Klopstock, but was now able to appreciate 
the poetry by seeing it in a new way. 
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The PI (in contrast to the T-LP) has an approach to truth based on coherence 
rather than on correspondence. Wittgenstein (PI 201 ff.) stresses the practice of 
following a rule. When people play cricket, for example, what makes the game 
function is that all the players agree on how to behave. Cricketers are not discovering 
an arcane metaphysics of cricket that dictates how the game must be played. From 
time to time new rules are introduced and old ones modified and abolished. 
Cricketers today dress very differently from those of the past, and women’s cricket 
has been introduced into what was an all-male world. The term ‘Owzat!’ (a 
contraction of ‘How’s that?’) makes sense when shouted out during a game of 
cricket because it is an agreed way of appealing to the umpire to have a player 
dismissed, but it is not usually an acceptable replacement for ‘How’s that?’ outside 
cricket. There is a carefully managed coherence within the game of cricket. As 
Wittgenstein (PI 202) notes, following a rule is a practice, and it is not possible to 
follow a rule privately. We look at what people do, and speak of rules. The same 
would be true of literary practices, such as translation: rules do not determine what 
we do. It is a question of coherence. 
John Gibson (2004:117) calls such coherence ‘the wonder of agreement’, 
citing Wittgenstein’s example in PI 50 of the standard metre in a Paris archive, held 
to be the measure for making rulers etc. There is again nothing arcane about this 
metre-rule, which has ‘no extraordinary properties’. It is simply used by those who 
need it, under the proviso that, wherever the metrical system is established, it should 
be taken as standard: we can neither state that it is one metre long nor not one metre 
long. Gibson (2004:121) argues that literature itself can be seen as an archive, so that 
the existence of literature becomes something with which to measure our 
distinctively human ways of seeing and behaving. Similarly, custom decrees that the 
word ‘dog’ in English means what it does in the contexts where it is used. A word 
has an agreed application within a context. Words can therefore change or expand 
their meaning, for example, the noun ‘mouse’ has taken on a new meaning as a piece 
of computer hardware. Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, does not offer any metaphysics 
of meaning, as is seen in PI 126, given as (28). What is astonishing about this remark 
is how it contrasts with the received idea of philosophy as a quasi-mystical quest for 
metaphysical reality. 
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 (28) 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything. – Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For 
whatever may be hidden is of no interest to us. 
 
 
Philosophy is a matter of description rather than of discovery. A Wittgensteinian 
approach to literature would similarly involve the formation of the surveyable 
representation. The task of the translator reading the ST for translation is not to 
think, but to look (PI 66).  
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2.2 Language-games 
 For the reflective practitioner of translation, Wittgenstein’s notion of the 
language-game can provide both a way of describing the ST and a way of translating 
it. In this section, I introduce the language-game, which is at the heart of the 
philosophy of the later Wittgenstein. 
At the beginning of the PI, Wittgenstein cites a passage from Augustine’s 
Confessions in Latin, giving his own German translation. The Confessions (1961) is 
regarded by many as one of the most significant texts in western civilisation (Brown, 
1967:158), Wittgenstein himself referring to it as the most important book ever 
written (Rhees, 1984:90). Georg Henrik von Wright (1958:21) has noted that 
Wittgenstein’s own way of philosophising owes a lot to the philosophical parts of the 
Confessions. Augustine describes his conversion to Catholic Christianity in the 
Confessions, effectively writing the first autobiography, and the passage that 
Wittgenstein quotes contains reflections on how Augustine came to learn language 
as a child. It is given as text (29), translated from Wittgenstein’s German (PI 1). 
 
(29) 
When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I 
perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound that they 
uttered, since they meant to point it out. This, however, I gathered from their 
gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language that by means of facial 
expression and the play of eyes, of the movements of the limbs and the tone of 
voice, indicates the affections of the soul when it desires, or clings to, or rejects, or 
recoils from, something. In this way, little by little, I learnt to understand what 
things the words, which I heard uttered in their respective places in various 
sentences, signified. And once I got my tongue round these signs, I used them to 
express my wishes. 
 
 
 
Here is a story of how language is learned. I shall refer to it as ‘the Augustinian 
paradigm’, to distinguish it from Augustine’s theory of language (Kerr, 1988:56), 
which lies outside the scope of this thesis and to which Wittgenstein does not refer. 
The Augustinian paradigm describes learning language as a process of denotation, of 
ostensive definition. If I want to show a child what a dog is, I point at the dog: the 
word ‘dog’ denotes the fuzzy thing sleeping in the corner of the room and the child 
learns how to recognise and then apply the term. The theme of the PI has been 
introduced, i.e. the investigation of the human person as linguistic. As Hacker 
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(2001:68) comments on the project of the later Wittgenstein: ‘The behaviour of man 
has to be understood, and something interpreted, in the sense in which the behaviour 
of inanimate nature and much of animal behaviour do not. This is obvious in the case 
of human linguistic behaviour.’  
Wittgenstein, in the opening sections of the PI, takes his reader through a 
series of scenarios designed to show that the Augustinian paradigm is too narrow. It 
offers a code model of language, a picture theory not unlike that of his early work, in 
which terms were held to stand for things in the world (T-LP 2.161). Wittgenstein 
shows the limitations of this view. For example, he tells the story of the two builders, 
A and B (PI 2), as an instance of where ‘the description given by Augustine is right’, 
which I give as (30). 
 
(30) 
A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has 
to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this 
purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words ‘block’, ‘pillar’, ‘slab’, 
‘beam’. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-
and-such a call. – Conceive of this as a complete primitive language. 
 
At this very basic level, A and B function as builders who successfully 
communicate, in the sense that things get built, so that Augustine ‘does describe a 
system of communication’ (PI 3). It is too limited, however, to fit the way that 
people live outside the story of the builders. The Augustinian paradigm shows how 
nouns might be learned: ‘Someone who describes the learning of language like this 
is, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like “table”, “chair”, “bread”, and of 
people’s names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; 
and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself’. 
Wittgenstein sets against this the story of the shopping trip (which I discuss in 3.1) 
and shows how the primitive language used by the builders in PI 2 would have to be 
expanded beyond ostensive definition if it is expanded to include more than nouns: 
the builders function according to the Augustinian paradigm when they only need to 
use the four nouns for different types of building materials, but once other elements 
are introduced, such as numbers or demonstratives (PI 8 ff.) then the paradigm 
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collapses, not because it is wrong as such, but because it is too restricted.
19
 The 
significance of the paradigm lies in the way that it exemplifies a common way of and 
indeed natural way of looking at language (Bellos, 2011:83), but which is more like 
an account of how people learn a second foreign language than a first language, as 
Wittgenstein points out in PI 32; it is as if the child Augustine had come into a 
foreign country, already able to think and already having a language, but not the 
language of the new country. Things in the world as we find it are more complicated. 
For a start, there are many different types of utterances. In PI 23, Wittgenstein 
attacks the traditional view in logic (fundamental to the T-LP) that there are three 
types of proposition: the statement, the question and the command, represented here 
by (31), (32) and (33) respectively. 
 
 (31) 
 Ben is in the kitchen. 
 (32)  
 Is Ben in the kitchen? 
 (33) 
 Go into the kitchen, Ben! 
 
Language is seen as propositional, as representing reality through pictures. Text (31), 
for example, is a proposition that can be true or false, depending on whether Ben is 
in the kitchen or not, and depicts a certain dog in a certain room.  
Against his earlier picture theory of language, Wittgenstein advances the 
position that the meaning of a proposition is shown by its use, both in the language 
as a whole and in its immediate context. He introduces the concept of the ‘language-
game’ to explain this: ‘We can think of the whole process of using words … as one 
of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call 
these games “language-games” and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as 
a language-game. … I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the 
actions into which it is woven, a “language-game”’ (PI 23). He indicates a 
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 Even the initial situation is more flexible than the paradigm suggests, as discussed in 3.1. 
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multiplicity of linguistic activities that can be categorised as language-games, given 
as (34). 
 
(34) 
Giving orders, and acting on them –  
Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements –  
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –  
Reporting an event –  
Speculating about the event –  
Forming and testing a hypothesis –  
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams –  
Making up a story; and reading one –  
Acting in a play –  
Singing rounds –  
Guessing riddles – 
Cracking a joke; telling one –  
Solving a problem in applied arithmetic –  
Translating from one language into another –  
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. 
 
 
 
Instead of three types of linguistic activity, there are many: the list could in fact be 
extended indefinitely.
20
 As Wittgenstein (PI 108) notes, to ask ‘What is a word 
really?’ is like asking ‘What is a piece in chess?’ I take this to mean that a piece in 
chess has a set move that it can make according to agreed rules but that there exists a 
vast number of positions in which it might end up, a vast number of ways in which it 
can be used, especially when it is recalled that no chess piece operates in isolation. 
The mistake would be to describe its physical appearance and to think that here was 
an end of it. Something similar is true of words. To say that ‘dog’ is a noun of three 
letters may be an important observation, but there is a lot more that can be said about 
how the word can be used (for example, as a noun or as a verb: this is discussed 
further in 2.3). 
Such an approach is of use to the translator, who can be brought to see that 
reading is not a scientific procedure but a language-game, an activity carried out by 
people, in which we engage with language-games played in a text, rather than 
dealing with denotation. Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Grammar (PG) I 5, describes 
how a sentence from a story may make complete sense in isolation, so that a context 
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 The significance of translation as a language-game is discussed in 3.1. 
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may be invented, but that ‘I do not understand it in the sense in which I should 
understand it if I had read the story.’ 
As Hacker (2007a:46) comments, meaning is not a matter of scientific 
discovery. It is much more than denotation, than the Augustinian paradigm of the 
child pointing at the fuzzy thing in the corner and working out that it is Ben the dog. 
In PI 43, given as (35), Wittgenstein advances a different way of looking at meaning. 
 
(35) 
 
For a large class of cases of the employment of the word ‘meaning’ – though not for 
all – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language. 
 
 
 
This remark is probably the most celebrated in the PI (Hacker, 2010b). Wittgenstein 
is careful to stress that exceptions do arise, because there are cases when the 
Augustinian paradigm is correct, i.e. when the meaning can be explained by 
‘pointing to its bearer’ (PI 43), as in the case of the primitive language employed by 
the builders in PI 2 ff (but not when expanded). In most cases, however, meaning is 
best explained by looking at use.  
An example of how this Wittgensteinian epistemological tool can be applied 
to everyday language is given by Duncan Richter (2009:198), who examines the 
concept of happiness, showing that it is a ‘blurry and elusive’ concept: when a City 
banker and a Buddhist say they are happy, they may be playing different language-
games, confusing psychologists by their employment of the same adjective, so that it 
is wrongly assumed that they are referring to the same phenomenon. To understand 
the difference between the two individuals would involve looking at a wide range of 
examples from their respective lives, which may, for example, lead to a conclusion 
that the happy banker is talking about hedonism and the happy Buddhist is talking 
about spirituality. What matters is what they are doing with the word ‘happy’. There 
is one word but two uses. It is not as if there were some mystical meaning attached to 
‘happy’, so that we have both word and meaning as separate entities. Wittgenstein 
(PI 120) gives this parable to illustrate the point: we do not have both the money and 
the cow that we can buy with it; we have only the money, which means that we can 
do certain things, such as buy a cow. It is therefore important, as Hacker (2010b:32-
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33) asserts, to distinguish between a meaningful sentence and the meaningful use of 
a sentence. The sentence given as (36) is meaningful: it is well formed according to 
rules given by English grammars and would be readily understood by a competent 
speaker of English. 
 
(36) 
I am happy. 
 
To establish its meaningful use, however, a number of other criteria are relevant, 
such as: who says it; when it was said; in what circumstances it was said; how it 
contributes to a move in a language-game etc. If I am told that it was said by a 
banker to her boss after receiving her bonus, then I have a meaningful use of (36). I 
can see how a language-game is being played. 
Literary texts can be seen in terms of the language-games that they play. 
Queneau (1947), as discussed in 2.1, is playing different language-games, not giving 
his readers one story in many encryptions. James Joyce’s novel Ulysses (1992), 
which tells of one day in Dublin, uses a variety of narrative approaches that can be 
seen as language-games, for example: drama (1992:561-703); catechism (1992:776-
871); interior monologue (1992:871-933). Looking at language-games enables the 
translator reading for translation to be aware that an infinite number of things may go 
on in the literary text. It enables him or her to be aware that language is a ‘spatial and 
temporal phenomenon’ rather than ‘some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity’ (PI 
108). The Augustinian paradigm of language as labelling is too limited but is a 
common one. As McGinn (2008:62) notes, ‘we are focusing on one central case – 
the case of naming people or things – and overlooking the complexity that is inherent 
in our language-games; it is only when we turn our attention to language in use that 
we begin to see our original picture as a misleading over-simplification’. McGinn’s 
use of the first person plural is significant. By turning our attention away from the 
denotative, we realise how much more complicated matters are, for, as Wittgenstein 
(PI 6) notes, even the simplest form of language-game admits of variation. Hence 
Queneau (1947) can play the language-game of telling a story about a man on a bus 
in ninety-nine different ways, each of which is an individual language-game. The 
teacher holding up the flashcard of a dog may expect his or her students to do any of 
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the following: to listen silently; to repeat what they hear; to tick a picture of a dog in 
a series of animal pictures in their workbooks; to give a picture of a dog to a 
neighbour etc. Learning language involves using many types of language-game. As 
Savickey (1999:76) comments, Wittgenstein’s ideas on language-learning and 
language-use, the examples he uses and the analogies he gives, are all influenced by 
his work and experiences as a schoolteacher, of having seen how language is used by 
learners.
21
 
 Wittgenstein (PI 28) shows how problematic the notion of ostensive 
definition is by the example of trying to define the notion of ‘two’ by showing 
somebody two nuts. There is a danger that the student may think that he or she is 
learning the word for a particular group of nuts. The contrary can also happen, when 
the student mistakes the name of a particular group of nuts for the number two. 
Wittgenstein concludes: ‘an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in any 
case’. I recall showing a slide, part of the Nuffield Foundation course, to classes 
learning German. The slide depicted two boys armed with guns going into a wood. 
An accompanying tape gave the commentary in text (37). 
 
(37)  
Sie   gehen auf   die Jagd. 
they go       onto the hunt 
 
 
It was not uncommon for students to infer that the German phrase meant, ‘They are 
going into the wood’, rather than, ‘They are going hunting’. The teacher would know 
that the phrase had been misunderstood by the application made of it: some students 
might choose the wrong answer in a multiple choice exercise in their workbook; 
others might give a wrong translation when asked what the phrase meant; others 
might write the phrase in an essay when no hunting was involved. A form of 
triangulation is necessary to become aware of meaning: the context in teaching must 
be larger than a single slide with a single sentence. Similarly nobody can learn 
Finnish only by tuning in to Finnish radio when driving. A third point of reference is 
necessary, such as: a dictionary; a transcript; a tutor; a crib; interaction with Finnish 
speakers; all of these. There comes a point when even pointing at places and things 
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 See the discussion of WFV in 1.4. 
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will only work when the pointing ‘occurs in the use of the words too and not merely 
in learning the use’ (PI 9). 
 The relevance of language-games to reading for translation is illustrated by 
the dialogues in (38) and (39). 
  
 (38) 
Anna: Let me test you on your history. 
Richard: Fine. 
Anna:  When was the Battle of Waterloo? 
Richard:  1815. 
Anna: Who commanded the Prussian forces at Waterloo? 
Richard: Blücher. 
Anna: Well done. To where was Napoleon exiled after the battle? 
Richard: Elba. 
Anna: You’ve really worked hard on this. 
Richard: Thank you. 
 
 (39) 
Anna: Let me test you on your history. 
Chris: Fine. 
Anna:  When was the Battle of Waterloo? 
Chris:  1812. 
Anna: Who commanded the Prussian forces at Waterloo? 
Chris: Ney. 
Anna: Well done. To where was Napoleon exiled after the battle? 
Chris: Who? 
Anna: You’ve really worked hard on this. 
Chris: Thank you. 
 
 
These two sketches are almost identical. A reader who shares Anna’s knowledge – 
that the Battle of Waterloo was in 1815, that Blücher commanded the Prussian 
troops at that battle, and that Napoleon was then exiled to Elba – will be aware that 
Chris did badly in his test, unlike Richard. Therefore it is a reasonable inference that 
Anna’s remark, ‘You’ve really worked hard on this’, expresses a compliment to 
Richard but a reprimand to Chris, possibly spoken in a sarcastic tone. When Anna 
says this to Chris, she is neither mistaken nor lying but expressing disapproval. The 
same holds for her comment, ‘Well done’, whilst it may be reasonable to infer that 
Chris’s remarks, ‘Fine’ and ‘Thank you’, are spoken in a tone of defiance. There is 
no core meaning that can be extracted from even such a simple phrase as, ‘Thank 
you’, as the circumstances in which the phrase is uttered need to be taken into 
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account.
22
 I am not suggesting that the translator should necessarily translate the 
common phrases in text (38) differently from text (39), but that it is necessary for the 
translator to be aware of what is going on, that the meaning is in the use.  
 Wittgenstein’s distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar is 
useful here. In PI 664, there is the remark given as (40). 
 
 
 (40) 
In the use of words, one might distinguish ‘surface grammar’ from ‘depth grammar’. 
What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way that it 
is used in the sentence structure, the part of its use – one might say – that can be 
taken in by the ear. – And now compare the depth grammar, say of the verb ‘to 
mean’, with what its surface grammar would lead us to presume. No wonder one 
finds it difficult to know one’s way about. 
 
 
 
The distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar does not contradict 
Wittgenstein’s stress in PI 126 that everything of interest is on the surface and that 
nothing of interest is hidden, because we can only understand depth grammar by a 
careful reading of surface grammar. Nothing arcane is involved. Surface grammar is 
what the grammatical form of a statement seems to offer; depth grammar is how the 
statement is used, something indicated by the context. Anna in (38) and (39) uses the 
same surface grammar but the depth grammar is different. The translator of (38) and 
(39) might choose to find phrases that would represent the depth grammar in both 
cases. Boase-Beier (2011:17), for example, notes that translation is not only about 
transferring the surface features of the ST onto the TT. 
When language is not given a context, then – according to Wittgenstein – it 
idles, it ‘goes on holiday’ (PI 38).23 Hacker (2010b:31), for example, compares the 
utterances given as (41) and (42). 
 
 
(41) 
 
I don’t know what he means. 
 
 
                                                 
22
 It does not follow that no words have a core meaning if the term is understood as signifying a single 
meaning. The German word drei can be safely rendered as ‘three’ without too much hesitation, unless 
in a literary context (where it rhymed, for example).  
23
 Anscombe’s translation is discussed in 3.4. 
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(42) 
 
I don’t know what I want. 
 
 
 
The two sentences are very similar in terms of surface grammar. They both begin 
with ‘I don’t know what’, followed by subject and main verb in the simple present 
indicative active. In terms of depth grammar, they are different, however, because 
the respective use is different: (41) is a confession of ignorance while (42) is a 
confession of indecision. (And the situation may become more complicated if the 
context is stipulated.) As Hacker comments, in craving uniformity we overlook the 
‘fluidity, flexibility, forms of context-variability and distinctive uses of our language 
and its instruments’. It is a critical lesson for a literary translator to learn: how to see 
differences, to refer again to the quotation from Shakespeare (1972:81) that 
Wittgenstein considered using as a motto to the PI.  
If I am faced with a sentence such as that in (43), then the surface grammar is 
clear enough. 
 
(43) 
Anna went to the library. 
 
However, the depth grammar is here not clear without more contextual information. 
The sentence in (43), in isolation, is on holiday. It cannot do any work because it 
lacks specificity. To reference Wittgenstein’s list of language-games in PI 23, given 
as (34) above, (43) could be any of the following: an event being reported; a 
hypothesis being formulated; a story being made up; a story being read; a joke being 
told; a translation being made from another language. When reading for translation, 
it would be important to be aware of these possibilities and to form a view of the 
depth grammar, seen in the language-game, as can be shown by a literary example. 
Geoffrey Chaucer’s Middle English account of a pilgrimage to Canterbury, 
The Canterbury Tales, includes a description of a Benedictine monk who is very 
fond of hunting (1965:56), given as (44). 
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 (44) 
 He yaf    nat of that text a pulled   hen, 
 he  gave not of that text a plucked hen 
 That seith that hunters ben nat hooly men, 
 that  says that hunters be   not holy   men 
 Ne that  a monk, when he is reccheless, 
 nor that a monk  when he is irresponsible  
 Is likened til a fissh that is waterlees, 
 is like       to  a fish  that is waterless 
 This is to seyn, a monk out of his cloister. 
 this  is to say    a monk out of his  cloister 
But thilke text heeled he nat  worth an oyster; 
but this     text held     he not  worth an oyster 
And I seyde his opinion was good. 
and I  said   his  opinion was good 
 
 
 
The last line seems, on a reading of its surface grammar, to be expressing approval 
of the monk, for Chaucer says that the monk’s opinion was good. As James Winny 
comments, however, in his note on this text (Chaucer 1965:91), the line is ironic, a 
‘pretence of approval … a straight-faced joke which caps the outrageousness of the 
monk’s argument’. The monk is praised for virtues that have nothing to do with his 
monastic vocation. The translator who fails to note this would have problems not just 
with this line but with the whole portrayal of the hunting monk, whom Chaucer 
satirises by contrasting his worldly way of life with the ascetic ideals that drove the 
rule-givers of western monasticism, Augustine and Benedict. Chaucer never tells the 
reader that he does not approve of the monk, but writes in such a way as to trigger a 
response in his reader. As Pilkington (2000:47) asserts: ‘The literary writer attempts 
to articulate her feelings and experiences: the critic and reader do the same with the 
writer’s assistance’. Wittgenstein’s concept of the language-game is a philosophical 
way of describing this literary phenomenon. The narrator in (44) is playing several 
language-games: describing somebody; reporting what was said; narrating a story; 
satirising a cleric. The final language-game is the key one to note when reading the 
final line. It is the point of Chaucer’s description of the monk, making it an exercise 
in humour, not hagiography. For the trained reader, this is language at work, not on 
holiday, and it is part of the task of the literary translator to read (and eventually 
render) the depth grammar. As Tim Parks (2007:246) asserts, the ideal is the 
translator who has done everything in his or her power ‘to understand the deeper 
sense of the author’s text and to find a way of recreating that in translation’. The 
71 
 
writing of the TT is the topic of Chapter 3, but Parks is right to see it as based on an 
understanding of what, in a Wittgensteinian sense, can be seen as the depth grammar 
of the ST. As I remarked in 2.1, reading the ST for translation is not only a physical 
necessity but also an aesthetic one. In translating the final line of (44), a translator 
might therefore choose to find a phrase that maintained both surface and depth 
grammar. (A translation that explicitly stated that the monk was a hypocrite would 
lose the surface grammar.) In this reading of (44), there has been nothing arcane, no 
discovery of a secret lurking behind Chaucer’s text. Meaning remains a 
physiognomy (PI 568). The genius of Chaucer is shown by how he can use a phrase 
that in another context would indicate fulsome praise in order to undermine 
everything that this particular monk stands for and to allow the reader to interact 
with the ST in a certain way. It would be possible to read the description of the monk 
as documentation only, not as a satire, just as it is possible to read Middlemarch for 
the story and not for the literature (Attridge 2004:96), but this is only possible for the 
reader who ignores the depth grammar. Wittgenstein shows how the literary reading 
of Middlemarch could take place, which would in turn facilitate literary translation. 
 Wittgenstein’s presentation of the Augustinian paradigm is not meant to 
dismiss as stupid the way that we instinctively operate: ‘the difficulty is to remove 
the prejudice which stands in the way … It is not a stupid prejudice’ (PI 340). 
Malcolm (1984:59) records that Wittgenstein’s decision to use Augustine came 
about ‘not because he could not find the conception expressed in that quotation 
stated as well by other philosophers, but because the conception must be important if 
so great a mind held it’. The Augustinian paradigm shows the way that we naturally 
tend to think about language, one that is not easy to shift, hence the lengthy 
treatment that follows Augustine’s story in PI 1. The aim is to bring about clarity in 
the reader, as Wittgenstein points out in PI 81, given as (45). 
  
 (45) 
All this, however, can appear in the right light only when one has attained greater 
clarity about the concepts of understanding, meaning something, and thinking. For it 
will then also become clear what may mislead us (and did mislead me) into thinking 
that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it, he is thereby operating 
a calculus according to definite rules. 
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Wittgenstein refers here, I assume, to his own early work in the T-LP, which puts 
forward a theory of language as calculus. In contrast, the PI puts forward no theory 
(PI 109); we need to be wary of our forms of expression, which send us ‘in pursuit 
of chimeras’ when really ‘nothing extraordinary is involved’ (PI 94). Wittgenstein 
(PI 109) sees philosophy as a battle against ‘the bewitchment of our understanding 
by the resources of our language’. Does the battle against bewitchment also hold for 
the reading of literature? Does literature threaten us with bewitchment, as suggested 
by Plato (Republic 595a ff.)?  
 Schroeder (2006:156-7) analyses the contention by the pre-Socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus (Plato, Cratylus 402a) that one cannot step into the same river 
twice. By applying the methods of the PI, he concludes that this is an example of the 
philosophical misuse of language, because it ignores how the term ‘river’ is used. 
We are bewitched by the use of an expression into ignoring facts about rivers, i.e. 
that they are not lakes. Schroeder then questions whether this would apply to the 
literary use of language, which would also then be a misuse. He refers to Goethe’s 
poem ‘Dauer im Wechsel’ (‘Permanence in Change’) (Goethe, 1967:136), of which I 
give the second stanza as (46). An unacknowledged reference to Heraclitus is in lines 
7-8. 
 
 (46) 
Willst du   nach den Früchten greifen, 
want   you after the  fruits       to-grasp 
Eilig     nimm dein Teil davon! 
quickly take   your part of-it 
Diese fangen an zu reifen, 
these  begin        to ripen 
Und die andern keimen     schon; 
and  the others  germinate already 
Gleich mit  jedem Regengusse 
even    with every rain-downpour 
Ändert   sich  dein  holdes Tal, 
changes itself your lovely  valley 
Ach, und in demselben Flusse 
alas  and in  the-same   river 
Schwimmst du  nicht zum  Zweitenmal. 
swim           you not   for-a second-time 
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Schroeder argues that the use of Heraclitus is here legitimate because it is ‘a 
figurative expression of a feeling or a hyperbolical way of emphasising a certain 
aspect of the world’ (2006:157) and I think that this is an important point. 
Wittgenstein’s strictures against hyperbolical language in philosophy do not apply to 
literature, for different language-games are played in literature from philosophy. 
Literary features cannot be explained away and are there to be seen. As Wittgenstein 
(PPF 79) remarks, it is not so surprising that the same expression is used in different 
games. The key is to identify the game. To translate (46) whilst omitting or changing 
the lament that we cannot swim in the same river twice, on the grounds that this view 
is philosophically incoherent, cannot be justified on Wittgensteinian grounds.  
By identifying literary language-games, we facilitate reading for translation. 
As Attridge (2004:75) notes, formal features in literature are so significant that they 
can be imitated in translation, so that asking questions such as ‘Which language-
game is being played here?’ or ‘What is the depth grammar of this sentence?’ can 
become an important part of the task of translation and help the translator to get 
down to work. That Wittgenstein can indicate what Cook and Read (2010:473) call 
the ‘phenomenology of the experience of reading literature’ shows that it is possible 
for the literary translator to enter into this phenomenology. As Wittgenstein (PPF 7) 
remarks: ‘If someone says, “When I heard this word, it meant … to me”, he is 
referring to a point in time and to a way of using the word. (Of course, it is this 
combination that we fail to grasp.)’ A reading of the PI can help the literary 
translator to grasp this combination as a prelude to translation. 
If literature can be seen in terms of language-games, is there anything that 
can account for the language-games? In 2.3, I investigate Wittgenstein’s notion of 
the ‘form of life’ and its use for the literary translator. 
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2.3 Forms of life 
Wittgenstein argues that human beings agree not in opinions but in form of 
life (PI 241), i.e. the way they live, so that language becomes ‘the conversation that 
is carried on with the characteristic activities of a form of life’ (Kerr, 1988:30). To 
go shopping involves playing the language-game associated with that activity, to 
have a store of set phrases, expressions of politeness, items of vocabulary, 
transactional structures etc. A game of football is played according to a certain kit of 
expressions. An item such as ‘hand ball’ is meaningless outside the form of life that 
is football, where players apart from goalkeepers may not use their hand to touch the 
ball, whereas in many other sports, such as netball or rugby (or in everyday life) 
there is no offence in doing this. Wittgenstein (PI 23) stresses that he uses the term 
‘language-game’ in order to emphasise that ‘the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life’, thus linking the two concepts through his characteristic 
emphasis on practice. In this section, I argue that to explore the concept of the form 
of life can help the translator who is reading for translation. 
There is some controversy about how big a form of life can be (Kerr 
1998:31), but some writers on Wittgenstein have taken large-scale phenomena such 
as Christianity to be forms of life with their own language-games (Malcolm, 
1977:212). I similarly see any activity that has its own distinct language-game as a 
form of life, accepting a range from shopping to Christianity. In terms of literature, 
forms of life can be seen in many texts. The description of the monk by Chaucer in 
(31), for example, is set against the form of life of the pilgrimage and depicts the 
form of life of decadent Benedictine monasticism.  
The meaning of words can similarly be related to forms of life, e.g. ‘dog’ can 
be used in different language-games depending on the form of life in question. For 
Wittgenstein, as Guetti (1993:3) asserts, use of language is ‘not a mere saying of 
words; it is an application of words … that is both purposive and consequential’. 
Thus ‘dog’ can be used conventionally as a concrete noun or as a verb, but not as an 
adjective or as an adverb. A reader who was confused by its occurrence in a sentence 
could look it up in a dictionary, but would need to recall the context in which the 
word occurred in order to find a fitting definition, so that care would have to be 
taken as to whether the ST used ‘dog’ as a verb or as a noun: it would be an error to 
look up the adjective when the noun was implied, for example. In Table 2, a number 
of examples are given, all including the word ‘dog’. Each example consists of two 
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sentences, in order to make the context clear. There is an explanation in the right-
hand column. (It follows from what was said in 2.1 that the explanations would be 
unsatisfactory as literary translations.) 
 
TABLE 2: THE WORD IN CONTEXT 
EXAMPLE EXPLANATION 
There is a dog in the kitchen. He is called 
Ben. 
 
A barking domestic quadruped, i.e. a 
member of the genus canis and subspecies 
canis lupus familiaris, is in the kitchen. 
 
Bad luck seems to dog me. I lost at cards last 
night again. 
 
I always seem to be unlucky. 
You lucky dog. You won at cards, so I hear. 
 
You were so fortunate. 
He was as sick as a dog. Too much brandy. 
 
He vomited in a degrading way. 
This choir is going to the dogs. The last 
concert was terrible. 
 
This choir is in decline.  
 
 
The one word ‘dog’ has many uses. Wittgenstein (PI 77) advises his reader, when 
puzzled about a meaning, to think of how he or she learned the meaning of a word, 
from what sort of examples, and in what sort of language-games, in order to see that 
a word (his example is ‘good’) must have a family of meanings. There is no single 
ideal of exactness (PI 88), because language is a labyrinth of paths (PI 203). 
In inviting his reader to think in this way, Wittgenstein points beyond 
pragmatics to a rich picture of speaker interaction. The point of talking about 
language-games is not merely to clear up cases of ambiguity. It is of course 
important to know, when Anna refers to ‘a mouse’, whether she is talking about a 
rodent or a piece of computer hardware, but Wittgenstein takes his reader much 
further than this, as is made clear by his linking of the language-game with the form 
of life. Searle (Magee, 1987:339) sums up: ‘For the later Wittgenstein, all the criteria 
of meaning are ultimately social, not personal, and still less private. Words derive 
their meaning from the contexts in which they are used, and these in turn depend on 
social practices and thus ultimately on forms of living, forms of life’. The word ‘dog’ 
in the examples in Table 2 is ultimately bound up with forms of life, with the fuzzy 
way that we use the word in so many more ways than to designate the fuzzy thing in 
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the corner, as is illustrated in Table 3, using the same examples as Table 2 in the left-
hand column and indicating the form of life in the right-hand column. 
 
TABLE 3: FORMS OF LIFE IN TABLE 2 
EXAMPLE FORM OF LIFE 
There is a dog in the kitchen. He is called 
Ben. 
 
Dogs are kept as pets and treated as family 
members, given names (often human ones, 
as here) and referred to by a 
masculine/feminine personal pronoun. 
 
Bad luck seems to dog me. I lost at cards last 
night again. 
 
Bad luck is given an animate form as a dog, 
an animal with tracking abilities. We tend to 
think in metaphors. 
 
You lucky dog. You won at cards, so I hear. 
 
My envy leads me to dehumanise you, 
though the choice of a domesticated animal 
stops the image being too offensive. 
 
He was as sick as a dog. Too much brandy. 
 
The mores of this society prohibit being sick 
in public and expect a self-control that we do 
not expect of dogs. 
 
This choir is going to the dogs. The last 
concert was terrible. 
 
Dogs are regarded by most people as 
ontologically inferior to humans. A choir of 
dogs is unlikely to be a success. 
 
 
 
The examples in Tables 2 and 3 are typical of the sort of issue that translators face in 
their work. A translator would have to pay particular attention to the sentence, ‘This 
choir is going to the dogs’, for example, as this could mean either that the choir was 
in decline or that the choristers were going off to the greyhound races. The sentence 
that follows – ‘The last concert was terrible’ – makes it clear which language-game 
is being played here. Published translations often exhibit presumably unintended 
shifts in meaning when translators fail to look at context. Gill Paul (2009:54) records 
how Hanan al Shaykh was puzzled when, reading an Arabic translation of the 
Austrian writer Stefan Zweig, she read of a cat going to the fridge for a glass of milk, 
an activity alien to the form of life of cats. She later discovered that ‘cat’ was a 
mistranslation for ‘man’. The translator had confused the German word Herr 
(‘gentleman’) for a similar-sounding word in Arabic for ‘cat’. The context of the 
sentence in the TT makes it clear to a careful reader that something has gone wrong, 
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given that we know from other textual and biographical evidence that Zweig is not a 
writer of feline fantasy and given what we know about how cats live. Using the 
concept of language-games and forms of life can prevent the translator from making 
such error shifts, something addressed further in Chapter 4. 
The notion of the form of life explains why translators who themselves have 
different forms of life may translate differently, which is most clearly illustrated by 
looking at different translations of the same text. An eighteenth-century translation 
of Homer’s Iliad has a very different look to a contemporary one: the 1715 rendering 
by Alexander Pope (1931) is in rhymed couplets of iambic pentameter, for example, 
which was a common verse form when Pope was writing (and in which most of his 
other work is written), but this strategy is unlikely to be used by a contemporary 
translator, because the form is no longer fashionable and also bears no direct 
relationship to the hexameters of the Greek ST. Robert Fagles (1990:x), for example, 
writes that the aim of his translation is to find a middle ground between Homer’s 
aesthetic and the expectations of readers in the late twentieth century. 
 Forms of life imply that there are factors to account for the production of any 
text. In 2.2, I argued that the meaning of a literary work lies in its physiognomy 
rather than in any notion of meaning outside the text, accessible through decoding. 
However, an edition of any work will normally make reference to key facts in the 
author’s background and to the times in which he lived. In a Wittgensteinian sense, 
just as a word or a phrase has to be seen in context, so a person has to be seen in 
context. In order to read, describe or translate a text, it is of use to have information 
about forms of life. Books in the Penguin Classics series, for example, begin with an 
introduction in which an editor gives background about the text in question. The 
Penguin Jacques the Fatalist, a translation of a Denis Diderot novel by Michael 
Henry (1986), begins with an introduction by Martin Hall (1986:7-18) that gives 
information on the following topics: Diderot; fiction and reality; stories and story-
telling; thematic organisation; servant and master. The last concept, for example, is a 
topos with a long history in European literature. Hall shows what links Diderot to the 
tradition and also how he subverts it, which can aid the reader, especially in a case 
(such as Diderot) where many details about forms of life are only available through 
scholarship, because the ST was written over two hundred years ago. 
Does not this emphasis on what can account for a text contradict the earlier 
emphasis on meaning as a physiognomy in 2.1? I do not think so, because the reader 
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also brings his or her own form of life to the reading of a text. In the case of Diderot, 
many readers of the Penguin Classic who come to the text for the first time will have 
little idea of its background, the French Enlightenment. Appreciating a form of life is 
a necessary condition for meaning to function as a physiognomy. It is analogous to 
being in a foreign country, where knowledge of social mores may be of great help to 
a visitor, even to one who can speak the language, by facilitating communication 
(Lewis, 1999). To appreciate music, according to Wittgenstein, it is necessary to 
learn the rules of music: ‘Learning the rules actually changes your judgement’ (LA 
p.5). The same is true of poetry. To appreciate a sonnet, say, it is necessary to learn 
the conventions by which sonnets are written. The form of life and the language-
game are mutually enlightening. The reader – here the translator as reader, for whom 
this chapter is written – is now in a position to make a philosophical description, a 
surveyable representation, of the text. 
What can go wrong if a translator fails to take forms of life into account 
when making such a description is shown by Daniel Raveh (2008), who, in a 
discussion of translations of the Indian mystic Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, notes how 
many translators of this sacred text into English have failed to recognise that 
translation is not just an ‘interlinguistic phenomenon’ but something that involves 
‘transpositions of culture and thought’ (2008:169). Raveh (2008:179) concludes that 
most contemporary translators of Patañjali ‘have suppressed or even defused the 
world-renunciation directives of this ancient philosophical text in their eagerness to 
project more moderate, palatable images of yoga to their anticipated audience in the 
west’. What begins in the ST as a life-transforming activity ends in the TT as a 
manual on how to pass the time on a wet afternoon. What begins in the ST as yoga 
ends up in the TT as Yoda: Raveh (2008:174) describes how one translation relates 
the ST to Jedi Master Yoda from the Star Wars science fiction films of George 
Lukas. 
It should be stressed that a form of life may refer not just to a culture but also 
to a language. Different languages provide different ways of viewing the world. 
Contemporary English, for example, has a very large vocabulary. According to 
Crystal (2003:119), a conservative estimate of the number of lexemes in English 
would be around one million, whereas a more radical account (including scientific 
terminology) would double that figure. The very size of English vocabulary raises a 
problem for a translator from, say, the HG of the NT, where the extant vocabulary is 
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much smaller: the dictionary by Newman (1993), for example, contains about 8000 
lexemes. Any one word in some HG ST may therefore suggest multiple English 
possibilities. English also does not have gendered articles, unlike other European 
languages. In German, for example, a noun is masculine, feminine or neuter and 
shows this by the form of its article, so that ‘the fir-tree’ is masculine, i.e. der 
Fichtenbaum, and ‘the palm-tree’ is feminine, i.e. die Palme. Heinrich Heine is able 
to use the genders of these trees to suggest the notion of their being in love, in his 
poem ‘Ein Fichtenbaum steht einsam’ (‘A Fir-tree Stands Lonely’) (Heine 1976:36), 
in a way unavailable to a writer of English. Gender is one way in which some 
languages must say certain things, as Jakobson notes (1959:236). That this may 
make speakers of language perceive reality differently has been associated with the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf, 1956); most current thinking rejects the hard 
determinism sometimes associated with the hypothesis, but admits that language is 
one way in which we form reality (Deutscher, 2010). The language I use is part of 
my form of life. 
Such awareness of how language forms reality is similarly a useful 
intercultural skill for business travellers. Richard Lewis (1999:15), for example, 
describes how different languages make people see cultural interaction differently, 
so that for an English-speaker to demand ‘fair play’ is meaningless if he or she 
addresses somebody whose culture has no tradition of organised games and has no 
term for ‘fair play’ in his or her language. The point can be extended to the translator 
who is reading for translation, because awareness of forms of life – which are varied 
yet ultimately human practices – can make the translator aware of both the 
difficulties yet also of the possibilities of translation. Searle (2011:122) asserts that it 
is local cultural factors that make activities such as translation difficult, whilst the 
shared Deep Background we have as human beings makes them possible. (He refers 
to ‘the Deep Background’, where Wittgenstein would use ‘form of life’, as that 
which is necessary for human beings to function socially: to do something like 
attending an academic conference depends on a lot of shared know-how.) In an aside 
when the paper was given at the Second Annual Conference of the British 
Wittgenstein Society, June 2009, Searle told the story of a contemporary American 
translator, who has never been to France, translating a description by the French 
novelist Marcel Proust of a formal French dinner of the early twentieth century, 
which is very different from any dinner she has ever attended in the United States. 
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Her task is therefore far from straightforward. It is manageable, however, because 
she can make certain assumptions about the Background, such as that Proust’s diners 
will be placing the food in their mouths and not in their ears.
24
 
People can understand forms of life because of the nature of the human body, 
which means that there is a common human form of life, as Searle notes: this is the 
view on which cognitive linguistics is based (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), and gives us 
a further reason for looking at Wittgenstein, who offers support for and elucidation 
of such views. According to Wittgenstein, if a lion could talk, we would not be able 
to understand it (PPF 327). The reason for this, as Gordon Baker and Hacker 
(2009:73) point out, is not because a lion would not speak clearly but because the 
form of life accessible to lions is too far removed from our form of life for anything 
that a lion said to count as sense: talking lions in fantasy, such as the cowardly lion 
in the film The Wizard of Oz (Le Roy 1939), are blends of the human and the 
leonine. Lions as they really are do not speak, of course: the phenomenon of 
language, and its investigation in the PI, is necessarily both anthropological and 
anthropic. When this insight is applied to literature, it becomes clear (Pilkington, 
2000:12) that literariness as a phenomenon is universal, while the forms it takes vary 
according to form of life, so that literature itself is a cultural notion. The works of 
Proust are of their time (such as the clothes and customs depicted or the vocabulary 
available to Proust), but the poetic effects that a reading of Proust can trigger (such 
as regret) are of all times. Literature itself is a language-game, played in different 
ways at different times and places. Wittgenstein’s list of language-games quoted 
above as (34) includes ‘making up a story’, but the number of stories that people can 
tell is potentially limitless, even though there may be constraints on the way a story 
is structured (such that it needs a beginning).  
Current research from linguistics and neuroscience supports Wittgenstein’s 
approach. Anna Wierzbicza (1999), writing in linguistics, notes that cultures differ 
markedly in the vocabularies they employ, but that there exist lexical universals that 
allow them to be compared in the first place. David Robson (2011), writing in 
neuroscience, notes that recent research has overturned the view of the body as a 
vehicle driven by the brain, replacing it with a view of a partnership between brain 
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 This example is not in the published paper and I rely on my notes made at the conference. 
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and body. Such support is further warrant for using Wittgenstein’s philosophy in 
translation studies to describe what translators do and as a tool for working. 
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2.4 Philosophical descriptions 
In the German review Das Magazin, June 2009, is a cartoon by Adam on 
page 83 depicting three men sitting in a room. One man is speaking and his words 
are cited as (47) followed by my translation as (48). 
 
(47) 
Hallo, ich bin Tom und ich freue   mich    so  sehr,  hier zu sein.  
hello   I    am  Tom and I    rejoice myself  so much here to be 
 
(48) 
 
Hello, I am Tom and I am so very pleased to be here. 
 
 
What makes Tom’s words at least potentially funny is the clash between his 
conventionally polite speech, which expresses pleasure at where he is, and its 
context, as shown visually in the cartoon. His body language is that of a man 
resigned to a terrible fate. Of the other two men in the image, one seems bored and 
the other seems irritated. On the open door are the words ANONYME SARKASTEN 
(‘anonymous sarcastics’ or ‘Sarcastics Anonymous’), a play on the names of such 
organisations as Alcoholics Anonymous that help those with addictions. The context 
makes the meaning clear. Sarcasm is a language-game, just as Wittgenstein (PI 249) 
holds that lying is a language-game. The form of life is that of the contemporary 
west where addiction to drugs, alcohol etc. has become common, so that self-help 
groups proliferate, and Adam is playing with the fantasy of a self-help group for 
those addicted to sarcasm. In context, the words of the speaker, precisely through 
their surface-grammar of formal politeness, perfectly express the depth grammar, i.e. 
the language-game of the addict who is far from over addiction. Such insights would 
be of use to anybody engaged in translating Adam’s cartoon, who might choose, for 
example, to reference vocabulary associated with self-help groups in the target 
culture. 
The use of Wittgensteinian terms can therefore elucidate a text, in this case a 
cartoon. Both ‘language-game’ and ‘form of life’ are tools that can be used. The end 
to which they are used is that of the philosophical description. In PI 109, 
Wittgenstein asserts that the task of philosophy is one of description, and this should 
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be seen in the greater context of how Wittgenstein approached phenomena, i.e. 
through the grammatical investigation: ‘our inquiry is therefore a grammatical one’ 
(PI 90). The grammatical investigation is a tool in Wittgenstein’s battle against what 
he sees as our bewitchment by language (PI 109) and he undertakes grammatical 
investigations of terms such as: expectation (PI 434-445); negation (PI 446-448); 
meaning (PI 449-468). As McGinn (2008:14) asserts, his method has two purposes. 
Firstly, he shows the dichotomy between our idea of how we believe that a concept 
works and the way that it works in practice. Secondly, he shows the many different 
ways in which a concept can be used. In his investigation of ‘expectation’, for 
example, he presents the term as a linguistic rather than as an essentialist function 
(PI 445) and also as something that has various uses in the ways that people speak 
(PI 444). Concepts are examined as to how they function. The goal is the 
description, the surveyable representation (PI 122). Wittgenstein’s method can be 
used to gain a philosophical way of understanding literature. He does not address 
literature directly, but an application of his work to literature suggests a focus on 
language rather than on such literary tropes as characterisation, plot etc. As Huemer 
(2004:5) notes, on reading literature through Wittgenstein: ‘in literary texts language 
itself becomes the topic’. For the literary translator reading for translation, this is a 
valuable insight.  
An example of what would count as a surveyable representation is the way 
Goethe (2008:349) views the Middle High German epic the Nibelungenlied (The 
Nibelung Song) (1972). His summary is given as (49), with my translation as (50). 
 
(49) 
 
Die beyden Theile unterscheiden sich            von   einander. 
the  two       parts   differentiate   themselves  from each-other  
Der erste hat mehr  Prunk.  
the  first  has more splendour 
Der zweite  mehr Kraft.  
the second   more force 
 
(50) 
Two parts can be discerned in the work.  
The first has more splendour.  
The second more force.  
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Goethe avoids the common but misleading tendency to view the poem in terms of a 
dichotomy between the courtly and the heroic (Müller, 2007:426). His summary 
represents the way in which the author organises material in two halves, the first 
depicting the Burgundian court and the second a massacre in Hungary, but it does 
not try to relate the text to issues of ethos. To see a contrast between the courtly and 
the heroic is to ignore the fact that the narrator’s (and the characters’) fatalistic view 
of death and suffering does not vary throughout the text. Goethe remains at the level 
of description and I consider what he says to be a surveyable representation. Is it 
therefore an objective description? 
It may be argued that there can be no such thing as an objective description 
of any text. Goethe’s view of the Nibelungenlied can be seen as just as much an 
interpretation as the view that there is a dichotomy between the courtly and the 
heroic. Eliot Weinberger stresses: ‘As no individual reader remains the same, each 
reading becomes a different – not merely another – reading’ (Paz & Weinberger, 
1987:43). Similarly, in an attack on what he sees as the pseudo-scientific pretensions 
of stylistics, Stanley Fish (1996:110), whose reader-response theory of literature sees 
meaning as a process in the mind of the reader, claims that every act of description is 
an act of interpretation. To ask two people to describe a work of art may result in two 
very different descriptions, and the situation may become even more complicated if 
an aesthetic evaluation is called for. Would the duck-rabbit (Figure 1) mean anything 
to somebody who had never seen a duck? What would it mean to somebody who 
loves rabbits but hates ducks, or vice-versa? 
 I find it to be true, however, that a rigorous description of a text can be 
attempted, because facts can be given on which observers can agree. In his work on 
the archaeology of the mind, for example, Steven Mithen frequently disagrees with 
the interpretations of other scientists. For example, he argues that chimpanzees’ use 
of tools indicates only a general intelligence, not a technical intelligence (1996:83-
84). Both sides of the debate nonetheless agree on the core facts about how 
chimpanzees use tools, because they accept descriptions recorded by primatologists. 
Similarly, Jean Jacques Weber (1996:3) describes how pedagogical stylistics stresses 
that ‘stylistic analysis may not be objective and scientific but … it can be rigorous, 
systematic and replicable, and hence achieve intersubjective validity and pedagogical 
usefulness’ by pointing to facts about a literary work, such as a poem’s metre. Such, 
I think, would be the sense of a Wittgensteinian philosophical description: it is 
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rigorous, systematic and replicable and points to facts, so that reading for translation 
after Wittgenstein means putting the ST first, adopting what Weinberger 
(Weinberger & Paz, 1987:17) calls ‘an absolute humility towards the text’, which 
dissolves the translator’s ego.  
Wittgenstein’s methods of grammatical investigation can be applied to show 
that there is more than one sense of using the term ‘interpretation’, which is a highly 
contested term (Ricoeur, 2006:25). In Z 235, for example, given as (51), 
Wittgenstein shows the complexities surrounding an everyday activity such as 
reading a timetable. 
 
(51) 
 
If I see the thought symbol ‘from outside’, I become conscious that it could be 
interpreted thus or thus; if it is a step in the course of my thoughts, then it is a 
stopping place that is natural for me, and its further interpretability does not occupy 
(or trouble) me. As I have a time-table and use it without being concerned with the 
fact that a table is susceptible to various interpretations. 
 
 
 
A future historian may read a bus time-table as a source of information about twenty-
first century way of life, whilst a local councillor may analyse it in order to back up 
an argument about the need for better services. A student, however, may use it to 
work out when the next bus to the university is due, without worrying about these 
possibilities. Wittgenstein shows how it comes down to use. The literary translator 
uses the ST as a basis for translation, even though it is susceptible to various 
interpretations.  
To interpret (in the narrow sense) when I should be describing is dangerous, 
as Weinberger shows through analyses of various English translations of a poem by 
the eighth-century Chinese poet Wang Wei. He argues, for example, that a bad 
translation allows the reader to hear only the translator and not the poet, offering as 
evidence a translation by Chang Yin-nan and Lewis C. Walmsley that bears ‘little 
resemblance’ to the ST, because the translators see a need to improve on it: thus they 
reverse its couplets (Weinberger & Paz, 1987:17). Wittgenstein (PPF 234) similarly 
notes how the subject can see any phenomenon ‘in various aspects according to the 
fiction I surround it with’. The stress on description, on striving for a surveyable 
representation, involves attempting to look at the text and its context free from such 
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fictions. The mind is capable of making highly sophisticated connections, so that 
Fish (1996) is right to say that we often interpret before we describe. He goes too far, 
however, in his claim that the mind is unable to isolate facts. The key issue is the 
distinction between description and interpretation. As Wittgenstein (Z 234) notes, if 
we do not interpret, it is because we feel at home with a picture, whilst to interpret is 
to step from one level to another. Interpretations can also be shown to exist in a net 
of family resemblance and can be distinguished from associations and descriptions 
through grammatical investigation. 
Reading Wittgenstein enables the translator to be aware of when he or she is 
describing and when he or she is interpreting, as Sonia Sedivy (2004:168) notes. A 
reading of Wittgenstein can enable the translator, by paying attention to 
physiognomy, to avoid the pitfall of imposing interpretation. Wittgensteinian 
description is akin to what Heidegger (2010:144) understands by ‘Auslegung’, a 
term usually translated as ‘interpretation’, but which Heidegger sees as ‘the 
development of understanding’, by laying out the facts of a situation, playing on its 
etymology, ‘laying-out’. (An example of such laying-out is in the study of Jesus by 
E.P. Sanders (1993:10-11), which gives a list of established facts about Jesus’s life, 
such as his baptism.) For Heidegger (2010:144), interpretation as the working out of 
what the author meant – for which he uses another German noun for interpretation, 
‘Deutung’25 – follows on from this initial laying out of facts, even though there is 
inevitably an issue of choice in ‘Auslegung’. As Wittgenstein (Z 234) notes, we have 
stepped to a different level when we interpret in the sense of ‘Deutung’.  
The PI is about human practices, one of which is the reading of the work of 
literature. Wittgenstein addresses this in PI 652, given as (52). 
 
(52) 
 
‘He sized him up with a hostile glance and said …’ The reader of the story 
understands this; and he has no doubt in his mind. Now you say: ‘Very well, he 
supplies the meaning, he guesses it.’ – Generally speaking, he supplies nothing, 
guesses nothing. 
 
 
Wittgenstein is not saying that the cited words have to be taken as the final statement 
on what is happening in the story – he goes on to note that the character’s hostility 
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 The noun used by Wittgenstein. 
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may be a pretence – nor does he (I assume) want to stop readers of detective fiction, 
say, guessing who committed the murder. As Sedivy (2004:166) asserts, he shows 
that ‘a text presents an immediate meaning just as a face presents an immediate 
expression’. The literary translator can concentrate on identifying this immediate 
meaning (which may of course be puzzling or ambiguous) and considering how it 
may be rendered for the reader who does not command the SL.  
Certain followers of Wittgenstein have used his work in order to oppose 
interpretation completely: Phil Hutchinson et al. (2008) argue that interpretation has 
no place in the social sciences; Guetti (1993) claims that Wittgenstein shows that we 
must move away from the stress on literary interpretation because it suggests that we 
are decoding a hidden meaning. As usual in philosophy, it depends what is meant by 
interpretation. It seems to me that this position goes too far if the literary activity 
known as interpretation is banned, but that it is sound if a narrow view of 
interpretation is in question, which would pin the reader down to one view of a text. 
Gaps, implicatures and ambiguity, which often feature in literary texts, form part of 
such texts, and would be part of a description. Interpretation is a human activity and 
follows from facts. John Berger (1977:8) argues that the sight of fire had a different 
meaning in the European Middle Ages because of the prevailing belief in hell, but 
goes on to maintain that the belief itself ‘owed a lot to the sight of burns’. Most 
contemporary Europeans may not think of hell when they see a flame, but an image 
of fire will still evoke feelings of danger, memories of pain suffered etc.  
From a Wittgensteinian point of view, interpretations are not private: they 
follow on from descriptions of public phenomena, of facts. It would be very odd, 
when asked why he or she held a particular interpretation of a text, for a critic to say: 
‘I just do’. In reading the ST, the translator can note the facts that might give rise to 
later interpretation. For example, in the poem ‘Selige Sehnsucht’ (‘Blessed 
Longing’) by Goethe (2005:183), the image of the flame burning up the moth is 
crucial to the lyric’s effect: even if the reader does not share the anagogical world-
view of the narratorial voice, he or she will react to the ‘Flammentod’ (‘flame-
death’). As Sedivy (2004:182) notes, Wittgenstein’s work helps us ‘regain our sense 
that the meanings and facts of a text are immediately present to us – for the most 
part, depending on the forms of life that “grow” the text and the reader’. The 
Wittgensteinian method allows the reader to follow the benign route of interpretation 
rather than the malign route, and this route may vary from case to case. It is against 
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the spirit of Wittgenstein to use interpretation as if it were a doctrine, i.e. as if there 
were only one way of going about it. 
Mistakes can be made both in description and in interpretation. It would be 
an error to state that text (44) by Chaucer is a depiction of a Christian saint. 
Chaucer’s intention in describing the Benedictine has been taken to be satirical on 
textual evidence. How then can we proceed? Wittgenstein’s approach is summed up 
in PI 79, given as (53). 
 
(53) 
 
Should it be said that I’m using a word whose meaning I don’t know, and so am 
talking nonsense? – Say what you please, so long as it does not prevent you seeing 
how things are. (And when you see that, there will be some things that you won’t 
say.) 
 
We are constrained by the facts, but within this constraint we have great freedom. A 
dictionary is a good example of what Wittgenstein meant. We define X in terms of Y 
and Y in terms of X. It is a matter of coherence but also of pragmatism, for the word 
‘dog’ can certainly refer to a barking domestic quadruped. It is just that it can do so 
much more, because there is no central meaning to be extracted. But its use is limited 
by forms of life and by language-games. Brian Magee (1987:335) refers to the 
misconception of Wittgenstein as adopting an ‘anything goes’ attitude: ‘He did not 
think we can use language how we like and then claim meaning or validity for our 
utterances on equal terms with anyone else’s’. In (53), Wittgenstein insists that if we 
look at the facts then there will be certain things that we will not say: for example, 
that dogs and cats can be usefully categorised by the same noun. The meaning of the 
word (or of the sentence or of the text) is to be looked for in the utterance, e.g. the 
literary text, and in the human practices that sustain it. Facts are established by 
philosophical investigation, which is a descriptive activity. Hence good teaching of 
literary appreciation stresses that reference always has to be made to the text and that 
any assertion always needs support from that text (Eagleton, 2007). It is also why 
consensus can show what is a sound interpretation and what is not. Any attempt to 
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read the mind of the author must be based on agreed facts.
26
 Hence good practice in 
academic writing will use published work to support assertions made (Fish, 1980). 
 Wittgenstein opposed what Monk (1990:416) calls the ‘idolisation of 
science’. In terms of philosophy, as stressed in 1.4, this led him to a stance against 
theory in the sense of systemisation. His position is exemplified by Simon 
Blackburn’s attack on theory (1999:119): ‘Theorists and gurus like to make a 
pattern: people are all selfish; people are only influenced by class interests; people 
hate their parents; people can be conditioned; men are aggressive; women are gentle; 
people cannot help themselves, and so on. But this is not so much a matter of 
following the evidence as of imposing an interpretation on it.’ For Wittgenstein, the 
investigation of the particular case has to come first – in terms of logical priority if 
not in terms of temporal priority – and to perform such an investigation is the limited 
but demanding task of philosophy. Interpretation is inherently anthropic, not 
objective.  
Readings of a text can change over time because of this anthropic aspect, for 
example, the different readings that have been brought to Plato’s Republic (1998). 
Annas (2000:28 ff.) asserts that the dominant status of the Republic within the work 
of Plato is a post-Enlightenment construct rather than one that can be attributed on 
available evidence to what Plato thought of the work, and she describes three stages 
in the reception of this text in the English-speaking intellectual community: the 
Romantic; the Utilitarian; the Victorian. Each of these intellectual trends was able to 
find in the text the merits it was looking for, i.e. respectively: mystical reality; 
rationality; education for the common good. Every generation has a tendency to read 
a text through its own concerns. If reading, like translation, is seen as anthropic, then 
this variety of interpretation should not be a cause of surprise or of distress, for the 
measurement of what people believe will always be relative to a human community. 
Fish (1980) uses Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life to speak of ‘interpretative 
communities’. The difficulty of arriving at a consensus is inevitable and it helps the 
reader for translation if he or she is aware from where he or she is coming.  
I have argued in this chapter that a reading of Wittgenstein can lead to a 
philosophical description, i.e. a surveyable representation based on a text’s 
                                                 
26
 Post-structuralism would say that the attempt to read the mind of the author is a category error, but 
recent critical work refutes this (Burke, 1998). 
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physiognomy, which can form a basis for the translation of the ST. In 2.5, I show 
how such a description can be made, by presenting two case studies. 
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2.5 Case studies 
Here I present two case studies of reading the ST for translation: in 2.5.1, the  
German poetry of Mörike, which I also examine in 3.5 as a case study on writing the 
TT; in 2.5.2, the HG NT, which I also examine in 4.5 as a case study on theorising 
the TT. I offer two case studies in order to illustrate two genres, poetry and prose: as 
Antoine Berman (2004:279) stresses, it is easy to forget that literary translation 
applies as much to prose as to poetry. Both forms have considerable expressive 
potential (Scott, 2000:159). In investigating Mörike, I show how the consideration of 
forms of life and language-games can help the reflective practitioner of translation; 
in investigating the NT, I show how the consideration of surface grammar and depth 
grammar can help the reflective practitioner of translation, in line with 
Wittgenstein’s epistemological instruction (PI 45) that meaning can be found by 
examining use. This separation is artificial and is a result of constraints of space, and 
there will be overlap, because any Wittgensteinian investigation is necessarily criss-
cross (PI p.3). 
 In making use of Wittgenstein’s terms, there is a danger of falling into what 
Read (2004:85) calls the ‘technicalisation and jargonalisation of what … must above 
all be an activity, a set of methods’. I hope to avoid this danger, though the genre of 
the academic thesis involves a necessary referencing of Wittgensteinian tools, more 
than would be the case in an inquiry outside a thesis. The Danger of Words by 
Maurice Drury (1973), for example, has been described by Monk (1990:264) as 
‘perhaps, in its tone and concerns, the most truly Wittgensteinian work ever 
published by any of Wittgenstein’s students’. What is noteworthy is that 
Wittgenstein is rarely referred to in Drury’s essays (although the intellectual debt is 
fully acknowledged in the Preface). Drury simply submits psychological terms to 
grammatical analysis by examining how they are used and showing how this use 
causes confusion in the practice of psychiatry. I think that translation after 
Wittgenstein can proceed in a similar way. Wittgenstein would be mentioned as a 
source and then applied. The ladder is thrown away (TL-P 6.54). Therefore the case 
studies in this thesis will not constantly make specific reference to Wittgenstein for 
support, although his terms will be used and the overall perspective will be 
Wittgensteinian. As Laura Cook (2007:xv) notes, applying Wittgenstein is not to 
muse in the abstract over how his terms work: the terms are instructions for 
procedure rather than abstract theories.  
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            2.5.1 The poetry of Mörike 
 Wittgenstein, in a letter to Russell in 1914, asserts that Mörike ‘really is a 
great poet and his poems are among the best things we have’ (McGuinness 
2008:65). In line with what has been argued in this chapter, it is possible to state a 
number of facts about Mörike and his verse: Mörike lived between 1804 and 1875 in 
Swabia, Germany; his work is part of the canon of German Literature; he was a 
Lutheran minister by profession who completed his studies in Tübingen; he found 
his vocation to be a difficult one, eventually taking early retirement to eke out a 
living from writing, journalism and teaching; his poems have become popular 
through their settings by Hugo Wolf (1926); there is an immense variety in his verse, 
both in form and in voice, as shown in Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4: MÖRIKE’S POETRY 
ST FORM VOICE 
 
‘Abschied’  
(1975:31) 
(‘Departure’) 
 
Rhymed couplets and 
tercets with free rhythm 
A poet kicks a reviewer 
downstairs with burlesque 
abandon. 
 
‘Auf ein altes Bild’ (1975:46) 
(‘On an Old Picture’) 
 
Rhyming couplets with 
four line stress 
(Knittelvers): 6 lines 
An image of the nativity of 
Jesus foreshadows his death. 
 
 
‘Bilder aus Bebenhausen’ 
(1975:9-10) 
(‘Pictures from Bebenhausen’) 
 
Unrhymed elegiac couplets Pictures of a ruined 
monastery are given. 
‘Der alte Turmhahn’ 
(1975:16-25) 
(‘The Old Weathercock’) 
 
Knittelvers: 306 lines A self-styled idyll in which a 
weathercock describes the 
wonders of parsonage life. 
‘Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag’ 
(1975:31) 
(‘One Small Hour Before 
Day’) 
 
Folk song (see below for 
more detailed comment) 
A young woman is told by a 
swallow that her lover is 
unfaithful. 
‘Im Frühling’  
(1975:3) 
(‘In Spring’) 
 
Use of rhyme to no scheme 
and with free meter 
The lyric ‘I’ muses on spring 
and contemplates the 
unknowable past. 
‘Rat einer Alten’ 
(1975:37) 
(‘Advice of an Old Woman’) 
 
Unrhymed verse in heavily 
stressed lines of five 
syllables 
An old woman advises 
young people on life. 
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This laying-out of facts is in line with Wittgenstein’s stress on description (PI 124). 
The seven poems play seven different language-games. Whereas ‘Im Frühling’ 
portrays the lyric voice introduced to German Literature by the poetry of Goethe, 
‘Auf ein altes Bild’ shows a more Christian sensibility, while ‘Der alte Turmhahn’ 
celebrates a particular bourgeois form of life etc. A number of tropes can be seen in 
the images that dominate his poetry, making manifest the transitory nature of a 
beautiful world: rivers flow; animals announce betrayal; the sun disperses the mist; 
signs of death are everywhere, even when everything seems to be going well, so that 
even the old weathercock realises that its days are numbered. 
These are typical of the facts of which a reader needs to be informed (Fish, 
1996) and therefore central to reading for translation. I see in the variety of mood in 
Mörike’s verse the same tensions he exhibited in his failure to follow his pastoral 
vocation. The reader encounters the voice of a Romantic poet with a bad conscience 
in one poem (e.g. ‘Im Frühling’) and the voice of a bourgeois poet with unfulfilled 
longings in the next (e.g. ‘Der alte Turmhahn’). The portrayal of a fractured self 
possibly accounts for his continued popularity in an age where questions of identity 
and self-definition proliferate. His work is a blend of conflicting drives, each poem 
articulating this blend in a different way. The poems were also written for a 
particular reading community, i.e. bourgeois readers prepared to look back to the 
Romantic vision.  
The 1837 poem ‘Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag’ (1975:31) is given as text (54). 
 
 (54) 
EIN STÜNDLEIN WOHL VOR  TAG 
a     small-hour       well      before day 
 
Derweil ich schlafend lag, 
while     I     sleeping   lay 
Ein Stündlein    wohl vor      Tag, 
a     small-hour well   before day 
Sang vor      dem Fenster auf dem Baum 
sang before the   window on  the   tree 
Ein Schwälblein    mir,    ich hört’  es kaum, 
a    small-swallow to-me I     heard it hardly 
Ein Stündlein  wohl vor     Tag. 
a    small-hour well before day 
 
‘Hör an, was   ich dir       sag! 
hear on  what I     to-you say 
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Dein Schätzlein       ich verklag: 
your small-treasure I    accuse 
Derweil ich dieses Singen tu, 
while      I    this     singing do 
Herzt     er ein Lieb in guter Ruh’, 
cuddles he a    love  in good peace 
Ein Stündlein   wohl vor      Tag.’ 
a     small-hour well  before day 
 
Oh weh, nichts  weiter  sag! 
Oh alas nothing further say 
O  still,  nichts   hören    mag! 
o  quiet nothing to-hear desire 
Flieg ab,    flieg ab      von  meinem Baum, 
fly     away fly    away from my         tree 
– Ach Lieb’ und Treu’    ist wie ein Traum 
   ah   love    and loyalty is  like  a    dream  
Ein Stündlein   wohl vor      Tag. 
a     small-hour well  before day 
 
 
 
There are facts about the poem’s physiognomy that can be agreed upon: it plays with 
the Volkslied (‘folk song’) tradition, exhibiting elements of that tradition, e.g. the 
refrain, the use of diminutives, the talking bird and the theme of disappointed love; it 
is a Rollengedicht (‘role-poem’), in which the lyric poet adopts a persona, i.e. that of 
the betrayed lover; it uses full rhyme to the scheme of [(aA¹BbA¹) (A²accA¹) 
(A²aBbA¹)]; within three stanzas the narrator is brought from being secure in love to 
total disillusionment with a faithless lover; the blend of the talking swallow sets the 
poem in the world of the fairy tale; it is influenced by the Tagelied (‘dawn-song’) 
tradition (in which lovers part at dawn), on which it is an ironic take. 
 The language-game played is that of the human person in love who finds that 
love betrayed. In a comparison of Minnesang (Middle High German love lyric) with 
the sweet lyric of the 1930s (the work of such songwriters as Cole Porter), Ruth 
Harvey shows how both traditions manifest the same patterns, with the same themes 
and techniques appearing in lyrics from both traditions, so that sweet lyric can be 
described as ‘an art form … preserving many of the essential features of a long and 
glorious tradition’ (1963:15). It could be said that the two forms play the same 
language-games. Similarly, ‘Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag’ plays the same language-
games found in many contemporary pop songs, e.g. its guiding metaphor LOVE IS 
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A TRAP
27
 is also seen in the song ‘Womanizer’ by Britney Spears (2008). The 
particular form of life portrayed (the intricate verse form; the use of full rhyme; the 
fantasy of the talking bird) makes the poem difficult to translate, but that the form of 
life is human makes translation possible (Searle, 2011). Writing in 2011, I therefore 
find myself wondering what contemporary singers such as Spears, Werner Güra or 
Katherine Jenkins would make of this lyric. How about the contemporary 
Symphonic Metal band Within Temptation? How could the poem be written to make 
it performable by any of these? Could the rhyme scheme be preserved without 
descending into bathos? Are multiple translations possible? If this is a surveyable 
representation of the human being in love, which retains its poetic effects some two 
hundred years after its composition, is it possible to replace it by a surveyable 
representation in English? Could the same language-games be played? Such 
questions indicate a turn from reading the ST for translation to writing the TT, the 
topic of Chapter 3. 
 
2.5.2 The New Testament 
 Most people who read the NT do so in translation (Boase-Beier & Holman, 
1999:3), a point further considered in 4.5.1. To recognise that the NT is a translation 
and to look at the HG of its first-century writers is to investigate the stylistic and 
lexical choices made by these writers, which may indicate that opportunities open to 
them are not open to a writer of contemporary English, French, German etc. Julian 
Barnes (2012:np), reviewing translations of Gustave Flaubert’s novel Madame 
Bovary, points out that English grammar is not French grammar, which seems an 
obvious enough remark, but one that, he claims, has escaped a recent translator of 
Flaubert, Lydia Davis, who imports a clunkiness to her version that is not in the ST 
by trying to imitate French grammar in her rendering. Noting the differences 
between languages is an essential task of the translator. Jakobson (1959:236), for 
example, asserts that languages differ not in what they may say but in what they 
must say, which is supported by the insistence in the PI that meaning is on the 
surface, that we should look at the form of what is said etc. 
The NT is a collection of 27 texts written in the first century and accepted as 
canonical by most Christians. Can a Wittgensteinian reading, which puts the ST first, 
                                                 
27
 The use of capitals is a convention to indicate a conceptual as opposed to a textual metaphor. 
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shed any light on a work that has been studied intensely for two thousand years? To 
put the ST first involves acknowledging that it lacks any easy categorisation. The 
Gospels (traditionally ascribed to Matthew, Mark, Luke and John), for example, 
which tell the life of Jesus, are not biographies in the contemporary sense of the 
word: Mark omits material that would be expected in a contemporary biography, 
such as any description of Jesus or details of his life before his ministry. There has 
been a recent trend in scholarship, however, to read the NT as literature, and this 
would fit in, I think, with a Wittgensteinian stress on the primacy of practice and of 
use. Thus the Gospels do fit the criteria of first-century Greek and Roman lives that 
combine ‘folklore, gossip, praise and literary invention’ (Keefer, 2008:19). We can 
bring a literary reading to the NT, which would allow readers ‘to understand content 
through close engagement with form’ (Keefer, 2008:7), to be part of the text, to 
engage with it, to use it to change his or her mind or life. A grammatical 
investigation of Mark, for example, can show how the style is integral to the 
presentation. Keefer (2008:29) notes that Mark presents Jesus as a lonely and 
misunderstood figure, an enigmatic portrait supported by the ‘sparseness of the 
narrative’, so that in ‘the same way that the narrative isolates the character of Jesus, 
thus also the syntax of the Gospel isolates the reader’. An instance of this is the 
iconic way that chapters 8, 9 and 10 of Mark all end with a prediction by Jesus that 
he must suffer and die, a prediction that the disciples meet with incomprehension, 
making the reader ask himself or herself if he or she is prepared to follow Jesus no 
matter what it takes.  
 Looking at how the ST uses words can enable us to see how an author has 
chosen to write in a particular way in order to create a particular effect. In Mark 9:2, 
for example, a past occurrence is described in the present tense. The ST is given as 
(55). 
 
 (55) 
 Καὶ  μετὰ ἡμέρας  ἓξ    παραλαμβάνει ὁ   Ἰησοῦς 
Kai   meta hêmeras hex paralambanei   ho  Iesous 
and after  days        six  takes-away       the Jesus 
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The use of the present tense heightens the tension for dramatic effect. Jesus 
interrupts his journey, in order to take three of the disciples up a high mountain. It 
seems that something significant will happen, especially as the Old Testament 
frequently sets important events on mountains, such as Moses receiving the 
Covenant from God on Mount Sinai (Exodus 19:20). In Mark, Jesus will be 
transfigured before his disciples. Most translations of this episode (e.g. the New 
Jerusalem Bible) choose to use the past tense for rendering the text, but Nick King 
(2004) uses the simple present, maintaining the note of the unexpected: ‘And six 
days later Jesus takes aside …’ 
 I use texts (56) and (57) to show how surface grammar relates to depth 
grammar, following PI 664. The texts represent John 20:27 and John 21:19 
respectively. 
 
 (56) 
 Φέρε τὴν χεῖρά σου     καὶ βάλε  εἰς   τὴν πλευράν μου 
Phere tên cheira sou      kai bale    eis   tên  pleuran   mou 
take   the hand   of-you and place into the  side         of-me 
 
 (57) 
 Ἀκολούθει    μοι. 
Akolouthei    moi. 
be-following to- me 
 
The aorist imperatives in (56) indicate that a single action is commanded: Jesus 
demands that Thomas should place his hand into his side on this occasion only. The 
present imperative in (57) indicates that an ongoing action is commanded: Jesus 
commands Peter to follow him forever, not just for the next few minutes. To look at 
the grammar of the ST in this way is useful for the translator, who can see how the 
meaning of the HG depends on the use, viewing each sentence as an instrument ‘and 
its sense as its employment’ (PI 421). By analysing the grammatical choices made 
by ST authors, by working out why an author made a particular choice, a way in to a 
translation can be found as a translator writes commands in his or her TL that would 
maintain the distinction. 
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Text (58) represents Mark 1:15 and shows how the choice of lexis 
instantiates meaning. 
 
 (58) 
 μετανοεῖτε καὶ πιστεύετε ἐν τῷ  εὐαγγελίῳ. 
metanoiete kai  pisteuete  en tô   euangeliô. 
repent        and believe     in the  good-news 
 
 
 
The initial verb, μετανοέω [metanoeô] (‘I repent’) in the present active imperative 
indicative, second person plural, has the implication of turning round one’s entire 
life, not simply giving up sweets for Lent. In translating this term, therefore, a 
translator might choose to find ways of maintaining the radical nature of the message 
preached, as in the rendering in Die Bibel in gerechter Sprache (The Bible in Just 
Language) (2006), cited as (59). 
 
 (59) 
 Kehrt zum    Leben um      und vertraut dem   Evangelium! 
 turn    to-the life      round and trust      to-the gospel 
 
 
 
The notion of turning one’s life round is maintained and faith is construed as trust 
rather than assent, though the noun ‘Evangelium’ retains a scholastic rather than an 
everyday connotation. 
Text (60) is the description of Jesus’s death by crucifixion in John 19:30.28 I 
use the analysis by University of London BD examiners (2004:13) in my discussion. 
 
(60)  
 
ὅτε    οὖν         ἔλαβεν   τὸ  ὄξος       [ὁ]    Ἰησοῦς  εἶπεν,   Τετέλεσται:  
hote   oun         elaben    to  oxos       [ho]   Iesous   eipen,   Tetelestai: 
when therefore received the vinegar [the] Jesus     he-said  it-has-been-finished 
 
καὶ κλίνας    τὴν  κεφαλὴν  παρέδωκεν τὸ  πνεῦμα. 
kai  klinas     tên  kephalên  paredôken   to  pneuma. 
and reclining the  head       he-gave-up  the spirit 
                                                 
28
 The square brackets indicate that not all manuscripts have the definite article here. 
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The surface grammar is a simple narrative account of four actions: Jesus drank 
vinegar that had been offered to him by a Roman soldier; he said that it was over; he 
bowed his head; he died. My translation in (61) therefore seems to be satisfactory, 
because it represents these actions. 
 
 
 (61) 
 
So when Jesus had taken the vinegar, he said: ‘It is finished’. And, bowing his head, 
he died. 
 
 
Or should the final clause be translated as ‘he gave up the ghost’, in order to retain 
the Greek idiom (which has become a standard if now somewhat archaic – and 
potentially facetious – form in English, because it was the rendering of this 
expression by the translators of the King James Bible)? The question seems to be 
one of stylistic choice and nothing more. 
Attention to the way in which the Greek is written, however, shows that other 
factors have not been taken into account in this reading, i.e. the implications of the 
verbs ‘Τετέλεσται’ [tetelestai] and ‘παρέδωκεν’ [paredôken]. The first verb often has 
a purposive sense, a sense of fulfilment, consonant with the stress throughout the 
whole Gospel on how Jesus, as Word of God, is in control of events. The second 
verb can also mean ‘hand over’, so that Jesus could be said here to be handing over 
the Holy Spirit to the Church. The Examiners (2004:13) comment that this 
understanding of John’s words ‘is not necessarily refuted by the observation that 
Jesus gave the Spirit only at Easter (John 20:22), since John tends to merge Jesus’s 
death and glorification’. It is a question of reading the text with a view to the form of 
life that produced it, what King (2004:12) calls ‘the kind of life that lurks beneath the 
text of the NT’. (King has told me in personal correspondence that he believes a 
reading of Wittgenstein has influenced his approach to translation.) His rendering of 
this verse brings out the theological implications and is given as text (62) and 
enables the reader to construct the depth grammar beneath the surface grammar. 
 
(62) 
And when he had taken the vinegar, Jesus said, ‘It is perfected’. And inclining his 
head, he handed over the Spirit. 
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In PI 373, Wittgenstein notes: ‘Grammar tells us what kind of object anything is. 
(Theology as grammar.)’ By reading the NT grammatically, we encounter its 
theology, which may allow in turn the theology to be translated. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
‘How should I translate?’ The correct answer to this question is to point out 
that translation is a practice and that this practice begins with reading, i.e. reading for 
translation. If Berger (1977:8) is right to assert that what we see is affected by what 
we know, then it follows that a knowledge of Wittgenstein will enable a reader to see 
the text as physiognomy and to be freed from the (possibly unconscious) paradigm 
of decoding. In the Big Typescript (BT) p.314, Wittgenstein notes that we encounter 
philosophical problems in practical life when we are guided by ‘certain analogies 
within language’, rather than by practical purpose, an insight that supports work by 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on cognitive metaphor showing how certain 
cognitive metaphors can mislead us into thinking that meaning has an existence 
independent of words, as in the container metaphor: when somebody says, for 
example, that it is difficult to put his or her thoughts into words (Lakoff & Johnson, 
2003:11). False analogies are embedded in our language. 
 That it is possible to link Wittgenstein to theorists such as Lakoff and 
Johnson strengthens the case for looking at his work. Wittgenstein supports and is 
supported by relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), for example, where the 
stress on reading the mind of the speaker parallels Wittgenstein’s notion of the form 
of life. Similarly, Michael Burke (2003) uses the concept of the cognitive scenario 
(following Lakoff, 1987) as a tool to facilitate the understanding of love poetry, 
giving the example of the pub (after Stockwell, 2002:77). Most people know the sort 
of things to expect when they enter a pub: drinks and food for sale; quiz machines; 
tables at which to sit; a bar etc. Somebody is unlikely to be surprised to hear that a 
pub is serving food, but might be very surprised to be told that food is being served 
by a dog, because this is not typically part of the cognitive scenario outside a joke or 
a fantasy narrative. Similarly, a number of features might be expected by the reader 
who opens a volume of love poetry: the intense expression of emotion; the use of 
metaphor; the use of the first person singular etc. Wittgenstein’s methods offer a link 
to the cognitive scenario, a short-cut for getting there, a set of methods for describing 
it. The attentive reader of the PI is offered tools to allow him or her to become adept 
at seeing what is instantiated in a literary text, at becoming at home there. For the 
translator, this means to be in a better position to translate, by seeing the text’s 
physiognomy and responding to it, just as one might note differences between a 
German pub and an English pub. 
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 My claim is not that a reading of Wittgenstein will produce perfect translators 
and perfect translations. Any such claim would view translation as a scientific 
procedure analogous to propositional calculus, a view alien to the spirit of the later 
Wittgenstein. Pilkington (2000:49) asserts that there is no single theory or method 
that can unlock a meaning within literary texts, so that they can be read correctly by 
the reader who happens to have come across that theory or method. If that were the 
case, then the vast majority of readers would have no hope of ever understanding 
literature. Pilkington’s view is correct because the concept of a hidden meaning in a 
text, waiting to be unlocked, is a chimera, as shown by my reading of Wittgenstein. 
To use Wittgenstein is a philosophical way of describing the process of reading for 
translation. There are other ways available: the sociological; the cognitive; the 
literary; the psychological etc. And any way of describing a process is bound in turn 
to become part of that process. Boase-Beier (2006b:147) argues that knowledge of a 
theory can be ‘a pair of spectacles through which we see the world differently’, 
quoting the philosopher Mary Midgeley (2001:26). 
 Wittgenstein, in Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (RPP) I 94, 
similarly recommends the need for ‘new conceptual glasses’ in order to see with 
clarity. The tools in the PI can provide such glasses, which is not to suggest that to 
use Wittgenstein is necessary for literary translation. The number of acclaimed 
literary translations written before the publication of the PI in 1953 is sufficient to 
dismiss that notion. My claim is rather that the story told by Wittgenstein in his later 
work is too important for the reflective practitioner of translation to ignore, because 
he offers a perspective on language that can enable the task of reading for translation 
to be approached with clarity: ‘the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete 
clarity’ (PI 133). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
3. WRITING THE TARGET TEXT 
     
 
 
 
In the elder days of art 
Builders wrought with greatest care 
Each minute and unseen part, 
For the Gods see everywhere. 
 
Longfellow (1904:186) 
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3.1 The translator and the fly-bottle 
In this chapter, I address the translator, the writer of the TT, and ask how the 
account of Wittgenstein that I have built up can be of use to him or her. For the 
practising translator, the later philosophy of Wittgenstein can offer a philosophical 
turn that can improve practice. In PI 309, Wittgenstein states that his aim in 
philosophy is to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle (a simple form of trap). 
This image has been taken (for example, by Kerr, 1998:55 ff.) as a metaphor for 
Wittgenstein’s project of subverting a metaphysical way of thinking that has been 
highly influential in the west. The destruction of a false paradigm can make it 
possible for the world to be seen clearly. Drawing on insights from the translation 
theorist Berman, I argue that the metaphysical tradition critiqued by Wittgenstein has 
been responsible for an approach to translating that deforms literary translation, and I 
claim that a reading of Wittgenstein can be used to tell a different story that opposes 
the metaphysical: Read (2010:605) notes that for Wittgenstein the opposing term to 
‘ordinary’ is not ‘extraordinary’ but ‘metaphysical’ or ‘nonsensical’. The translator 
is freed from the fly-bottle. Literary translation becomes possible.  
 The activity of translating is frequently divided into literary and non-literary, 
as discussed in 1.1. Chesterman and Wagner (2002:5) give the example of Ted 
Hughes’ translation of Aeschylus from Greek to English (1999) as an example of 
literary translation, and the translation into English of the label on a packet of white 
powder in a Greek supermarket as an example of non-literary translation. This 
example is a straightforward way of categorising translation, which reflects a 
division in the way that the discipline is organised in the academic world: UEA 
(2010), for example, offers an MA in Applied Translation Studies in the School of 
Language and Communication Studies and an MA in Literary Translation in the 
School of Literature, Drama and Creative Writing. The aspiring translator is directed 
to a school of study depending on the sort of texts that he or she wishes to translate. 
Theo Hermans (2007a:77), commenting on how Chesterman and Wagner refer to 
literary and non-literary translation as the ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ ends of the range, 
respectively, notes how ‘value enters the picture as well’. The plays of Aeschylus 
(on account of their literariness) are valued more highly than works of popular 
fiction and advertisements, even though advertisements, for example, can exhibit 
literariness and can be very difficult to translate. Hughes’ translations (on account of 
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their literariness) have in turn been valued more highly than translations of popular 
fiction and of advertisements. 
In a 1985 essay, Berman (2004:277) addresses the ‘great split’ between 
literary and non-literary translation. He defines literary translation as being 
concerned with works ‘so bound to their language that the translating act inevitably 
becomes a manipulation of signifiers’, and non-literary translation as being about 
‘semantic transfer’. These definitions are themselves problematic, for they seem to 
suggest that literary translation does not involve replacing a text in one language 
with a text in another language, but they can be used to explain the examples given 
by Chesterman and Wagner. Hughes manipulates the signifiers of the Greek text of 
Aeschylus for literary effect, producing a creative work that is itself literary, so that 
it can be read in its own right or performed on the stage; his translation involves 
more than the competent use of a dictionary, because he is concerned with 
maintaining the poetic effects of the ST. By contrast, the main thing that matters 
about the translation of the label of the white powder is that the English-speaking 
tourist should not mistake rat poison for sugar and meet an untimely end while on 
holiday. Here, only semantic transfer is the issue, which might well involve the 
competent use of a bilingual dictionary and nothing more. This raises a crucial 
question: can the literariness of the ST go missing?
29
 
Berman’s core assertion (2004:288) is that there has been a tendency in 
western translation to translate literary texts as if they were non-literary by 
prioritising the restitution of meaning, so that translators have attempted to produce 
works that are (paradoxically), more clear, more elegant and more fluent than the ST, 
by ignoring the ST’s literariness and attempting to producing a TT that is easily 
understood. His critique is similar to that of Ezra Pound (2004:93), who notes how 
translators often engage in the self-defeating task of writing for the linguistically lazy 
reader. Berman refers to this tendency as a ‘deforming’ method of translation. Works 
of literature have been translated as if they were technical manuals, without regard to 
matters of style or to the production of literary effects, only to easy comprehension. 
This pessimistic view of the history of literary translation is shared by other 
translation theorists. I use Berman to exemplify a common perception. Venuti (1998 
& 2008), for example, sums up the history of literary translation as a succession of 
                                                 
29
 See 4.3 for further discussion of quality in literary translation. 
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scandals, in which translators attempt to make themselves invisible by normalising 
the ST in their rendering, whilst Barnstone (1993:35) warns against the ‘mindless 
imposition of standards for information transfer onto the translation of aesthetic 
texts’. The normalising of the ST in translation is a recognised tendency in 
translation that Bellos even sees in the translations of Edgar Allen Poe by the great 
French poet Charles Baudelaire (2011:199). Similarly, Berman’s view that literary 
translation is not a matter of searching for semantic equivalences (2004:287) is 
common to many translation theorists, for example, Paz & Weinberger (1987) or 
Hermans (2007b). 
In that Berman was writing to expose a scandal, understood as a 
misrepresentation of the literary task of the translator, and to propose ways of 
reforming it, it might be hoped that the situation is different in the twenty-first 
century. However, this does not seem to be the case. I give two examples. Firstly, in 
a recent article Sarah Lawson (2009) describes how translations she produced for the 
Foundation for the Production and Translation of Dutch Literature were rejected 
solely because the style of her English was perceived to be insufficiently elegant and 
insufficiently easy to read, a rejection made without any reference to the style of the 
ST and how this might have been echoed in the writing of the TT. Lawson argues 
that one of the most important tasks of the translator is to bring out the voice of the 
ST author, which is a central claim of Berman, so that in her opinion the experts 
from the Foundation confused translation and translator. I find this to be true: if I 
were to translate Simone de Beauvoir on Monday, Albert Camus on Tuesday and 
André Gide on Wednesday, it would be odd if I rendered them in the same elegant 
English style, because these authors have very different French styles. To look solely 
towards the TT is to ignore the physiognomy of the ST (PI 568). As Berman 
(2004:279) notes, literary masterpieces – he cites François Rabelais and Jean Paul – 
are often characterised by ‘a kind of “bad writing”, a certain “lack of control” in their 
texture’. To aim to render a novel by Rabelais into elegant English is to be engaged 
in the same sort of exercise as translating the label on the bottle, for all the surface 
differences. It is to fail to be aware of the novel’s depth grammar, to use the term 
from PI 664 discussed in 2.2. In Wittgensteinian terms, the difference between 
literary translation and non-literary translation can be described as the difference 
between the translation of depth grammar and surface grammar, a description that 
has the advantage of criss-crossing genres and avoids the problems in Berman’s 
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definitions. Secondly, Eliza Handyani (2011:34) notes that many literary translators 
into Indonesian produce the TT by rendering the ST word for word, instead of 
looking for creative solutions, a situation she explains by lack of SL competency and 
literary skills, both of which would seem to be necessary to produce a literary 
translation in Berman’s sense. 
Value judgement is crucial to Berman’s argument. He identifies exceptions to 
the deforming trend, for example, the Sophocles renderings carried out by Hölderlin 
(1952), which he sees as ‘one of the great moments of western translation’ 
(2004:276). Such exceptions, however, only confirm the rule. He details twelve 
‘deforming tendencies’ in translation: rationalisation, clarification, expansion etc. 
Yet to see these as ‘deforming’ involves a value-judgement that is presumably not 
shared by those who use strategies such as clarification in the first place. There is no 
reason per se why to produce a rationalising translation should be seen as deforming. 
Every translation is in one sense deforming because the writing of the TT inevitably 
changes the form in which a reader encounters the work: Berman’s contention is that 
the manner in which reformulation has taken place has frequently been detrimental.  
Berman would need to show why the situation he describes has arisen and 
then to show why it is wrong. I think that he addresses the first of these two points 
but fails to address the second. My reading of Wittgenstein can be used both to 
support and to complete Berman’s argument.30 It supports the argument by showing 
that Berman has identified the correct target in the metaphysical tradition. It 
completes the argument by offering a way of subverting this tradition: methods from 
Wittgenstein can be used to show other ways of approaching literary translation, so 
that the work of Wittgenstein can offer a set of tools to be used in the training of the 
translator. In Chapter 2, I argued that Wittgenstein can be used to help the translator 
read the ST. In this chapter, my point is that he can be used to help the translator 
become clear about the nature of literary translation. The translator is introduced not 
to a single method, but to methods, like ‘different therapies’ (PI 133). Using 
Wittgenstein in this way, I am in line with what Pym (2007:24) sees as one of the 
three main interactions between philosophy and translation studies, i.e. the use of 
philosophical discourses by translation theorists and practitioners for support and 
authority for their ideas, as discussed in 1.2. 
                                                 
30
 Arrojo (2010) similarly sees Platonic thought as responsible for a wrong picture of translation as 
transference and uses Nietzsche’s thought as a tool to argue against it. 
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Berman (2004:288) traces the deforming tendency in literary translation to 
the (largely unconscious) influence of Plato and the ‘typically Platonic separation 
between spirit and letter, sense and word, content and form, the sensible and the non-
sensible’, so that all translation becomes the translation of surface grammar, which is 
seen as bad writing, and tidied up. It would never be possible to prove whether Plato 
has caused the deforming tendency in translation. The views attributed to him are in 
any case those expressed by Socrates, the main character in Plato’s dialogues, whose 
views do not necessarily represent those of Plato. There are also many different ways 
in which Plato has been interpreted. Berman’s perception of how Platonic dualism 
has formed and dominated western thought is, however, not isolated. Mark 
Edmundson (1995), Kerr (1998) and Sontag (1996) describe how Platonic dualism 
has influenced the following fields respectively: literary criticism; philosophy and 
theology; aesthetics. I now examine the views that Plato expresses through Socrates 
on art.  
 In Plato’s most widely-read dialogue, The Republic (1988), Socrates attempts 
to sketch an ideal society, one ruled by philosophers, and maintains that artists would 
have no place in it. He sees the activity of art as corrupting for citizens, so that if a 
dramatic poet visited the Republic, he or she would be taken politely to the border 
(514a). Murdoch (1997) relates this view to the parable of the cave (514 ff.), in 
which Socrates describes prisoners who lie shackled in an underground cave lit by a 
fire, to which they have their backs. They watch shadows cast on the wall, as events 
take place behind them, and mistake these shadows for reality. Socrates asserts that 
philosophical activity can allow the prisoner to leave the cave and to see the true 
world in the light of the sun. He advances the doctrine of the Forms, which are 
ultimate instances of the qualities that we dimly discern. The good qualities that we 
ascribe to phenomena – for example, when we describe a wine or an action as good – 
are caused by the eternal, immutable Form of the Good, for example. Philosophy 
enables human beings to perceive the Forms, which is why Socrates expresses 
hostility to art. The artist makes copies of the material world, itself a copy of the 
spiritual world. The artist mistakes the fire for the sun. Art therefore ‘apes the 
spiritual and subtly disguises and trivialises it’ (Murdoch 1997:433) and must be 
banned.  
With respect to literature, the Republic would accept the Greek legends if and 
only if they have an improving moral. Stories that do not have such a moral would 
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be rejected, and even stories that are morally praiseworthy would be stripped of their 
style. Socrates (393d) analyses Homer’s account in The Iliad of Chryses the priest 
appealing to the Greeks on behalf of his daughter. Socrates decodes the episode, 
stripping away the style in order to find ‘the pure narrative, which is free from 
representation’: signifier and signified are separated in the same way that Platonic 
dualism separates body and spirit. The story of Chryses is narrated as somebody 
might describe a film that he or she has just seen to a friend who had missed it. Style 
is seen as decorative, not as structural. Even Homer would be led to the border. If 
Socrates would banish the artists because they copy a copy, he would presumably 
also banish the translators for making a copy of a copy of a copy and thus 
committing the same metaphysical crime as the artist. 
The tendency to take an essentialist view of language, i.e. postulating a one-
to-one correspondence between words and their meanings, can also be traced back to 
Plato. Socrates, in the Cratylus (338A), defends the view that ‘everything has a right 
name of its own, which comes by nature … a name is not whatever people call a 
thing by agreement … there is a kind of inherent correctness in names’. Socrates also 
attacks this view, but it can be taken to represent a way that people construe 
meaning, and is the construal found in the Augustinian paradigm in PI 1. 
In contrast to Berman, who both argues against the dualist tradition and 
names Plato as its source, Wittgenstein generally avoids individual targets in the PI. 
As McGinn (2008:20) asserts: ‘The philosophical doctrines and pictures of how 
language works that Wittgenstein looks at, some of which may be identified with the 
views of particular philosophers, are really of interest to him insofar as they 
represent a style of thought which he believes makes misunderstanding and 
confusion inevitable’. He is not attacking Plato, but what Nassim Nicholas Taleb 
(2007:xxv) calls ‘Platonicity’, which Taleb defines as ‘our tendency to mistake the 
map for the territory, to focus on pure and defined “forms”’. The mind attempts to 
deny the body. The translating mind attempts to deny the words on the page and 
looks towards the Forms not the forms. The target that Berman identifies can be 
broadened from Plato to Platonicity.  
What is missing in Berman is any foundation for his argument. There is 
assertion and example and illustration, but no reason why his essay should not be 
seen as just a passionately-held opinion. There is no appeal to anything outside for 
support. Socrates, in other words, might be right. Berman (2004:288) specifically 
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states: ‘this Platonic figure of translation is not something “false” that can be 
criticised theoretically or ideologically’. The implication of this is that Berman’s 
own counter-argument is similarly beyond criticism. The situation becomes one of 
the assertion of intuitions, or of emotions, of trying to scream the loudest. There is a 
logical gap here that a reading of Wittgenstein can fill, for the PI can be seen as an 
extended criticism of the phenomenon of the dualism that Plato is taken by Berman 
to represent. Many other influential figures in the western tradition can be described 
as dualists: Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Martin Luther, Descartes, Franz Kafka, etc. 
What is at stake is a whole metaphysical tradition, which Kerr (1998:136) defines as 
‘the age-long refusal to acknowledge the bodiliness of meaning and mind’, so that 
life becomes a quest for objectivity. This metaphysical tradition can be seen as 
implying that there is a language of ideas that lies behind reality, to which an 
individual can gain access by introspection. A work of literature is accordingly seen 
as a translation into ordinary language from this ideal language. William James 
(1981:185) describes, for example, how we can discover ‘states of consciousness’ 
through introspection, positing what McGinn (2008:117) calls ‘a pure psychological 
language … free of any objective reference’. 
Wittgenstein (PR 3) points out: ‘How strange if logic were concerned with an 
“ideal” language and not with ours. For what would this ideal language express? 
Presumably, what we now express in our ordinary language; in that case, this is the 
language logic must investigate’. To look for an ideal language remains, however, a 
very human temptation. Read (2010:595) argues that PI 243-275, usually categorised 
as the private language argument, depicts ‘the reader’s (and the author’s) inclination 
to fantasise that a “private” language will satisfy his desires, giving him certainty, 
the kind of foundation that he philosophised in order to obtain’. The desire for a 
private language can frequently be seen in the view held of translation. Will Stone 
(2005:14), for example, introducing his translations of the Austrian poet Georg 
Trakl, refers to ‘trying to absorb and filter that more elusive language lying just 
beyond, a language which the German is privileged to carry’. It is the ‘pure 
language’ described by Walter Benjamin (2004:80), which the translator is seen as 
striving to release. By contrast, a reading of Wittgenstein suggests that meaning is 
found in the forms, not in the Forms. 
The search for an ideal language is seen in the way that the process of 
translation is often described. In a discussion of machine translation, for example, 
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Wagner (Chesterman & Wagner, 2002:124) asserts that translation is a process in 
three stages. Step 1 is the analysis of the ST. Step 2 involves ‘visualising the abstract 
non-linguistic sense of the language’. Step 3 is the synthesis, the writing of the TT. 
In the context of machine translation, it is unsurprising that her model is a 
mechanistic one, but it seems to me to make no sense to talk about a non-linguistic 
sense of the linguistic. I am not denying that thought can take place without 
language. Steven Pinker (1994:70), for example, notes how many creative people 
report thinking in mental images not words when they are inspired, citing Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s account of how he composed the poem ‘Kubla Khan’, while 
Temple Grandin and Catherine Johnson (2005:241ff.) argue that recent research 
shows that many animals can think, although they cannot use language. My denial is 
that it makes no sense to look at a linguistic string and to try to work out its non-
linguistic sense. To do so is to fall into the trap of decoding. It is not the case that we 
have a non-linguistic meaning that we turn into linguistic meaning by making some 
sort of mental act (PI 120).  
This view of language is one of the major targets of the PI. The Augustinian 
paradigm sees meaning as ostensive, as a mental activity. Kerr (1998:57) describes 
the paradigm with the metaphor ‘the hermit in the head’. The mind is viewed as 
something isolated and distinct from the body. Knowledge is conceived as mental 
and individual and meaning is seen as hidden, which is the view of the early 
Wittgenstein (T-LP), for whom the task of the philosopher as logician is to excavate 
meaning by formalisation. For the later Wittgenstein, the case is different, as shown 
by his attack on the Augustinian paradigm, which can be linked both to the picture 
theory of the T-LP and to the metaphysical tradition described above. In PI 1, 
Wittgenstein tells a story to show how the mentalist view of the world is absurd, how 
there cannot be a hermit in the head. I quote it as (63). 
 
(63) 
 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a 
slip of paper marked ‘five red apples’. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who 
opens the drawer marked ‘apples’; then he looks up the word ‘red’ in a chart and 
finds a colour sample next to it; then he says the series of elementary number-words 
– I assume he knows them by heart – up to the word ‘five’, and for each number-
word he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer. – It is in 
this and similar ways that one operates with words. 
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The key point is in the final sentence: ‘one operates with words’. The shopper is 
involved in a transaction, where what matters is the use of language in order to 
obtain the five red apples, and the behaviour of the shopkeeper is similarly 
transactional. Counting, for example, is not a mysterious mental activity, but a 
technique, in which somebody (here the shopkeeper) can be trained. If I have been 
taught how to count, then I can give somebody five apples, five oranges, five 
bananas etc. Wittgenstein comments: ‘But what is the meaning of the word “five”? – 
No such thing was in question here, only how the word “five” is used’. To find the 
meaning of a word it is necessary to look at its use (PI 43), not to try to relate the 
word to an internal concept. Wittgenstein attends to practice. For him, language is 
about doing things, so that learning a language is about learning to do things. 
 The rest of the PI can be seen as Wittgenstein’s working-out of this thought. 
All the key Wittgensteinian concerns follow from it: the language-game; the form of 
life; the surveyable representation; the impossibility of a private language; the way in 
which rules are followed etc. Wittgenstein offers methods that allow the grammatical 
investigation of terms, what he calls the occasions on which ‘we call to mind the 
kinds of statement that we make about phenomena’ (PI 90). 
The metaphysical tradition is a picture that holds us captive because of the 
bewitching nature of language: ‘And we couldn’t get outside it, for it lay in our 
language, and language only seemed to repeat it to us inexorably’ (PI 115). Berman 
sees this as true but cannot offer a theoretical or an ideological critique. Translation 
studies, unaided, cannot offer a theoretical or ideological critique. Translation after 
Wittgenstein, however, can justify through Wittgensteinian methods how the 
practice of taking meaning as something to be extracted and conveyed can be 
replaced by looking at the use of a word and moving on from there (PI 340). This is 
the central contention of my thesis. As with his presentation of the Augustinian 
paradigm, Wittgenstein’s criticism does not dismiss as stupid the way that we 
instinctively operate (PI 340). 
One of the key ways in which Wittgenstein attempts to free his reader from 
the false picture is through offering other pictures. Images are central to the PI: 
Wittgenstein compares words to different tools in a tool-box, in order to bring out 
the diverse functions of words (PI 11); he describes looking into the cabin of a 
locomotive, where the similar-looking handles must be manipulated in different 
ways, in order to show how words must be used differently (PI 12); he describes the 
113 
 
language-games of the builders, quoted as (30), in order to show how the meaning of 
a word can be found by looking at its use in the language: any of their four words 
could be used in different ways to get different transactions to take place (PI 2, 7 ff.); 
he uses the urban image quoted as (64), in order to describe language as a whole (PI 
18). 
 
(64) 
Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, 
of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods; and all this 
surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and 
uniform houses. 
 
 
The point of this image is to subvert any inclination to impose a unified view onto 
language. As Kerr (1998:31) notes, it contrasts with the enthusiasm for ‘orderly 
towns’ planned by an engineer, as opposed to ‘badly proportioned’ old cities, 
expressed by the dualist Descartes (1968:35). Every person is born into a language 
community with a history, into the traditions and techniques of which he or she must 
be trained. To see language as an ancient city (as opposed to a planned town) will 
make a difference to how one conceives of language and accordingly will have 
consequences for how one translates. 
 Berman describes a situation in which a truth about one kind of translation, 
i.e. translation as transfer, has been taken to be the whole truth about every kind of 
translation. As Bellos (2011:25) argues, it is easy for English speakers to be misled 
by the word’s etymology of ‘carrying-across’, from the Latin trans, ‘across’, and 
latum, supine of ferre, ‘to carry’.31 The etymology suggests and supports the idea of 
translation being summed up by the conceit of the ferryman or trucker moving 
something from A to B. As Barnstone (1993:15) notes, Greek vans often bear on 
their sides the logo μεταφορα [metafora] (‘carrying across’) to signify 
‘transportation’: the noun signifies the transference of a word to another sense as 
well as the movement of goods. Etymology is a valuable tool, but Wittgenstein’s 
advice to seek meaning in use shows that it is dangerous to equate etymology with 
meaning. As Bellos (2011:26) notes, knowing that the noun ‘divorce’ comes from 
the Latin divortium, (‘watershed’ or ‘fork in the road’), does not tell us what the 
                                                 
31
 The etymology is common to many European languages, as in the Greek example that follows. 
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word means now, i.e. how it is used to designate the legal end of a marriage. In 
‘carrying-across’, we have a metaphor of one way of seeing translation. By applying 
it to all translation, it becomes a prejudice. 
It is not a stupid prejudice and is understandable in view of the human need 
to generalise, but it has been a disastrous prejudice. As I noted in 2.6, my claim is 
not that literary translation only becomes possible after Wittgenstein: the existence 
of great literary translations that pre-date his work invalidates any such claim. As 
mentioned above, Berman cites Hölderlin’s translations with unqualified approval, 
renderings described by Steiner (1998:340) as being ‘of the first importance’. What 
Wittgenstein offers is a short-cut for the translator, who is shown both the existence 
of the fly-bottle and the way out. The short-cut begins with the realisation that 
translation has more to do with shopping than with mental processes. An example 
from literature can illustrate this. 
Language has many more uses than denotation. In Kafka’s German story ‘Ein 
Landarzt’ (1963) (‘A Country Doctor’), the eponymous protagonist’s maid is called 
Rosa, a name that connotes the adjective rosa, ‘pink’, and the feminine noun Rose, 
‘rose’. Kafka’s choice of name for the maid relates to both connotations. After 
watching with apparent helplessness as a mysterious servant breaks into his house in 
order to rape Rosa (1963:55), the doctor rides away to treat a patient, whose wound 
he describes as ‘Rosa’ (1963:58). The foregrounded adjective, capitalised at the 
beginning of the sentence, is now identical to the maid’s name. Not only does it 
describe an injury but it also links the wound to the maid, and hence to sexual crime. 
The revolting wound (it is crawling with worms) blends sex, guilt and violence, 
contrasting with the positive associations of the rose: Adele Nozedar (2010:309) 
comments that the rose is a sacred flower that symbolises love, beauty, perfection 
and purity. A literary translation of the story would have to address the different 
ways in which language is being used by Kafka. In 3.3, I examine two translations of 
this example, and note here that to reach for a dictionary to translate the word in 
Kafka’s story and not to go further is to remain within the fly-bottle. 
Both Socrates and Wittgenstein use images of freeing the captive. Socrates 
wants to release the prisoner from a cave by introducing him or her to philosophy. 
Wittgenstein wants to set the fly free from the fly-bottle by dispelling confusion. The 
crucial difference is that the prisoner has been born in the cave whereas the fly has 
flown into the fly-bottle. Socrates describes a situation that is metaphysical and 
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demands a change in the whole human condition by looking beyond to the Forms; 
Wittgenstein looks at the world as we find it and demands a change in our way of 
thinking about language. Socrates contributes to one of the great myths of the west; 
Wittgenstein, as Kerr (1998:75) notes, has ‘written a text that enables the reader, 
with patience and luck, to become suspicious of the power the myth still wields’.  
One further conclusion follows. The background to Berman’s essay is the 
split within the field of literary criticism between the literary and the linguistic 
(Boase-Beier, 2006b:6-12), a split reflected in his insistence that literary translation 
has nothing at all to do with semantic transfer (2004:277). Whereas traditional 
language studies looked at both language and literature, a division opened between 
those following the literary path, using ideas taken from structuralism, 
poststructuralism and postmodernism, and those following the linguistic path, taking 
their cue from the generative linguistics of Noam Chomsky. As Jakobson (1960:351) 
notes, aiming to forestall the split: ‘The separation of the two fields [poetics and 
linguistics] is based on a current but erroneous interpretation of the contrast between 
the structure of poetry and other types of verbal structure’. The bridge between the 
two fields has now been built in literary studies by the growth of stylistics, but it is a 
bridge that has not yet been fully constructed in translation studies. Current work on 
stylistic approaches to translation may be seen as making a start, for example, Boase-
Beier (2006b), and the work of Wittgenstein is here of potential importance. Firstly, 
he gives a rich picture of communication, thus helping the translation theorist restore 
what Elżbieta Tabakowska (1993:10) calls the ‘human factor in communication’. 
Secondly, he shows that if communication is based on language-games then it is not 
possible to split language into the linguistic and the literary. Wittgenstein (PI 23) 
notes the following as being language-games: reporting an event; making up a story 
and reading one; translating. One list includes both the literary and the linguistic. 
The bridge is built in the PI. It can now be constructed by the translator, who can 
write the TT while responding to the style of the ST. How this might be done is the 
topic of 3.2. 
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3.2 The language-game of translation 
As Edith Grossman (2010:63) remarks, literary translation ‘is an occupation 
that many critics agree is impossible at best, a betrayal at worst, and on average 
probably not much more than the accumulated result of a diligent, even slavish 
familiarity with dictionaries’. The impossibility of translation is due to the demand 
for perfect equivalence: Barnstone (1993:18) argues that if ‘truly literalist 
assumptions’ prevailed, translation would indeed be impossible, because in 
translation ‘A=A is impossible’. The work of linguistic determinists such as 
Benjamin Whorf could also be used to support the view that literary translation is 
impossible, for linguistic determinism would suggest that no form of translation 
could be successful if (and only if) this view is taken to its extreme. Whorf 
(1956:215), for example, argues that Hopi and English cannot be ‘calibrated’ against 
each other because they embody different metaphysics, different ways of looking at 
the world. If we think that we can translate from Hopi into English then we deceive 
ourselves. Donald Davidson (2001:128), however, remarks that Whorf’s position is 
self-destructive because Whorf does use English to show the contents of sample 
Hopi sentences. It does not follow that because one language cannot be calibrated 
against another that it cannot be translated. One argument against those who believe 
that translation is impossible is to take them into a bookshop. How, though, can we 
know that the works on sale there are genuine translations? How can we know that 
translation is possible? 
 I take Wittgenstein’s later account of language to show that translation is 
possible once meaning is recognised as not being something private, i.e. when it is 
seen as inter-subjective, not objective. Meaning in the PI is to be understood by 
looking at interaction: between individuals; between communities; between the 
individual and the community. As Wittgenstein (PI 265) notes: ‘justification consists 
in appealing to an independent authority’. It would not be possible for a totally 
isolated person to look up words in a mental table for this would be like buying 
several copies of the morning paper to assure oneself that what is in it is true. What a 
dictionary does is to ‘justify the translation of a word X by a word Y’. It would be 
impossible to translate a newly discovered language, for example, without some 
form of independent reference. The 196 Rosetta Stone, discovered in 1799, displays 
a text in Ancient Egyptian, a language that had proved impossible to translate. That 
the Stone also contains the text in Ancient Greek, which could be translated by 
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scholars, enabled linguists both to translate the Ancient Egyptian and to form a basis 
for understanding the entire language, as a result of triangulation (Parkinson, 2005). 
Where no triangulation has to date been possible, nor has translation, as in the case 
of Linear A (Davidson, 2011:256). Wittgenstein stresses that there can be no such 
thing as a private language (PI 256-314), and translation is similarly a shared 
language-game (PI 23). Linear A is not in principle untranslatable. 
 The description of translation as a language-game is convincing because 
translation is an activity already practised within the communities into which we are 
born, one that pre-exists the individual, so that a person can in turn be trained to 
translate. Cultures have professional translators. If I want to read the latest crime 
bestseller from Sweden, I do not have to learn Swedish, because I can buy an 
English translation. If I have a meeting with a Swede who does not speak English, I 
can employ an interpreter. There is a heuristic aspect to translation, to which 
Wittgenstein appeals by naming it a language-game, an activity that can be carried 
out by the child learning a second language and by the academic working on a new 
version of a play by Goethe. Translation has history and traditions. A constantly 
growing body of texts has been produced by translators, describing what they have 
done, giving advice, justifying strategies etc., from Herodotus’s fifth-century BC 
comments in his Histories (1963) to the translator’s notes in any recently published 
edition of a translated work, for example, Constantine (2005). Wittgenstein (PI 23) 
sees the language-game of translation as analogous to such activities as: giving 
orders; presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams; guessing 
riddles; thanking.  
 Wittgenstein advises his reader to look for the meaning of a word in its use 
(PI 43). For the practising translator, this is a way into playing the language-game of 
translation. He or she can look at the ST and decide what use is being made of 
words. Charles Travis (2011:np), for example, gives the example of dining in France 
with a companion who does not speak French. The waiter announces: ‘Les oursins 
sont arrivés’ (‘The sea urchins have arrived’). Travis translates the sentence as ‘They 
have sea urchins’, and asserts that his is an acceptable translation because the games 
he plays in English make the same demands on the correctness of words and their 
use as do the games played by the waiter in French. In PI 20, Wittgenstein asserts 
that sentences can have the same sense because they can have the same use, 
illustrating this by Russian having ‘Stone red’, whereas German (or English) has 
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‘The stone is red’. He notes that the copula is not missing: it does not have to be 
attached ‘in thought’ by speakers of Russian. To refer again to the example of non-
literary translation quoted from Chesterman and Wagner (2002:5) in 3.1: when 
translating the label on the packet of white powder, the translator needs to be aware 
that the use of the Greek term is to impart information in order to make sure that 
nobody dies, and he or she will therefore make sure that the choice of words will 
signify to an English-speaking tourist that this is, say, rat poison, not something to be 
added to coffee. An iconic sign like the skull and crossbones could be used, in order 
to make matters absolutely clear, and not only to Anglophone tourists (cf. Davidson, 
2011:325). Chesterman (1997:9) is therefore right to call equivalence ‘a red herring, 
in that it is virtually unattainable, and hence not a useful concept in translation 
theory’, pointing to Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances (PI 67) as a more 
fruitful way of examining meaning. As Travis (2008:70) notes, Wittgenstein shows 
there is ‘a gap between what words mean and what is said in them on occasion’. The 
slipperiness of meaning is something often noted by translation scholars. Grossman 
(2010:71), for example, asserts that translators need to avoid the literalist trap, 
because ‘words do not mean in isolation’ but are part of a ‘contextual whole’ (such 
as emotional tone or literary antecedents), so that good translators can be said to 
translate context. 
 Gledhill (2007:1) asserts that Wittgenstein’s concept of the language-game 
can be used as a means of translating: ‘The translator needs first to identify the 
nature of the “game”, and then to use the translation strategy most appropriate for the 
particular language-game’. Wittgenstein’s way of describing language becomes a 
method of translating. It is the refusal to play the game, the insistence on seeing 
literary translation as objective transference, which accounts for bad translations in 
Berman’s sense of the deforming translation. It is not just that stylistically difficult 
texts such as Finnegans Wake by Joyce (1950) are untranslatable if there is a search 
for equivalence: all literary texts are untranslatable if there is a search for 
equivalence. If the search is dropped, then possibilities open up, which supports the 
assertion by Berman (2004:287) that the task of the literary translator ‘is not to 
search for equivalences’, and offers a strategy both practical and based on the literary 
way in which we may read literary texts. Wittgenstein can be used to support 
translation theory and literary theory, which strengthens the case for introducing his 
work to translation studies, as can be shown by three examples in which scholars 
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express Wittgensteinian insights. Firstly, Grossman (2010:10) sees good literary 
translators as proceeding ‘by analogy – that is, by finding comparable, not identical, 
characteristics, vagaries, quirks, and stylistic peculiarities in the second language’. 
Secondly, Attridge (2004:76) sees literary works as translatable because their 
singularity can be imitated in the TT. Thirdly, Bellos (2011:78) urges that translators 
should translate the genres in the text, by which he means something very close to 
language-games, so that a good translator will not translate a Chinese kitchen recipe 
into English but into a kitchen recipe. 
 To develop a strategy based on the language-games in the ST is coherent in 
the way that another frequently-advocated strategy is not, i.e. translating for the same 
effect. David Constantine (2005:xxxix), for example, describing his translation of 
Goethe’s Faust, asserts that he aims to attain ‘equivalence of effect’. As Chesterman 
(1997:35) notes, however, trying to reproduce effect is inconsistent, because no two 
readers can ever approach the same text with the same set of cognitive assumptions. 
There will be a variety of effects associated with a text such as Faust, because many 
different readers read it at different times. A twenty-first-century reader cannot 
possibly experience the same effects as an eighteenth-century reader. The notion of 
playing the same language-game in the TT avoids the problem, for the (extremely 
important) effects can look after themselves if the language-games are imitated. 
Literary translation is more about playing games than breaking a code, 
something that good literary translators have always known. As Weinberger (Paz & 
Weinberger, 1987:34) puts it: ‘The point is that translation is more than a leap from 
dictionary to dictionary; it is a reimagining’. A reimagining has many possibilities, 
just as a game can be played in many ways. If the later Wittgenstein is right, it means 
that the literary translator cannot extract a meaning from a text that he or she can 
move somewhere else, as a mechanical operation. It offers support for the notion that 
even a single word has to be seen in context (Bellos, 2011:75). An example of a 
translator dealing with the problem of context is Bell (2009b:xxix), who, in her note 
to Kafka’s The Castle, explains the problems of terminology she faced in translating 
this unfinished and unedited novel, giving as one instance the Bauern (plural form) 
whom the protagonist K. meets when he first arrives at the Bridge Inn. Bell notes 
that a bi-lingual dictionary would offer the alternatives ‘peasant’ or ‘farmer’ for 
Bauer (singular form), but that neither possibility appealed to her, the first sounding 
too medieval and the second suggesting the modern National Farmers’ Union of the 
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British Isles, many of those described by Kafka as Bauern not being farmers 
anyway. Her translation choice, ‘the local rustics’, indicates how literary translation 
is not a search for equivalents. Later uses of the same word by Kafka are given 
different renderings by Bell depending on context: ‘the local rustics’ when 
applicable; ‘the locals’; ‘the rustics’; ‘the villagers’. 
 In Z 698
32
, Wittgenstein asks the question given as (65). 
 
 
 (65) 
 
 How is this joke (e.g.) to be translated (i.e. replaced) …? 
 
 
 
The description of translation as replacement is significant.
33
 Wittgenstein sees no 
quasi-mystical procedure by which one text is transformed into another. One text is, 
rather, simply replaced by another. Instead of Goethe’s Faust in German, I pick up 
an English translation to read, a TT that replaces the German ST in my form of life. 
That is all: but the implications are important. The text that replaces the ST can be a 
surveyable representation or can fail to be one (a topic discussed further in Chapter 
4). There is no single way of solving the problem of replacement because there is no 
systematic method to which appeal can be made (Z 698), which opens out the 
possibilities of translation and also ought to enhance the status of translators, which 
are the twin aims of Tymoczko’s Wittgensteinian book on translation (2007). To aim 
to produce a replacement rather than a perfect rendering of the ST into pure language 
should remove any need to apologise. The translator becomes an author, a solver of 
problems, a creator, not just a cipher, and although a problem in translation can be 
solved, e.g. a joke can be replaced, there is no systematic method of solving it (Z 
698), as discussed in 3.4. Steiner (1998:290) notes the importance of the distinction 
that Wittgenstein puts forward of how a solution can coexist with the absence of any 
systematic method of solution and sees it as being true not only of translation itself 
but also of the descriptions and judgements made of it.  
 There would seem to be a contradiction here of my argument in 2.1 that it is 
not possible to replace the literary text, when I quoted Wittgenstein in (20) on how 
                                                 
32
 The remark is also in RPP I 778.  
33
 It is similar to the definition of translation by J.C. Catford (1965:20), but without Catford’s appeal 
to equivalence. 
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certain sentences (such as poems) cannot be replaced by another sentence any more 
than one musical theme can be replaced by another (PI 251). It is the description of 
translation as a language-game, as part of the human form of life, which saves the 
contradiction. Wittgenstein notes that a poet’s words ‘can pierce us’ and that this is 
connected with the ‘use that they have in our life’ (Z 155). Translations can be 
written that have an analogous use in our lives. The literary translator can choose to 
write in such a way as to respond to the literariness of the ST by playing the same 
language-games, just as Milton’s translation of Horace was a response to the Latin 
poet’s ‘specific verbal arrangement’, according to Attridge (2004:74). Reading and 
applying Wittgenstein would enable the translator to do this consciously. It makes no 
sense for me, as a speaker of English, to read a decoding of an English literary text 
under the illusion that I am reading the text, but it makes a great deal of sense for me 
to read a translation of, say, a Japanese literary text, as long as I am aware that I am 
playing a certain game. For the game of literary translation to be played, the 
translator must be responding to a literary reading. I noted in 2.1, following Attridge 
(2004:96), that it is possible to read Middlemarch as literature or not as literature, so 
that it would be possible to translate the novel in a literary way or in a non-literary 
way. Translation after Wittgenstein stresses both the form of life of the work and the 
language-games played in it, just as stylistics stresses the cognitive state of the reader 
and the style of the text (Boase-Beier, 2006b). 
 I began this section with the comment by Grossman (2010:63) on how 
literary translation is often perceived as an impossible task. Scott (2000:2) similarly 
notes how translation theorists continue to speak about ‘the translator’s lack of 
literary credibility, about the translator’s invisibility, about the impossibility of any 
translation worth the name’, but goes on to assert that this is not the end of the story: 
‘All these symptoms of a condemned condition can … be turned round, if we are 
prepared to change our expectations and our prejudices’. His use of the word 
‘prejudice’ can be linked to Wittgenstein’s remark that it is prejudice that keeps us in 
thrall to the correspondence theory of meaning, but that it is not a stupid prejudice 
(PI 340). We need to change both the way we see meaning and – this follows 
logically – the way that we see translation. Wittgenstein can be a tool to this end, a 
tool employed in the forms of life of the literary translator. 
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3.3 The forms of life of the literary translator 
 Nikolaou and Kyritsi (2008:3), noting the frustration that has accompanied 
experiments with machine translation, assert that human consciousness remains 
central to the task of translation and quote Wittgenstein to explain why: ‘Language is 
a part of our organism and no less complicated than it’ (NB p.48). It is impossible to 
divorce the self of the translator from the text, for language is a part of being human, 
not a faculty that can be practically isolated.
34
 
Rachel May (1994:9), in a review of Russian Literature in translation, 
identifies what she calls ‘a sort of translator-consciousness’, translational tendencies 
that persist across cultures and across time. One example is the trend to alter the 
structures of the ST in order to assert ‘a more objective, more authoritative literary 
stance’, an empirical finding (based on the analysis of a large corpus of translated 
novels) in line with Berman’s identification of deforming tendencies in translation 
(2004:288). If translators act not only on the text but in it, i.e. if there is a translator-
consciousness, then this consciousness must be something that can be formed, for 
which a reading of the PI, described by Read (2007:1) as a ‘philosophical self-help 
text’, can be used. One of the central drives of the PI is to show that language and 
behaviour are products of how we are trained. Wittgenstein’s ideas can be applied to 
the training of the translator in order to suggest how a translator-consciousness could 
be produced that does not lead to the deformation identified by Berman and May. In 
2.1, I argued that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can help train the translator as reader of 
the ST. In this section, I investigate the language-game of writing the TT as found in 
the forms of life of the literary translator, in order to examine how a translator-
consciousness can be formed that moves beyond intuition. As Wittgenstein asserts: 
‘Instinct comes first, reasoning second. Not until there is a language-game are there 
reasons’ (RPP II 678). Grossman (2010:72) cites Gregory Rabassa, whose main 
concern as translator of the Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez was 
whether his English was up to the task, not his Spanish. It would be absurd to 
suggest that reading Wittgenstein can make a great stylist out of a translator, but 
reading Wittgenstein can suggest reasons for writing so as to create a language-
game. It may help the translator’s TL to be up to the task. 
                                                 
34
 Chomsky (2000) and his followers argue that there is a language faculty, but Wittgenstein’s inquiry 
is different, coming out of philosophy, not cognitive science. See the discussion in 5.3. 
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I use the form of life in three ways: to describe a way of living that the 
translator takes on, i.e. a vocation; to refer to the way of life of the writer of the ST, a 
particular form of life that has produced a particular work of literature; to refer to the 
forms of life depicted in the ST and the TT. Wittgenstein’s term, while often used in 
the singular, is frequently to be understood as plural, because every person is 
involved in many forms of life. Chris has the distinctive form of life connected with 
having a human body, so that he needs to eat, keep warm etc., but he can be viewed 
in other ways, such as having the form of life of a computer specialist. 
Translation as vocation is a way of living, often a way of earning a living, 
and it begins in a way of reading, as described in Chapter 2. Scott (2008:17) sees a 
translator as ‘someone who reads in order to write’. One becomes a translator, 
however, by producing translations: writing must follow reading, as Scott notes. It is 
a practice into which one can be trained, in which one can become qualified, for 
example, by taking a professional qualification. To read accounts by practising 
translators of their work, whether in the paratextual material attached to a particular 
translation or in theoretical works about translation, is to find a form of life with its 
own language-games, involving concepts such as: source-target; equivalence; 
untranslatability; free-vs-literal; all-writing-is-translating etc. These are the five 
translation supermemes identified by Chesterman (1997:7-14), who sees them as 
themes that have occurred throughout the history of translation. The grammatical 
investigation of such concepts is something that a reading of Wittgenstein can bring 
to translation studies, as exemplified in 4.4.1. The form of life of translation 
includes: reading of literature and literary theory; translation studies; one’s own past 
translations; reading translated literature; drafting; delivering the TT etc. These are 
practices.  
 Although translation is a profession that has often been characterised by its 
invisibility (Venuti 2008), the translator appears as the hero of novels. In Gaudí 
Afternoon (1991) by Barbara Wilson, for example, the central character is the 
translator Cassandra Reilly, who takes on a job as a private detective, but for whom 
being a translator is at the heart of her self-definition. In a work where nothing is 
ever quite as it seems, Cassandra is involved in the dialogue quoted as (66), (Wilson, 
1991:74). 
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(66) 
 
‘My name is Carmen’, Carmen said in English. ‘I am woman. Please, what are you? 
 Woman or man?’ 
 
‘Neither,’ I said in English then in Spanish. ‘I am a translator.’ 
 
 
 
Perhaps this is to say no more than that translators are professionals, but that is to say 
a lot. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (2003), influenced by Wittgenstein, advances 
the theory of ‘field’ and ‘habitus’ to explain cultural phenomena such as professions. 
A field is defined as the domain in which somebody acts: Cassandra works in the 
field of literary translation, being currently engaged on the translation of a South 
American novel. Habitus is defined as the set of aptitudes that somebody must 
develop if he or she is to flourish in a certain field: what Bella Brodzki (2007:45) 
refers to as the ‘shrewd critical skills and opinions that Cassandra has honed as a 
practising translator, cosmopolitan traveller, and social critic’ (and which 
incidentally help her in her new role as detective). Field and habitus can be seen as 
an extension into sociology of the concepts of form of life and language-game 
developed in philosophy by Wittgenstein. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, 
Cassandra’s work as a translator involves her in a form of life, which results from 
her competence at playing the language-game of translation. Certain English texts 
(that represent certain Spanish texts) exist because of her aptitude, which is a further 
reason why the invisibility of the translator in western culture described by Venuti 
(2008) is offensive to the translator, not only professionally but also personally. 
Françoise Wuilmart (2009:40), for example, describes being ignored in a radio 
discussion about a book she had recently translated from German. She refers to 
‘“my” words that were being broadcast, or rather the words of the anonymous 
German woman that my labour had transposed into French’, and laments that 
nobody on the radio programme thought to reference them as such. The 
identification of the translator with texts that he or she has translated – Wuilmart 
insists that the words being broadcast are not those of the ST writer – shows why 
Cassandra can define herself as a translator rather than as a man or a woman. That 
she may be trying to dodge the question is irrelevant to this argument. People tend to 
identify themselves with what they do.  
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Patricia Clancy (2006) describes her work as the translator of the detective 
novels of the French writer Pierre Magnan, identifying two main challenges, the 
translation of lexis and the translation of style. Lexis is an acute problem when 
translating an author such as Magnan, whose novels contain a wealth of detail from 
Provence, e.g. Clancy wonders if Le Blayeul is a village, a mountain, a range or a 
river (2006:7). Such questions send her to: the internet; long out-of-print French 
dictionaries and encyclopaedias; contacts in Provence; the ST author. The meaning 
of the term Le Blayeul can be found by looking at its use in the language, 
Wittgenstein would advise (PI 43), and Clancy found that it was used by Magnan to 
designate a mountain. The translator, professionally concerned with meaning, must 
address the issue of contextualisation, because all expressions, not just this one, must 
be seen in context and the ST must be referenced to the form of life that produces it: 
‘after nine years in Magnan’s company, I feel as if I have lived there’ (Clancy, 
2006:7). Yet the translator translates texts, not just words, and the meaning of a 
literary text cannot be separated from its style,
35
 as argued in Chapter 2, so that the 
rendering of style is also the concern of the literary translator, which is why Clancy 
(2006:11-12) describes Magnan’s novels as a challenge not only linguistically but 
also stylistically. She gives an example of one image that caused her particular 
difficulties, only resolved after consultation with Magnan. The ST image, a 
description of Le Blayeul, is quoted as (67), with Clancy’s translation as (68). 
 
(67) 
 
vertement vêtu      de sa consonance d’arbre à   tisane 
greenly     dressed of its harmony     of tree  to  tisane 
 
 (68) 
 
robed in green resonance with le tilleul, the lime tree, which its name always 
evoked. 
 
 
 
Magnan explained that he was trying to evoke the similarity in sound between the 
name of the mountain and the name of the lime-tree, le tilleul, and Clancy notes that 
she has been able to retain the alliteration and some of ‘the unusual poetic 
                                                 
35
 Clancy (2006: 7) categorises Magnan’s novels as too literary to be classed as thrillers and too close 
to genre fiction to be classed as literature. In my opinion they do exhibit literariness. 
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juxtapositions of sound and sight’, and writes of ‘the ability and the tenacity of 
translators who, once the allusions in the image have been teased out, will work to 
create something that still conveys something of the original expression’. Yet (68) 
exhibits the drive for objectivity that May criticises, because Clancy leaves little 
room for any imaginative play on behalf of the reader. She interprets, where Magnan 
implies, and has moved to a different level (Z 234, as discussed in 2.4). She has 
allowed her attention to the form of life depicted in the ST to distract from the form 
of the ST, so that (68) could be described as a Platonising translation. It would seem 
that attention to the form of life of the ST, whilst a necessary condition of literary 
translation, is not a sufficient one. The language-games must also be considered. 
The literary translator stands between ST and TT. I offer two contrasting 
translations of the description of the patient’s wound in the story ‘Ein Landarzt’ (‘A 
Country Doctor’) by Kafka (1963:58), referred to in 3.1. The doctor’s maid is called 
Rosa and the wound is described by Kafka in the sentence quoted as (69), the first 
word referring the colour pink and recalling the German noun Rose (‘rose’) but also 
representing the maid herself, because its initial and capitalised position make it a 
possible proper noun. 
 
 
(69) 
 
Rosa, in vielen Schattierungen, dunkel in der Tiefe, hellwerdend zu den  
pink   in many  shadows             dark    in the depth  brightening  to  the  
Rändern, zartkörnig mit  ungleichmäβig sich  aufsammelndem Blut,   offen wie ein  
edges       tender      with irregularly       itself collecting            blood  open like a  
Bergwerk obertags. 
mine         to-the-air 
 
 
 
Malcolm Pasley (1963:22) draws attention to the text’s repetition of the word ‘Rosa’ 
in his editorial introduction to the story: ‘His [the doctor’s] two new-found concerns, 
erotic and spiritual, are linked together. The wound is “rosa”’.  
One translation, by Richard Stokes (2005:81), is quoted as (70).  
 
 
 (70) 
 
Pink, in many shades, dark in the depths, paler towards the edges, soft-grained, the 
blood welling unevenly, gaping like the surface of a mine. 
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Stokes has preserved in his translation the name of the maid as Rosa, but by keeping 
the name and by rendering the colour of the wound as ‘pink’, he does not show how 
Kafka foregrounds the blend of name and adjective. His rendering can be contrasted 
with that of Pasley, given as (71), which illustrates how a close reading by the 
translator (1963:22) can be traced in the writing of a translation (1990:159). Pasley 
(1992:157) changes the name of the maid from Rosa to ‘Rose’, which in English has 
a multiple resonance that echoes that of the ST word, and that is picked up in the first 
word of (71). 
 
 (71)  
 
 Rose-red, in various shades, dark in the depths, paler towards the edges, finely  
grained, with blood welling unevenly, open like a mine at the surface. 
 
 
 
Pasley both conveys the use of multiple connotations typical of Kafka’s style (Crick 
2009:xxxv) and the linking of the erotic and the spiritual central to the story’s 
meaning. It is neither a Platonising translation nor the rendering of meaning alone, 
but a translation that maintains meaning as a physiognomy (PI 568): a literary 
translation. I argue in this thesis that the work of the later Wittgenstein provides 
ways of looking at language (Chapter 2) and using language (Chapter 3) that open up 
new possibilities for the translator. Using Wittgenstein is a short-cut, a way of 
attaining clarity, of moving out of the Platonic paradigm. The story told by 
Wittgenstein becomes a part of how we see translation and this new way of seeing 
can in turn drive translation by changing what we expect from it. Of the three 
examples quoted in this section, only Pasley provides a literary translation of the ST. 
Stokes renders meaning but fails to maintain a key aspect of Kafka’s style. Clancy 
writes an English that is literary but that deforms the ST by doing too much work for 
the reader. 
 One becomes a translator, as evidenced both in the title and the content of 
Robinson’s Becoming a Translator (2003), where he examines field and habitus. 
Discussing the translator’s experience, he cites a foundational statement on 
translation from Jerome (2003:106). I give Jerome’s text, written in 395, as (72) 
(1997:25). 
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 (72) 
Now I not only admit but freely announce that in translating from the Greek – 
except of course in the case of Holy Scripture, where even the syntax contains a 
mystery – I render, not word for word, but sense for sense. 
 
 
 
Robinson (2003:107) comments that this is what ‘translation instructors have been 
telling their students for decades’ and recommends that students be told this early in 
their careers to save them the problem of working it out for themselves. We therefore 
have an influential current work on translation, recommended, for example, to 
candidates for the examinations of the Chartered Institute of Linguists (2010:np), 
which activates the oldest debate in translation studies and advocates translating 
sense not words. 
 The work of Wittgenstein shows that such a dichotomy between sense and 
word is a false one, reliant on a Platonic paradigm, as argued in 3.1. We have no 
access to meaning outside language and it is on forms that we must rely, not on the 
Forms. Otherwise translation becomes a process of attempting to discover the correct 
answers, which may be an acceptable procedure for translating the label on a packet 
of white powder but not for translating Aeschylus (Chesterman & Wagner, 2002:5). 
Eugene Nida and Charles Taber (1969:12) define translation as ‘reproducing in the 
receptor’s language the closest natural equivalent of the source-language message’, 
which is to see translation as a science. Again the notion of equivalence is the 
conceptual hinge. 
 It is easy to set up equivalence as a straw man. It is obvious, for example, that 
Brot and pain (French and German nouns respectively for ‘bread’36) are not 
equivalents in the sense of being identical, because a long list of differences can be 
compiled, such as different acoustic values or different cultural connotations. 
Therefore there is the risk that my thesis could be accused of using Wittgenstein in 
order to win a debate that has been won in translation studies without his work: 
Berman, for example, writing in 1985, insists that literary translation cannot be a 
search for equivalences (2004:287). My contention, however, is that any translator 
who sits down to translate a literary text will still be tempted by the same sort of 
dualism seen in Jerome. Why should this be so? 
                                                 
36
 The example is from Benjamin (2004:78) and is discussed further in 3.4. 
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 In BT 423, Wittgenstein comments on his later method, quoted as (73). 
 
 
(73) 
 
One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really makes no progress, that the 
same philosophical problems that had occurred to the Greeks are still occupying us. 
… The reason is that our language has remained the same and seduces us into asking 
the same questions over and over. As long as there is a verb ‘to be’ which seems to 
function like ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, as long as there are adjectives like ‘identical’, 
‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’, as long as one talks about a flow of time and an expanse of 
space, etc., etc., humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious 
difficulties. 
 
 
 
That we are bewitched by our language may be because of the way the mind works. 
Pinker (2007:83 ff.) suggests that the mind’s settings were fixed in the remote past 
and describes what he calls ‘cognitive quirks’ i.e. mental habits that worked well 
once but do not fit the modern world, for example, the conduit metaphor, similar to 
the container metaphor discussed in 2.6, which suggests that it is possible to know 
something and to send it on to others in a package. This scenario can explain why we 
are in thrall to a model of translation based on transference (Tymockzo, 2007), 
which is itself based on a split between sense and word (Berman, 2004) and which 
can be changed by changing our view of language by reading Wittgenstein, who can 
show that the sense is in the word. 
 The semantic model lying behind equivalence, according to Pym (2010:18), 
is that of the ‘tertium comparationis’37, which involves deverbalising the ST in order 
to listen to the sense, which is then translated. A twentieth-century advocate of this is 
Danica Seleskovitch (Seleskovitch & Lederer, 1984). Pym (2010:20) comments that 
her theory is in many ways naïve and idealistic, because it seems to be impossible to 
make sense of a sense that is deverbalised; but he maintains, writing twenty-five 
years after Seleskovitch, that the operational values of her approach ‘correspond to 
some very widespread ideas about what translation is (or should be)’. Translators, 
from a Wittgensteinian perspective, keep flying into the fly-bottle and are unaware 
that they are doing so (PI 309). Pym re-asserts the equivalence model (2010:38), 
despite the numerous difficulties he sees associated with it, as shown in text (74). 
 
                                                 
37
 Latin: ‘third of comparison’. 
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 (74) 
Equivalence might appear to be dead, except for the occasional deconstructionist 
who has read little translation theory and needs a straw man. Then again, history has 
not finished. 
 
 
 
Equivalence is not a straw man. Our dilemma lies in the fact that we think that it is. 
Pym admits that his defence of the equivalence paradigm will be unpopular but 
maintains that the paradigm underlies all thinking about translation (2010:6 ff.) and 
that it is still the ‘dominant paradigm’ underlying many approaches (2010:91). 
 My reading of Wittgenstein can offer several ways forward. Firstly, it shows 
that the equivalence paradigm is misleading, as was argued in 3.1 and as will be 
taken up again in 4.2. Secondly, it focuses on the forms of life of literary translation, 
so that the translator can be seen as a reader of literary forms and as a re-writer of 
them as literary forms. Thirdly, the use of Wittgenstein offers insights into the way 
that language works, insights that can free us from false paradigms and that can offer 
clarity.  
Winch (2008) argues that the humanities do not function through 
correspondence to objective facts, but through agreement on what could be held to 
be true. We agree to call something a translation, just as we agree to call something a 
theory in literature. The translations that are written are to be located within a 
tradition. Baker (2004:48) notes that the criteria for judging the correctness of a 
description are ‘as indeterminate as the criteria for judging the correctness of the 
description of a painting’, and something similar must apply to judging translations. 
What can be formed is an educated judgement, however, an awareness of what one is 
doing and of what one might do in translation. For Wittgenstein, educated judgement 
is a result of work on oneself, as asserted in CV p.24, quoted as (75). 
  
 (75) 
Work on philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more 
work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On how one sees these things. (And 
what one expects from them.) 
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This remark shows how one becomes a translator: through work on oneself. One 
works at how one sees things (in the ST), and on what one expects from them (in the 
TT). Wittgenstein (RFM III-85) asks who it is who says that a poem can be 
translated to our satisfaction. For the literary translator, the answer is to look in the 
mirror and then to work on himself or herself. The ideal I am putting forward is the 
one described by Johann Gottfried von Herder (1997:207), who wonders: ‘Where is 
the translator who is at once philosopher, philologist, and poet?’ Such a translator, as 
Herder puts it, would be a bright morning star. 
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3.4 Translating a play on words 
 In this thesis, I aim to offer a picture of Wittgenstein’s relevance to literary 
translation, not, as stated in 2.6, to show that literary translation is only possible after 
Wittgenstein. My position is analogous to that of Read (2010), who argues that the 
PI, although not overtly a political book, can be used to show how Wittgenstein’s 
thinking can inform the ways in which philosophers approach politics. In this 
section, I examine one of the deforming tendencies in translation identified by 
Berman (2004) – i.e. how idioms (such as plays on words) are translated – in order 
to show how Wittgenstein’s line of thinking can feed the ways the literary translator 
approaches his or her task. 
How do you translate a play on words? It is an important question because it 
cuts to the heart of translation. Jokes, proverbs, puns and plays on words bring in a 
cluster of problems at both cultural and communicative levels. As anybody who has 
ever tried to translate a pun knows, to transfer its meaning through conscientious 
word-by-word rendering is often to come up with something that will only puzzle the 
addressee. An example of this is the English joke given as (76). 
 
(76) 
What do you do if an elephant takes a gate? 
Nothing: he might take offence. 
 
The humour here lies in two things. Firstly, there is the homophony of ‘offence’ and 
‘a fence’, so that the reply to the question can also be construed as ‘Nothing: he 
might take a fence’, which is both a mondegreen and a blend: the elephant is not 
only easily hurt but also liable to run off with a second artefact. Secondly, there is a 
zeugma implied in the use of ‘take’, which is used concretely in the question and 
abstractly in the answer. 
Berman attacks translators’ ‘destruction of expressions and idioms’ 
(2004:286), prescribing that these should be rendered literally i.e. word for word, a 
consequence of his view that translation ‘is not to search for equivalences’ 
(2004:287). He gives examples from André Gide’s French translation of Joseph 
Conrad’s novel Typhoon, which are rendered word for word by Gide instead of being 
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given a so-called equivalent. I give the English as (77) and Gide’s translations as 
(78) (from Berman, 2004:286-287). 
  
 (77) 
 
 He did not care a tinker’s curse 
 
 Damme, if this ship isn’t worse than Bedlam! 
 
 (78) 
 
 Il   s’          en    fichait               comme du       juron d’ un étameur 
 he himself  of-it was-indifferent as          of-the curse of a   tinker 
 
 Que diable m’emporte si l’on  ne  se          croirait            pas à  Bedlam! 
 that  devil  me take       if one   not oneself would-believe not at Bedlam 
 
 
 
As Berman (2004:287) notes, there is a common French expression that would 
convey the same idea as that of not caring a tinker’s curse, while the mention of 
Bedlam is potentially confusing for a French reader because it was an English 
institution for the mentally ill, so that a translator might have gone for a relocation, 
such as Charenton (a similar French institution).  
But does abandoning the search for equivalences necessarily imply that the 
way forward is literal translation? To suggest that this is the only strategy is to fail to 
grasp the nature of the difference between languages and to be still in thrall to the 
longing for pure language discussed in 3.1. Benjamin, for example, sees the 
interlineal version of the Scriptures as the ideal translation, a position following 
logically from his belief in a pure language (2004:83). Glossing is increasingly a part 
of good practice in translation studies, as a type of surveyable representation of the 
ST; but to remain at the level of the gloss or of the literal translation is to fail to look 
at the physiognomy of the text. To take the two nouns pain and Brot, which signify 
‘bread’ in French and German respectively, it is basic to note that they are different 
both in form and connotation, as Benjamin does: ‘The words Brot and pain “intend” 
the same object, but the modes of this intention are not the same. It is owing to these 
modes that the word Brot means something different to a German than the word pain 
to a Frenchman, that these words are not interchangeable for them, that, in fact, they 
strive to exclude each other’ (2004:78). So far, so good. But Benjamin then looks 
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towards the pure language that supposedly hides behind the languages of the world, 
quoting Stéphane Mallarmé as support: ‘The imperfection of languages consists of 
their plurality’ (2004:80). It is against this sort of dissatisfaction with the world as 
we find it that the Wittgensteinian project is aimed. As Kerr (1998:50) comments, it 
is difficult to see what is obvious because of the desire to see something 
metaphysical beyond. For the translator, what is obvious is the text: the word pain or 
the word Brot, i.e. their physiognomy (PI 568). And yet we so much want to see 
something beyond the text, as if there were an eternal immutable Form of the Bread, 
whereas Wittgenstein, through his stress on practice, shows that nothing 
extraordinary is involved (PI 94). 
There is a tension in Berman (2004:288) between his assertion that ‘literal 
translation’ is to be defined as attention to the stylistic qualities of a text (2004:121) 
and the word-for-word rendering he praises in the examples from Gide, which 
conforms to the more common understanding of the notion of literal translation (cf. 
Nabakov, 2004:121). A proverb, for Berman, must be kept as it is in the ST in order 
to respect the source culture, rather than being translated as what would be said in 
the target culture in those circumstances. Such translation is certainly a possibility, 
but to think that it is the only possibility is still to be trapped in the fly-bottle, still to 
see literary meaning as a quality that can be transferred mechanically. It may be 
possible to calibrate an English TT against a German ST, but this is because German 
and English have many similarities, belonging to the same language family. 
Calibrated translation is not possible between languages that do not themselves 
calibrate, such as Hopi and English, which are from different language families 
(Whorf, 1956). Berman is still locked in the extreme Augustinian picture, of 
language as code, which Wittgenstein attacks: despite Berman’s insistence that 
translation is not about equivalence, he implies that for translation to be possible 
there must be perfect correspondence, perfect equivalence. By contrast, the 
Augustinian paradigm is shown by Wittgenstein (PI 1 ff.) to be untenable, so that it 
follows that the search for perfect equivalence must also be dropped. Berman 
identifies the problem, but his prescriptive solution must be rejected as the sole 
option. 
To use my own example of translating a proverb: in (79) I give an example of 
a German proverb, with two possible renderings as (80) and (81). 
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(79) 
Besser einen Spatz      in der  Hand  als   eine Taube auf dem Dach. 
better  a        sparrow in  the  hand  than a      dove   on   the   roof 
 
(80) 
Better to have a sparrow in your hand than a dove on the roof. 
(81) 
A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. 
 
Translation (80) follows Berman’s demand (2004:287) that a parallel expression 
should not be used, because it would be an ethnocentrism implying that ST 
characters express themselves in TL images. Berman would therefore have problems 
with (81), the parallel English phrase to the German. (A German speaker and an 
English speaker might say (79) and (81) respectively if they were, say, trying to 
console themselves about not being able to partake in a particular venture.) Berman 
(2004:287) insists that reproducing idioms in translation, as in (80), will enrich the 
TL. His prescription is ethically praiseworthy, but is based on the view that 
characters in an English novel in French translation should be shown to be speaking 
English, whereas they are speaking French. The translated novel is a special case of 
what Coleridge (1975:169) calls ‘that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment 
which constitutes poetic faith’. That the reader is required to believe that SL 
characters are speaking the TL is the contradiction at the heart of all literary 
translation, part of its language-game.  
Following Wittgenstein’s stress on the importance of the use of the literary 
work in our form of life (Z 155), a proverb can be translated in various ways 
depending on its use in a particular ST. If a particular acoustic or phonaesthetic 
effect is desired, for example, then a complete recasting is required. Text (82), for 
example, is an anapaestic tetrameter and therefore uses ‘bird’ instead of ‘sparrow’, in 
order to create this metrical pattern. It is a rendering that might be offered by a 
translator seeking a poetic effect. Text (83) relocates the proverb to the twenty-first-
century against an implied backstory of marital breakdown, perhaps as part of a 
drama. 
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(82) 
For a bird in the hand’s worth a dove on the roof. 
(83) 
A Renault in your drive is worth a BMW in your husband’s. 
 
And other translations are possible, because the question of how to translate the play 
on words cannot be considered apart from the context. The canonical translation that 
Berman praises, that of Hölderlin (1952), itself moves beyond literal translation: as 
Wolfgang Schadewaldt (1970:119) comments, while the intermediate versions 
Hölderlin made of the Antigone of Sophocles can be described as literal in the sense 
of word for word, the final versions represent what Schadewaldt calls ‘erneuerndes 
Nachgestalten’ (‘renewing post-shaping’, or transformation).  
In Last Writings on Philosophical Psychology (LWPP I 278), Wittgenstein 
asks: ‘What is the correct German translation of an English play on words? Maybe a 
completely different play on words’. The remark shows how the concept of playing 
the same language-game allows the translator a great deal of freedom. If I need to 
translate a joke in a novel, the key factor may be that a joke is being told, rather than 
that somebody is making a pun on a certain verb, so that the best choice may be to 
write an entirely different joke. An example is the way that Bell translates the 
characters’ names in the world of Asterix the Gaul, the cartoon creation of René 
Goscinny and Albert Uderzo: ‘Names: the books to date contain some four hundred 
proper names of people … nearly all of which have had to be changed in translation, 
since they are not really names, but comic spoofs on names made up out of French 
words in the original. For instance the village bard Assurancetourix = assurance tous 
risques, “comprehensive insurance”. As with all the Gauls, his name ends in the 
suffix –ix, to echo the genuine Vercingetorix. But translated straight the phrase 
sounds nothing like a name of any kind. In English he becomes Cacofonix because 
he is tone-deaf and sings and plays so badly out of tune that his music is mere 
cacophony’ (Bell 2009a:np). Bell’s key realisation is that Goscinny and Uderzo are 
playing more than the language-game of naming when they invent terms such as 
‘Assurancetourix’. By translating it as ‘Cacofonix’, a strategy appropriate for the 
137 
 
language-game (of punning) has been chosen, with reference to the form of life of 
the character in question. 
It is the stress on formalism (correctly viewing form and content as 
inseparable) that makes translation seem impossible. Jakobson (1959:239) argues 
that poetry cannot be translated, that only ‘creative transposition’ is possible. The 
Wittgensteinian surveyable representation (PI 122) is, I think, a more coherent 
concept than the creative transposition, because Jakobson’s term is too broad: all 
sorts of things can count as transpositions, whereas a representation keeps the ST 
always in mind. The translation of Magnan by Clancy cited in 3.3 as (68) is a 
creative transposition, but I do not think it is a literary translation, because it does not 
represent the ST. I now examine three translations, of Ernst Jandl, Perec and 
Wittgenstein, which in my opinion function as surveyable representations.  
 Scott (2008:27), describing German poems and their English translations in 
Waldrop’s edition of Jandl (2000), asserts that the translations are ‘maybe not 
translations so much as imitations, using the same creative principle’. Scott’s notion 
of the creative principle is analogous to the language-game. The ST ‘reihe’ (‘series’) 
(Jandl, 2000:19) is given as (84). It is a creative mishearing of the numbers one to 
ten in German,
 38
 as if written down by somebody who does not know them and is 
trying to find German words that match what is heard; (84) is not glossed because 
my translation in (85) functions as a gloss. 
 
 
(84) 
 
reihe 
 
eis  
zweig 
dreist 
vieh 
füllf 
ächz 
silben 
ach 
neu 
zink 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 These are: eins, zwei, drei, vier, fünf, sechs, sieben, acht, neun, zehn. 
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The poem works because many readers will spot the intertextual reference to 
German cardinals. Text (85), however, will only baffle any English-speaking reader, 
although it is a word-for-word rendering of a list, something that at first sight 
appears to be the easiest translation task in the world, that of words without context. 
  
(85) 
 
ice 
branch 
brazen  
cattle 
fill 
groan 
syllables 
alas 
new  
zinc 
 
 
 
Unless the intention is in fact to baffle the reader, this is unsatisfactory, because the 
ST does have a context, i.e. the language-game of counting. Jandl’s translators have 
come up with various solutions, and I reference two. Martine Bellen (Jandl, 2000:20) 
writes a string of words based on the English cardinals, while Julie Patton’s 
(untitled) rendering (Jandl 2000:21) is based on the German cardinals. I give their 
translations as (86) and (87) respectively. 
 
 
(86) 
 
series 
 
wand  
toot 
tree 
fort 
fry 
sex 
servin’ 
eh 
none 
tan 
 
(87) 
 
hind 
size 
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wire 
fear 
fund 
sexy 
bent 
act  
anoint  
zen 
 
 
 
Both Wittgenstein (LWPP I 278) and Scott (2008:27) use the word ‘maybe’ in the 
comments cited. We are talking about possible ways of translation, which is seen by 
Scott as transferring the energy of the ST, just as Robert Lowell (1971:xi) speaks of 
trying to retain ‘the fire and finish’ of the poems he translates, a task that 
paradoxically necessitates ‘considerable re-writing’. Bellen and Patton have 
produced possible surveyable representations, based on the use Jandl makes of 
German cardinals. 
 What does a translator do, however, when he or she is faced with translating 
not a single play on words but an entire novel playing on words? Perec’s La 
disparition (The Disappearance) is a product of Oulipo
39
, the literary movement that 
seeks to evoke creativity by imposing constraint on authors. Perec’s novel is 
lipogrammatic, for the letter ‘e’ does not appear, a considerable creative feat given 
that many common French words use ‘e’, such as elle (‘she’), je (‘I’), le (‘the’: 
masculine definite article). Perec’s opening (1969:17) is quoted as (88). 
 
 
 (88) 
 
Anton Voyl n’   arrivait          pas à  dormir. Il  alluma. Son Jaz marquait  
Anton Voyl  not was-arriving not to sleep     he lit-up    his   Jaz was-showing  
minuit     vingt.  Il  poussa un profond soupir, s’          assit    sur son lit,  
midnight twenty he pushed a  deep      sigh     himself seated on  his  bed  
s’            appuyant sur son polochon. Il prit    un roman, il  l’  ouvrit,  il   lut;   mais il  
himself   leaning   on   his  bolster      he took a  novel    he it  opened he read but  he 
n’   y       saisissait      qu’  un  imbrolglio confus,    il  butait          à tout   instant  sur  
not there was-seizing only an  imbroglio  confused he was-hitting at each instant  on 
un mot dont         il   ignorait                la   signification. 
a word of-which  he was-not-knowing the signification 
 
 
  
                                                 
39
 Oulipo (French) signifies Ouvroir de littérature potentielle (‘workshop of potential literature’). 
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Referring to the English translation by Adair (1995), Perloff (2004:45) comments 
that Oulipo ‘seems to have exerted as powerful a force in translation as in the 
original’, so that ‘the central motive and its working out are wholly translatable, 
whatever the surface details’. Adair translates under the same constraint as Perec. 
His opening (1995:3) is given as (89).  
 
 (89) 
 
Incurably insomniac, Anton Vowl turns on a light. According to his watch it’s only 
12.20. With a loud and languorous sigh Vowl sits up, stuffs a pillow at his back, 
draws his quilt up around his chin, picks up his whodunit and idly scans a paragraph 
or two; but, judging its plot impossibly difficult to follow in his condition, its 
vocabulary too whimsically multisyllabic for comfort, throws it away in disgust. 
 
 
 
The challenge facing Adair is indicated by how the gloss of (88) uses ‘e’ 28 times, 
with ‘he’ occurring eight times for il in the ST. To work within the constraint 
demands rewriting, such as translating un roman (‘a novel’) as ‘his whodunit’, even 
though all translation can be said to be an act of rewriting, because no TT is in the 
same language as the ST: the word ‘rewriting’ is understood here as showing that the 
task of the translator is more than the transference of meaning. There is even a play 
on words in Adair’s translation of the title, because A Void both conveys the title’s 
reference to disappearance and also shows what Adair is attempting: it reinforces 
acoustically that he must try to avoid something, i.e. the vowel ‘e’. As Perloff 
(2004:45) comments: ‘The Wittgensteinian language-game paves the way for some 
of the most interesting poetic experiments of our own moment …To translate texts 
like … La disparition is to subordinate oneself to the original’. The Castilian 
translation (Arbués et al., 1997) similarly subordinates itself by avoiding the letter 
‘a’, not ‘e’, because ‘a’ is the most common vowel in Castilian. 
 The Oulipo methodology itself introduces explicit constraints to the writing 
of the literary text. Constraint, as Boase-Beier and Michael Holman (1999) argue, is 
a fact of all literary production and can be viewed as facilitating creativity rather than 
stifling it. They see the same being true of translation: ‘if translation is indeed more 
constrained than original writing, then, by virtue of the ability of constraint to 
engender creativity, it at least has the potential to be more creative, though of course 
an excessive burden of constraint can be crippling’ (1999:13). The qualification is an 
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important one. Deforming translation occurs when the translator is constrained by 
the Platonic or scientific paradigm, which results in the destruction of the literary. By 
contrast, the radical rewriting of Sophocles by Hölderlin (1952) is not deforming 
because it is creatively constrained by the ST. 
 The initial decision about what is the most important language-game in the 
ST will itself have ramifications. By choosing to write a lipogrammatic TT, certain 
moves are closed to Adair. He cannot reproduce the repetition of il (‘he’) in Perec, 
for example. Translation is analogous to a series of ‘moves, as in a game’, as Jiří 
Levý (2000:148) asserts, where ‘every single move is influenced by the knowledge 
of previous decisions’ (2000:149). It is noteworthy that Levý, like Wittgenstein, sees 
translation as a game. 
 Bellen, Patton and Adair cannot be said to have been influenced by 
Wittgenstein, unlike Anscombe, his pupil and first translator of the PI, the 2009 
edition of which is still based on her rendering, its cover announcing that the English 
translation is ‘by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte’, i.e. 
effectively a revision of her work by Hacker and Schulte. (Anscombe died in 2001.)  
They refer to her translation as ‘an impressive achievement’ (2009:viii).  
 Wittgenstein demands an aesthetic effort from his readers (Cavell, 2001:250) 
and Anscombe writes a translation that replicates this demand. Venuti (1998:108) 
examines her rendering of Wittgenstein’s explanation of why philosophical 
arguments arise. In (90), I give the German ST from PI 38.  
 
 
(90) 
 
Denn die philosophischen Probleme entstehen, wenn die Sprache   feiert. 
for     the philosophical      problems arise         when the language celebrates 
                                                                                                            idles 
                                                                                                            stops-work 
 
 
 
As shown by the gloss, the translator faces a problem with the final verb, which has 
three senses in German. Anscombe’s translation, quoted as (91) from the 2001 
edition of the PI, is what Venuti (1998:109) calls a choice ‘that goes beyond any 
equivalence based on lexicography’. 
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 (91) 
 
 For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.  
 
 
 
This expression has become part of English-speaking Wittgensteinian terminology. 
Read (2007b:109), for example, writing on politics, remarks that we need to look at 
the ‘illusions (not simple falsehoods) that are perpetrated upon us (and that we 
perpetrate upon ourselves and others) when language goes on holiday’. The 
reference to Wittgenstein (via Anscombe) is not referenced. Anscombe’s rendering 
preserves both the positive and the negative implicatures of Wittgenstein’s remark. 
When Anna goes on holiday, for example, she looks forward to it and is pleased to 
be going, but it does mean that she will not be around to do any work. The 2009 
revision of the PI maintains Anscombe’s rendering of this and most other key 
expressions. 
 As Venuti (1998:109) comments: ‘Anscombe’s translation can be said to 
have communicated Wittgenstein’s ideas, even to have mimicked his style of 
writing’. To use Wittgensteinian terminology, she has identified the language-games 
in the text and has adopted strategies to play them in her own rendering. The 
translation is a surveyable representation, which is reinforced by the edition being 
bilingual, with the German on the left page and the English on the right, which 
enables the reader to follow the German, so that even the reader without any German 
can keep track of key terms. The example of ‘feiert’ again shows a play on words 
being translated by a completely different play on words, as does the way in which 
Anscombe renders the pun by Wittgenstein (PPF 15), quoted as (92) in German and 
as (93) in her translation.  
 
 
 (92) 
 
 Wenn ich sage ‘Herr Schweizer ist kein   Schweizer’, so meine ich das erste  
 if        I    say     Mr   Schweizer is   not-a Swiss           so mean  I     the first 
‘Schweizer’ als Eigenname,   das zweite  als Gattungsname. 
‘Schweizer’ as  proper-name the second as   common-name 
 
 (93) 
 
If I say ‘Mr Scot is not a Scot’, I mean the first ‘Scot’ as a proper name, the second 
one as a common name. 
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Wittgenstein’s pun rests on the fact that ‘Schweizer’ means ‘Swiss man’ but is also 
frequently found as a surname. By translating ‘Schweizer’ as ‘Scot’, Anscombe 
avoids the English translation becoming an example of the sort of confusion that 
Wittgenstein was aiming to clear away (CV p.9). To write, ‘If I say Mr Schweizer is 
not a Swiss, I mean the first “Schweizer” as a proper name, the second one as a 
common name’, is confusing. The use of notes could support the translator who 
chose this rendering, but would add paratextual material not in the ST and would 
interrupt the flow of the text. Anscombe’s rendering solves the problem and also 
imitates Wittgenstein’s use of a nation apart from Germany where German is spoken 
(i.e. Switzerland) by the use of a nation apart from England where English is spoken 
(i.e. Scotland). 
 In 3.2, referring to how some works of literature are viewed as untranslatable, 
I cited Finnegans Wake by Joyce (1950), in view of its stylistic difficulty. Yet 
translations of Finnegans Wake do exist, Joyce himself (with Nino Frank) translating 
parts of it into Italian (1979). Gledhill (2007:118), discussing this translation, 
concludes: ‘To translate like Joyce, you have to write like Joyce, or at the very least 
be a brilliant imitator of his style’. In CV p.28, Wittgenstein remarks that philosophy 
should only be written ‘as one writes a poem’. The same is true of literary 
translation, which begins with recognising the poetry in a text – with seeing the 
literary text as literary – and ends with writing in a way that maintains the poetry, by 
writing a translation as one writes a poem. Texts such as Jandl or Perec or 
Wittgenstein are not exceptions in foregrounding a play on words. They are typical. 
All literature is a play on words. Most of the time we fail to notice this. The 
translators of these texts have noticed it. What is the correct translation of a literary 
work? Maybe a completely different literary work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
3.5 Case study: translating the poetry of Mörike 
 The purpose of this case study, which relates to the description of Mörike’s 
poetry in 2.5.1, is to show how a reading of Wittgenstein can influence the process of 
translation by opening up possibilities. In 2.5.1, I offered an account of Mörike 
influenced by Wittgenstein’s stress on description. Here I use Wittgenstein’s 
accounts of language and the tools of the PI to show how being reflective about 
practice can change practice. As Baker (2004:34) has noted: ‘Conscious analogies 
and comparisons are useful tools for curing diseases of the intellect, whereas 
unconscious ones generate insoluble problems by exercising an imperceptible 
tyranny over our thinking’. Wittgenstein writes to change the way that people think, 
by making things clear (PI p.4) and – given that translation involves thinking – his 
work can change the way that people translate. His method involves suggesting 
analogies that allow the reader to realise that if something is true of one situation 
then it may be true of others, thus undermining preconceived ideas (PI 1) and giving 
us conscious analogies and comparisons. What I write here is also analogical, 
because I trace a link between the grammatical investigations of Wittgenstein and the 
task of the translator. If Wittgenstein is right about language, then this has 
consequences for the translator: the story told in the PI enables him or her to find 
different ways of expression, as Kerr (1988:170) claims is the case for the theologian 
who reads Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s philosophy becomes a useful translation tool 
– and his notions become useful translation tools – through direct application.  
 A reading of Wittgenstein shows that words are things with which we operate 
(PI 1) rather than entities to which meaning adheres, which allows interesting 
questions to be asked about translation, in a way that may be unlikely outside a 
reading of Wittgenstein. How could a German poem written in the nineteenth 
century be expressed in the voice of a contemporary English-speaker? How could it 
be rewritten as a song, using rhythm and rhyme for poetic effect? How could it be 
placed in dialogue with other poems, songs, figures? What happens if Wittgenstein’s 
contention that meaning is a physiognomy (PI 568) is taken seriously? Translation 
becomes an exercise in anthropology, forsaking the crystalline beauty of the 
linguistic transfer of meaning (T-LP 3.343) for the rough ground of the everyday 
world of transaction (PI 107). Robinson (2003:112), discussing Wittgenstein’s 
instruction to look for meaning in use (PI 43), asserts that a ‘person-centred 
approach to any text, language or culture will always be more productive than a 
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focus on abstract linguistic structures or cultural conventions’. What would the 
people in Mörike’s poems – both the characters and the narratorial voices – say in 
translation? How could Mörike still speak through them? Bell (2011:215) describes 
how ‘the literary translator is always, as it were, playing a part like an actor, trying 
his or her hardest to become the author of the original’. Wittgensteinian notions, 
such as the language-game, may help the translator do this. Above all, they offer a 
rationale for doing this. As argued in Chapter 1, the rationale for practices comes 
from outside the practice. 
I give ten remarks derived from my own translations of the poem discussed 
as (54) in 2.5.1, ‘Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag’ (Mörike 1975:31). The translations are 
part of a larger project of translating Mörike’s poetry for a projected anthology, 
using Wittgenstein to drive the renderings. Considerations of space prevent the use 
of other material from this project. 
 
(i) 
I take Wittgenstein’s account of language to indicate that the language-game 
of translation is possible, because meaning is not just something that goes on in the 
head (PI 693) but is to be understood by looking at interaction: between individuals, 
between communities, between the individual and the community. As discussed in 
3.2, we can translate because justification consists in appealing to something 
independent (PI 265). At the very least, for example, the ST can be glossed, as in 
(54), providing what Scott (2000:149) calls the ‘negative function’ of signalling to 
the reader which sense of a word is meant where one or more semantic renderings 
are available: the word ‘weh’ in line 11 of (54), for example, is glossed to signify 
‘alas’ rather than ‘hurt’. Glosses are a valuable aid to study, but fall short of literary 
translation, where I take it as axiomatic that the TT must be able to stand by itself, so 
that it can play a similar role in the TL to the one the ST plays in the SL (Z 155). 
Literary translation involves playing a game with the gloss, so that use can be 
maintained (PI 43) by seeking strategies to enable the same language-games to be 
played in the TT as in the ST (Gledhill 2007:5). Text (94) represents one translation 
of (54). 
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(94) 
AN HOUR BEFORE THE DAY 
 
In deepest sleep I lay, 
an hour before the day: 
and, as I slept, from the nearby tree 
a swallow sang a song to me, 
an hour before the day. 
 
‘Now listen to what I say! 
Your love has gone astray. 
And while I sing, as swallows do, 
he holds a girl who is not you, 
an hour before the day.’ 
 
Oh no, what’s that you say? 
My swallow, go away! 
Before your singing from the tree 
I’d dreamed of love and loyalty, 
an hour before the day. 
 
 
 
I was interested in seeing whether the formalism of the ST could be recreated in 
translation. I therefore decided to use full rhyme and the iambic metre and complex 
rhyme scheme of the ST, i.e. [(aA¹BbA¹) (A²accA¹) (A²aBbA¹)]. Within this 
constraint, which preserves the song form (such as the refrain), I chose to write an 
English that did not twist itself to produce rhymed line endings, and that evoked the 
form of life of somebody moving from security to disillusionment before day has 
even begun. What I did not maintain were the three diminutives in the ST formed by 
the use of the suffix -lein, because using an analogous technique seemed archaic in 
English, such as adding the suffix ‘–let’; so Schwäblein, ‘the little swallow’ in line 4 
of the ST becomes ‘swallow’, not ‘swallowlet’, although I was able to compensate 
by having the protagonist call it ‘my swallow’. It is a poem that I intend to be able to 
work by itself through its poetic effects, without the ST necessarily being placed 
alongside it, a poem that could be set to music and sung by a contemporary singer 
such as Jenkins, as discussed in 2.5.1.  
 
(ii) 
 The PI shows that there are many ways of approaching problems: hence its 
warning against doctrine (PI 109) and its stress on the particular case (PI 66). Many 
translators do, however, translate according to a single strategy that precedes looking 
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at the text (cf. Jerome, 2004). An approach to translation after Wittgenstein would by 
contrast examine the ST’s meaning by looking at its form and responding to that. A 
translator might therefore bring a variety of strategies to his or her rendering. In line 
11, for example, I refrain from translating ‘O weh’ as ‘alas’ or ‘oh woe’, and use the 
expression ‘oh no’, which seems to me to be what somebody would say in the 
twenty-first century when faced with the collapse of his or her world. I do, however, 
retain the refrain (in contrast to (96) below) because of the song form: people may 
not speak with refrains, but they still sing with them. 
 
(iii) 
Using Wittgenstein frees the translator from the dualistic paradigm identified 
by Berman (2004:237) as a cause of failed literary translation, as discussed in 3.1. 
Raleigh Whitinger (2005:xix), for example, describing his translation of Mörike, 
writes of being in the ‘uncomfortable position’ of ‘having to produce English 
equivalents of German verse’. His renderings in my opinion parody the ST, and it is 
hard not to see the search for perfect transfer at all costs as the cause of this. An 
example is (96), which renders the opening of Mörike’s poem ‘Der Feuerreiter’ 
(‘The Fire Rider’) (2005:19), with the ST as (95) (Mörike 1975:62). 
 
 
(95) 
 
Sehet ihr   am     Fensterlein  
see     you at-the small-window 
Dort  die rote Mütze wieder?  
there the red  cap     again 
Nicht geheuer muß es sein,  
not     normal must it be 
Denn er geht schon    auf und nieder.  
for    he goes already up  and down 
 
 
(96) 
 
See you at yon window small 
There again, the red cap gleaming? 
See it rise, now see it fall, 
Like an omen ill, ’tis seeming. 
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Whitinger’s translation deforms the English language – the expression ‘’tis seeming’ 
in line 4, for example, is ungrammatical. It is therefore impossible to see it as a 
representation of the ST, which does not deform the German language. 
Translation after Wittgenstein is not a matter of seeking equivalences but a 
literary activity. The fly is freed from the fly-bottle (PI 309) when the translator is 
liberated from the false picture of translation being about moving meaning from one 
place to another. I am not transferring Mörike to English. If that were what was 
desired, it might be better to read English poetry contemporary with Mörike, such as 
Wordsworth, following Douglas Hofstadter (1979:380). To translate Mörike 
involves recreating the ST, not attempting to clone it.  
 
(iv) 
A translation, to be identified as such, must be taken as standing in some sort 
of a relationship to the ST. In Wittgenstein’s terms, this relationship is that the TT 
must be a surveyable representation of the ST. The surveyable representation (PI 
122), as discussed in 2.1, clarifies something to an audience by making connections. 
Moyal-Sharrock (2009:165) views literary works as surveyable representations and 
her theory can be extended to literary translations. The TT (94) was written to be a 
surveyable representation of the ST (54), a relationship that could be made clear by 
the way the poem is presented, for example, in a bilingual edition, as considered 
further in 4.3. Here I note that by writing in order to produce a surveyable 
representation, Wittgenstein’s notion becomes a tool. 
 
(v) 
The speaking of a language ‘is part of an activity, or of a form of life’ (PI 
23), which implies that the translator after Wittgenstein would see himself or herself 
as a translator of texts, rather than of meaning, because meaning does not exist 
outside the text as a form of life. Sentences, words and paragraphs must be seen in 
context, both the immediate context and the context of the whole language. The 
translator, like Wittgenstein, is engaged in a series of grammatical investigations, 
looking at the pragmatics of the ST and the pragmatics of what he or she writes in 
response, without having to translate out of a language of ideas. The poem given as 
(97), for example, can be taken as a translation of (54) because it maintains key 
aspects of the ST, such as the betrayed lover or the perceived dawning of day; as 
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well as formal aspects such as rhyme, although to a different scheme; the swallow is 
referred to in the title and its prophetic role is paralleled in the figure of Mike. The 
setting is contemporary – for example, the reference to getting a lift in line 1, or to 
the spiking of drinks in line 9. 
 
 (97) 
 HARD TO SWALLOW  
 
 rang Mike for a lift at 6 
 who said OK but that Rick 
 had left with some girl 
 
 so I rang Rick at 6.30 
 thinking back to the party 
 thought he’d seemed shifty 
 
 dumped Rick at 6.45 
 got a lift in with Mike 
 even got to wondering if my drink had been spiked 
 
 threw up at 7 
 
 
 
(vi) 
Because the translator after Wittgenstein is not attempting to find 
equivalences, many different translations of any text are possible. Baker (2004:34) 
sees any surveyable representation as ‘one of many possible orders, not the order’. 
(The consequence is not, however, that anything goes, given Wittgenstein’s 
insistence in PI 9 that we must respect how things are.) Text (98) is another possible 
order, which places the ST in dialogue with the world of contemporary Symphonic 
Metal, as considered in 2.5.1.  
  
 (98) 
WHAT THE RAVEN SANG 
 
You’ll call it cliché if I say there was a raven 
listening to Within Temptation 
from outside the window as I lay in bed 
getting round to wondering if the undead 
have to leave for work at seven. 
 
You’ll call it cliché if I say that the raven 
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began to sing along to Within Temptation 
about somebody slipping away. You didn’t text back,  
an hour before I left for work. 
I wish I could believe in heaven. 
 
Why does fate make us suffer? At seven  
I left for work, gave in to temptation 
and called on you. You were still in the park. 
You’ll be in the park forever. I came back. 
Couldn’t you resist this temptation? 
 
 
 
Symphonic Metal is suggested by the referencing in lines 2, 7 and 11 of the song 
‘What Have You Done’ by Within Temptation (2007), and by the intertextual 
reference in the title and lines 1 and 6 to the talking raven in the poem ‘The Raven’ 
by Poe (2003:69-76); the talking swallow, a bird that symbolises the world of the 
fairy-story, becomes a symbol of the Gothic world of Within Temptation. The TT is 
a poem in dialogue, just as the ST is in dialogue with the Volkslied and the Tagelied. 
 
 
(vii) 
For Wittgenstein, meaning is a physiognomy (PI 586); it is in the form not in 
the Forms. Translation is therefore not a scientific activity. My translation of Mörike 
is my Mörike, not an equivalent of Mörike or the definitive Mörike, just as Meredith 
McKinney (2005:59), discussing her translation of Sei Shônagon’s The Pillow Book, 
refers to ‘my Sei Shônagon’, recognising that other Sei Shônagons exist. Winch 
(2008) applies Wittgensteinian methods to show that the humanities do not function 
through correspondence to objective facts, but through agreement on what could be 
held to be true. We agree to call something a translation, just as we agree to call 
something a theory in literature. The translations I write are to be located within a 
tradition of writing TL poems that replace SL poems (Z 698). 
Text (99) is a free verse translation of the very formal ST. 
 
(99) 
JUST ONE HOUR BEFORE DAWN 
 
after Mörike 
 
While I lay asleep, 
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just one hour before dawn, 
I thought I heard a small swallow sing to me 
from the tree outside my window. 
 
‘Listen to what I have to say:  
I bring a charge against your lover. 
For while I am singing this song to you 
he is having his way with another.’ 
 
Ah, that was too much for me 
and I awoke into a bad dream 
where there was neither love nor loyalty. 
And the swallow flew away. 
 
 
 
Here, in another attempt at expressing my Mörike, the rhythms of ordinary speech 
take precedence over any imposed rhythm. The intricate sound patterns of the ST are 
echoed in half rhymes (‘asleep’ and ‘me’ in lines 1 and 3 etc.) and assonance 
(‘swallow’ and ‘window’ in lines 3 and 4 etc.), but there is no attempt to reproduce 
the refrain. The translation therefore has a different shape from the ST, because it has 
only four lines per stanza, not five, but my contention is that it can be regarded as a 
translation because I have rendered it as part of the public practice of translation – as 
seen in the subtitle ‘after Mörike’ – while paying attention to the physiognomy of the 
ST. 
 
(viii) 
 As argued in 3.3, applying Wittgenstein to translation involves linking the 
activity of translation to the forms of life of the literary translator, cf. CV p.75. In my 
own case, being a reader of Mörike has involved: studying his poems; reading his 
biography; researching secondary literature; visiting places associated with him; 
translating over thirty of his poems. The translator is involved in a public, not a 
private language (PI 243 ff.) and this is extended if and when translated poems 
themselves become part of the form of life of literature, e.g. through publication. The 
greatness of what anybody does, for Wittgenstein, depends on everything else that he 
or she does (CV p.75). Even the decision to use lower case at the beginning of lines, 
in contrast to the ST, can be related to a form of life, here the conventions of twenty-
first-century English versification. 
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(ix) 
 Just as Cook and Read (2010:473) ask whether Wittgenstein makes a 
worthwhile difference to how we read a text (as discussed in 2.1) and conclude that 
he offers ‘a phenomenology of the experience of reading literature’, I argue here that 
using Wittgenstein offers a phenomenology of writing literature, a practical method 
of translating that takes a translator into the heart of how the ST may be rendered. 
Trying to imitate the features of the ST makes more sense than trying to write to 
provoke effects. As argued in 3.2, attempting to replicate effects is too indeterminate 
a task. 
 
(x) 
 Wittgenstein’s project is a descriptive one (PI 109). In remarks (i) to (ix) 
above, I have described my Wittgensteinian translation work on a German ST. Given 
that I have completed the work, it might be asserted that the description is now of no 
use to me. However, as Boase-Beier (2011:77) argues, a description of any practice 
will in turn affect practice because it affects the way that people see things. 
Therefore my description of my practice will affect my future practice, as well as the 
practice of those who read the description, not by offering a methodology, but in the 
way that Richard Rorty understands the Wittgensteinian language-game as related to 
‘practices, traditions, the kind of things that people pick up without learning any 
rules but just by “know-how”’ (Rorty & Vattimo, 2005:59). Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy becomes a useful translation tool – and his notions become useful 
translation tools – through indirect application.  
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3.6 Conclusions  
 Wittgenstein (CV p.39) cites a quatrain from the poem ‘The Builders’ by 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1904:186) as a possible motto for his work. I give 
his citation as (100).
40
 
 
  (100) 
 In the elder days of art 
 Builders wrought with greatest care 
 Each minute and unseen part, 
 For the Gods are everywhere. 
 
 
I have in turn used the verse as the motto for this chapter because it sums up an 
attitude towards language found in Wittgenstein, who asserts in CV p.40 that 
language, music and architecture all contain ‘significant irregularities’. In Chapter 2, 
I showed how a reading of Wittgenstein can help the literary translator discern 
significant irregularities in the ST; in this chapter, I have shown how a reading of 
Wittgenstein can help the literary translator recreate significant irregularities in the 
TT, by working with greatest care on each minute and unseen part, in a process more 
akin to art than science. The thoughtful activity of Longfellow’s builders in the elder 
days may be contrasted with the form of life of Wittgenstein’s builders of PI 2, who 
play very limited language-games, as discussed in 2.2. William James DeAngelis 
(2007:88) describes their activities as pointless, claiming that Wittgenstein’s text 
implies that genuine building is something that should be done reflectively and not 
regarded as an end in itself. 
 Wittgenstein’s philosophy can play a dual role for the practising translator. 
Firstly, it can help him or her realise that literary translation is more than transfer, 
despite what our intuitions may tell us. Samuel Johnson’s seminal 1755 Dictionary 
of the English Language (1820), for example, defines linguistic translation as ‘to 
change into another language retaining the sense’, which matches the Platonic 
contention that form and content can be divided (Plato, 514a ff.). Wittgenstein’s 
methods undermine this dualistic intuition, as if by various therapies (PI 133), and 
allow the translator to avoid the deforming translations that Berman (2004) links 
with Platonic dualism. Secondly, Wittgenstein supports the contrary intuition, often 
                                                 
40
 Wittgenstein misquotes Longfellow, whose final line reads: ‘For the Gods see everywhere’. 
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put forward by creative writers (the builders of literary works) that literary 
translation is about more than transfer. The poets Matthew Sweeney and John 
Hartley Williams, for example, advise that the goal of translating poetry is to come 
up with a poem that ‘lives in the new language’, so that ‘a poem that’s ragged in the 
original needs to be ragged in the translation’ (2005:156). Their instruction is 
reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s remark, ‘What’s ragged should be left ragged’, though 
Wittgenstein is here addressing religion, not translation (CV p.51). Wittgenstein 
offers a set of tools, such as the language-game, to support those who choose to 
translate this way. 
 With respect to the academic study of translation, a correlative of my reading 
of Wittgenstein is that his methods oppose work on language and translation that 
assumes a code model of language or that stresses equivalence, such as the positions 
taken by Davidson (2001) in philosophy and by Pym (2010) in translation studies. 
His methods, by contrast, support an occasion-sensitive approach to language in 
philosophy (Travis, 2008) and a stylistic approach in translation studies (Boase-
Beier, 2006b). 
 As stressed in 2.6, there is no single Wittgensteinian method to be applied to 
the process of translation, just as there is no single way of building a house. 
Wittgenstein (PI p.4) claims that his aim is ‘not to spare other people the trouble of 
thinking’ but ‘to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own’. Similarly, the literary 
translator may be provoked by reading the PI to produce translations of his or her 
own. Wittgenstein asserts – in Anscombe’s translation – that philosophical problems 
arise when language goes on holiday (PI 38), i.e. when it idles, divorces itself from 
context. The same is true of translational problems and Wittgenstein can help us to 
see this – and therefore to translate – with clarity. 
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4. THEORISING THE TARGET TEXT 
     
 
 
 
Do not look for a theory behind the phenomena: they themselves are the theory. 
 
Goethe (1901:261)
41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 Translation by Luckhardt & Aue (RPP I 889). 
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4.1 The beetle in the box  
 Translation studies attempts to account for both the practice and product of 
translation, that is, the activity and its artefacts. Theorising has been a response to 
phenomena. As Tymoczko (2007:5) notes, the development of translation studies in 
its current form was influenced by historical events, including the importance 
attached to translation by the Allies during the Second World War and the decision 
of the European Union to recognise the official languages of all member states as 
official languages of the Union. From the Wittgensteinian point of view, it is always 
advisable to start with the phenomenon, not the theorising, as in the approach to the 
study of literature advanced by Attridge (2004:1): ‘I do not wish to begin … as many 
theoretical accounts of literature do, with the various philosophical projects that have 
largely determined our approach to these issues and the vocabulary we use, but 
rather with the observable phenomena themselves’. Philosophy, for Wittgenstein, 
likewise begins with looking, not with a doctrine (PI 66). Attridge (2004:143), as 
noted in 2.1, acknowledges the influence of the later Wittgenstein on his work, 
particularly in making him ‘cautious about the search for closed definitions’. And 
this is what is at stake in this chapter on the theorising of the TT: that the 
investigation should not be a search for a closed definition. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the later Wittgenstein takes a radical position on 
theory, given his assertion in PI 109 that ‘we may not advance any kind of theory’, 
which has led some commentators to advocate a total rejection of theory (Cook, 
2009). This position, however, does not seem to be justified by the German ST, 
given as (101). 
  
 (101) 
 Und wir dürfen keinerlei        Theorie aufstellen. 
 and  we  may    absolutely-no theory   put-up 
 
 
 
The verb aufstellen implies that we should not start with a theory, in line with 
Attridge’s position, not that theory is to be banned. The refusal to advance theory 
and to avoid the hypothetical involves a stress on the concrete and examples from the 
everyday, which contrasts with the theoretical approach of much traditional western 
philosophy, such as the continental tradition, or the traditions of philosophical 
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theology. As Searle (Magee, 1987:143) asserts, however, just because Wittgenstein 
did not advance a theory does not mean that his readers cannot have a theory about 
anything. As I argued in Chapter 1, to advance a view about something is not the 
same as to advance a doctrine. With respect to literary translation, the temptation to 
begin with the theoretical, with the closed definition, is strong, given the existence of 
a bewildering variety of theories that are on offer in the academic market place of the 
humanities: Iser’s book (2006) on how to do theory lists twelve theoretical 
approaches that can be taken to the analysis of literature.
42
 But the Wittgensteinian 
quest always begins with the concrete.  
Much of what was said about reading the ST in Chapter 2 will also apply to 
theorising the TT. A translated literary text will, for example, similarly be written in 
the language of information but will do more than give information (Wittgenstein, Z 
160). Is there any point to writing this present chapter, then? Would it not be simpler 
to state that what went on in Chapter 2 still applies, and to leave it at that? That the 
present chapter is necessary is because the language-game of translation has been 
played in writing the TT: in PI 23, Wittgenstein notes how translating from one 
language into another is a language-game, and this makes the TT a different sort of 
text from the ST. As Attridge (2004:73) notes, a translated text evokes a more 
complicated response from readers, who see the TT as ‘both original and 
translation’. Constantine (2005:xl), introducing his translation of Goethe’s Faust I, 
states that his aim ‘is always to write an English verse which, whilst conveying the 
whole freight of sense and implication of the original, will be readable with pleasure 
as English verse’. There are two aspects to that aim. When Constantine (2009) writes 
his own verse, only the second aspect is relevant. 
It is necessary to examine translation both as practice and as product. 
Confusion can be avoided from the start by being clear how the same word is being 
used to describe these different phenomena, and is then used in different ways in 
those descriptions.
43
 By using Wittgenstein in an investigation of translation theory, I 
can clear up conceptual confusion and open the way to clarity, by showing that there 
is no one meta-practice involved, but a variety of practices that results in a variety of 
outcomes. In this section, I refer to the work of Tymoczko (2007), who has applied 
                                                 
42
 These theories are, in chapter order: phenomenological; hermeneutical; Gestalt; reception; semiotic; 
psychoanalytical; Marxist; deconstructionist; anthropological; the theoretical approaches of John 
Dewey, Elaine Showalter and Edward Said. 
43
 This is a characteristic of language, not just of the language used to describe translation (PI 5). 
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Wittgenstein to the study of translation; in 4.2, I look at how a TT may be described; 
in 4.3, I consider how a translation practice or a TT might be evaluated; in 4.4, I 
examine aspects of the theorisation of the practice of translation from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective; in 4.5, I give a case study of NT translation. 
 In PI 293, Wittgenstein tells the story of the beetle in the box, quoted as 
(102). 
 
 (102) 
Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a ‘beetle’. No 
one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle 
is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to 
have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing 
constantly changing. – But what if the word ‘beetle’ had a use nonetheless? – If so it 
would not be the name of a thing. The thing in the box doesn’t belong to the 
language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box might even be empty. – 
No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
  
 
 
The example is about the public and the private, about the impossibility of knowing 
something only according to internal criteria. It illustrates Wittgenstein’s previous 
discussion in PI 293 about whether it is possible to know what pain is ‘only from my 
own case’, and should be seen in the context of the remarks about the possibility of a 
private language, PI 256-314. There is no way of knowing what somebody else has 
in their box within the constraints set out by Wittgenstein. A box could even be 
empty. As long as we look inwards for the meaning of the word ‘beetle’, it remains 
meaningless. The beetle would have to be shown for the term to be meaningful. 
Wittgenstein’s beetle in the box has received a vast amount of exegesis, as 
detailed by David Stern (2007). It has usually been taken as ‘a reductio ad absurdum 
of Cartesian dualism’ (Stern 2007:249) but has been interpreted in many other ways, 
e.g. Malcolm (1966) reads it as proving that there is no link between the learning of 
words for sensations and private objects. Martin Cohen (2005:109) describes it being 
‘too sparse and too ambiguous to lead to any conclusion’ and this is perhaps the 
point: it is not designed to lead to a conclusion, because it is a literary artefact. 
Cohen himself misses that point by seeing the ambiguity as a fault, rather than as a 
sign of literariness, referring to the story as a ‘thought experiment’ and pushing its 
boundaries (2005:106 ff.) in an analytic way contrary to its spirit. To read the story 
159 
 
analytically is to take it in a fashion that makes it appear that Wittgenstein’s writings 
are ‘assimilable into the very intellectual background they were largely a warning 
against’ (Drury 1984:101). Stern (2007:249) describes it as a parable, with its own 
afterlife, like Plato’s cave (Plato 514 ff.), within the context of the PI, a work he 
views as ‘a distinctly literary achievement that invites the reader to take part in the 
debate it presents’. This seems a much more profitable way of looking at the beetle 
in the box. If Wittgenstein had wanted to make assertions about the nature of mind, 
he was quite capable of doing so (as in the dogmatic statements that characterise the 
T-LP).  
I propose to take part in the debate by using the story of the beetle in the box 
as a parable for translation, so that its afterlife can enter the world of translation 
studies. My re-writing of the parable is given as (103). 
  
 (103) 
Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a ‘translation’. 
No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he or she knows what a 
translation is only by looking at his or her translation. – Here it would be quite 
possible for everyone to have something different in his or her box. One might even 
imagine such a thing constantly changing. 
 
 
 
By looking at what people mean by translation, at the use of the term, we can fulfil 
the anti-essentialist project at the heart of the PI, illustrated by PI 116, given as 
(104). 
 
 
 (104) 
 
When philosophers use a word – ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, 
‘proposition/sentence’, ‘name’ – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must 
always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language in 
which it is at home? –  
 
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. 
 
 
 
The metaphysical is rejected in favour of the everyday. Instead of trying to define the 
phenomenon and then looking for examples, the correct process is to pay attention to 
how the term is used in everyday discourse. To expect a single answer to the 
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question, ‘What is translation?’ is to fail to recognise that the meaning of the term 
‘translation’ is complex. Translation, whether as practice or as product, only makes 
sense when I show my translation practice or product to others and tell them what I 
mean by it. Considerations of time, place and context all apply. Thus the drive of the 
rewritten parable in (103) is anti-essentialist. 
 An example of how translation might be shown to others is through the use 
of the dictionary. Although it is frequently commented that literary translation is 
about more than competent use of a dictionary (cf. Weinberger & Paz, 1987:43), it 
would be an unusual translator who did not have a dictionary to hand. The sort of 
errors that make people laugh in translation can often be ascribed to poor use of a 
dictionary. Robinson (2003:187), for example, gives the example of the slogan (of 
the scotch tape 3M) ‘It sticks like crazy’ being given in Japanese as ‘It sticks 
foolishly’. That this is wrong can be discovered by the reaction of the English person 
who reads it in back-translation, which would typically be amusement. Meaning is a 
communal activity and the dictionary is a guarantee of how that meaning is 
constituted through use, for example the historical quotations given in the Oxford 
English Dictionary to show the various uses of words now and in the past. There are 
other guarantees, such as those cited from Clancy (2006:7) in 3.3: the internet; 
encyclopaedias; consulting the ST author etc. The competent use of the dictionary 
and other forms of checking can be seen as a necessary if not sufficient condition of 
literary translation. 
With reference to products, the term ‘translation’ is used to refer to very 
different outcomes. Clarity is attained by comparing the phenomena under 
investigation (PI 50). It is, for example, all too easy to see translation solely from a 
western perspective, forgetting that non-western traditions instantiate different 
approaches (Tymockzo, 2006). Anuvad (Spivak, 2007:274) is a Sanskrit and Hindi 
term for written translation that means ‘repeating’ or ‘saying later’, so that 
translation in this context can be seen as a process of ‘updating and elaborating, 
rather than as some kind of physical movement across cultures’ (Pym 2010:2). 
Different western translation practices have also dominated in the past: for example, 
the notion of foreignisation is very different in the nineteenth-century writings of 
Schleiermacher (2004) from what it is in the contemporary writings of Venuti (1998, 
2008). 
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 The term ‘translation’ can be seen to be controversial, and it has often proved 
impossible for scholars and writers to agree on what it means, as can be shown by 
three examples. Firstly, Don Paterson (2006:73 ff.) asserts that his rendering of a 
sonnet cycle by Rilke is not a translation but a version. He defines ‘translations’ as 
works that aim to be ‘true to the original words and their relations’, and ‘versions’ as 
works that are ‘trying to be poems in their own right’. His contention is that there are 
two types of rendering available to the literary translator and that the version is the 
better option. Secondly, the writers of the canonical Middle High German romances 
and legends, by contrast, stress their status as translator and their trueness to the ST, 
so that Hartmann von Aue (1972:61), for example, maintains that his role in the 
production of the Gregorius was to bring it into German poetry out of Old French. 
Today, however, his work is studied as literature in its own right, with little reference 
to any ST used (Jackson, 1994), which shows that the distinction between translation 
and version has been much more fluid in the reception of texts than Paterson’s 
definitions would suggest. Thirdly, in his analysis of film and translation, Michael 
Cronin (2009:81) investigates interpretation as well as translation. He analyses, for 
example, Sophia Coppola’s presentation of the Japanese interpreter in her film Lost 
in Translation (2003). His study assumes that the practice of translation is wider than 
often recognised and can refer to oral as well as to written work. The difficulty of the 
term, as seen in these examples, has led translation theorists to attempt classification.  
As discussed in 2.1, Jakobson proposes a tripartite classification: intralingual 
translation or rewording; interlingual translation or translation proper; intersemiotic 
translation or transmutation (2004:139). Although influential, his definitions are too 
broad to allow certain texts to be satisfactorily categorised. A relocation, for 
example, involves a very specific strategy on the part of the translator: the translation 
of Frédéric Beigbeder’s novel 99 francs (2000) by Hunter (2002a), £9.99, moves the 
setting of the ST from Paris to London, yet it can only be classified as interlingual 
translation according to Jakobson’s system, which would not differentiate it from 
translations that do not relocate, for example, Hunter’s translation (2002b) of 
Catherine Millet’s erotic memoir. 
Munday (2009:8) gives the more detailed classification represented in (105), 
which he refers to as a ‘cline of strategies’ that contrasts the derivative with the 
primary and enables any translation to be located at a point along the cline. Hunter’s 
relocation of Beigbeder can thus be mapped on the right hand side of the cline as a 
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‘translocation’. The cline represents an advance on Jakobson’s classification, 
because it includes more categories and allows texts to be placed along a line, rather 
than given a designation. 
 
(105) 
More derivative                                                                  More primary 
phonological translation                                                      creative/primary 
       word for word                                                         translocation                                 
               literal                                                          free – adaptation  
                     formal                                            functional 
The problem is that the cline offers a two-dimensional view of any given strategy, 
whereas the solution that is called for is at least three-dimensional. The cline opposes 
the phonological and the creative, for example, but there is no reason why a 
phonological translation should not be creative, as is the case with the English 
edition of the Latin poet Catullus by Celia and Louis Zukofsky, who aim to follow 
‘the sound, rhythm, and syntax of [Catullus’s] Latin … to breathe the “literal” 
meaning with him’ (1969:np); theirs is both a creative and a derivative project. 
 To map a translation on Munday’s cline is too restrictive, a false dilemma. It 
is analogous to saying that if I take after my mother then I cannot bear any 
resemblance to my father at all. Tymoczko (2007:83-90) uses Wittgenstein’s notion 
of family resemblance, discussed in 3.2, to avoid the sort of problems of 
classification that arise in systems such as those of Jakobson and Munday (too broad 
in the first case, too narrow in the second). Just as the search for any one 
characteristic, found in all members of a family, is typically fruitless, so Tymoczko 
argues that trying to apply all-encompassing categories to the variety of phenomena 
addressed in translation studies is futile. She uses the term ‘cluster concept’ to 
designate a concept that includes different aspects, and proposes translation as a 
cluster concept, being, like ‘game’, a concept with ‘blurred edges’ (PI 71). The term 
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is brought back from a metaphysical to an everyday use, as part of an anti-
essentialist project. 
 Seeing translation as a cluster concept can clarify the use made of the term. 
To return to the three examples given above: Paterson (2006) is playing with words 
when he tries to seek an essentialist difference between a translation and a version, 
rather than spelling out clearly his own aims as translator, possibly deflecting 
attention from how he has rendered the ST; the case of the writers of German 
mediaeval courtly romances shows that the concept of originality in creative work is 
more flexible than often thought (Boase-Beier & Holman, 1999:2 ff.), so that 
translations are acts of creative writing; the Japanese interpreter in Coppola (2003) is 
as much a translator as Faust in his vaulted study. The meaning of the term chosen to 
describe individual acts of translation depends upon its use (cf. PI 43). The opera 
Faust by Charles Gounod (1962), for example, can be described as a translation of 
Goethe’s Faust (Goethe, 1972), but I should probably cause frustration if I were to 
bring back the score if my friend asked me to get a translation of Faust when I was 
in town. I should have failed to carry out a grammatical investigation of what my 
friend wanted.  
 Tymoczko, as part of her grammatical investigation of the phenomena of 
translation, accordingly writes the term with an asterisk, i.e. ‘*translation’, in order 
to signal to the reader that it is a cluster concept that can include different practices 
of translation and hence signify ‘the cross-cultural understanding that translation 
studies must move towards’ (2007:59). An advantage of seeing translation in this 
way is that it allows overlap between different types of translation and different 
types of translating. The translation of Beigbeder by Hunter (2002a) for example, 
can be analysed from several angles: the purpose of the relocation; the consistency of 
the relocation; the way that her style echoes the style of the ST; the accuracy of the 
rendering of French expressions etc.
44
 All are part of the cluster.  
The description of any TT will involve its identification as a translation. This 
point will be elaborated in 4.2. Here it is important to note the variety of words that 
are used to describe translations and to use Wittgenstein to show that terms such as 
‘adaptation’, ‘literal translation’, ‘version’ etc. only have sense in the way they are 
used. There is no essence behind a concept to which appeal may be made, just as the 
                                                 
44
 Such was my strategy when I used this novel as a case study for an essay for the MA in Literary 
Translation at UEA, 2007-8. 
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box may not even contain a beetle in Wittgenstein’s story. In a review (2008:76) of 
Gordon Pirie’s Fables (2008), a translation of poems by the seventeenth-century poet 
Jean de la Fontaine, for example, Maya Slater makes this comment: ‘None of the 
poems is a complete and faithful translation: he always adds something of his own. 
He takes so many liberties that his poems are versions rather than translations.’ The 
word ‘version’, as in Paterson above, is used to indicate a certain type of translation. 
Here it is based on the fidelity debate in translation (which I shall review in 4.4), and 
it is implied that a version is inferior to a translation, in contrast to Paterson. Slater 
does define her term so that the reader can understand what she means by a version, 
i.e. a free translation as opposed to a supposedly faithful one. But she fails to 
recognise that translation is a cluster concept. There are many ways of translating la 
Fontaine and it is not possible to formulate essentialist categorisation, although her 
review at least indicates what sort of rendering a purchaser of Pirie’s text might 
expect. La Fontaine is in any case a much-translated author whose opus allows 
comparison of different renderings. His own work can itself be described as a set of 
‘translations going back to the semi-mythical Aesop’ (Barnstone, 1993:93). The 
cluster is more complicated than Slater implies. 
 By referring to *translation, Tymoczko is able to challenge what she sees as 
the predominant western paradigm of translation, i.e. the transference of meaning 
(analogous to a scientific process), as discussed in 3.1. She regards this paradigm as 
too narrow, principally because it excludes non-western ways of engaging with the 
ST. She quotes the Chinese fanyi (or ‘turning over’) as an example of such a way, 
and it would also apply to the Sanskrit/Hindi anuvad mentioned above. Her call 
(2006:20) is for the broadening of the term ‘translation’ in critical and scholarly 
discourse, to include such non-western methods, in order to move away from a 
situation that is ethically unacceptable because it assumes the superiority of western 
paradigms. Munday (2009:19) predicts that the response to Tymoczko’s call will be 
of immense importance, possibly involving a radical change in the whole discipline 
of translation studies, ‘a new “turn”, detour, byway or complete translocation’. As 
with Wittgenstein’s laboratory work on shock, described in 1.5.1 as an example of 
how the insights of his philosophy can be applied, what begins as a look at how a 
term is used ends by threatening to change everything (Monk, 1990:533).  
 Faced with a cluster, there is a tendency for the critic to oversimplify. Freud 
(2006:59) points out that to recognise that something is a cluster is to make a start, 
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not a finish: ‘The only way that we can give an account of complex clusters is to 
describe their various elements one by one. And consequently, all our explanations 
are initially guilty of being one-sided simplifications, and wait to be filled out, added 
to and thereby corrected.’ Tymoczko (2007:90) quotes with approval the assertion by 
Peter Fawcett that it is a mystery ‘why theorists are so determined to defuzz the 
discipline’ of translation studies. Defuzzing ignores the ‘rough ground’ of linguistic 
practices (PI 107), by seeing language as an artefact of ‘crystalline purity’, a 
preconceived ideal that ‘can only be removed by turning our whole inquiry around’ 
(PI 108). An example of the defuzzing tendency is the way that translation is often 
viewed in polarities. It is possible to read many classic statements from translation 
practitioners and translation theorists in terms of polarity, where one method of 
translating or viewing a translation is contrasted exclusively with another. In Table 5, 
I give examples of nine translation polarities, based on the summary by Pym 
(2010:33), with the sources in chronological order of composition. 
 
TABLE 5: TRANSLATION POLARITIES 
SOURCE  POLE 1 POLE 2 
Cicero (1997) As an interpreter As an orator 
Schleiermacher (2004) Foreignising Domesticating 
Nida (1969) Formal Dynamic 
Newmark (1988) Semantic Communicative 
Levý (2000) Anti-illusory Illusory 
House (1997) Overt Covert 
Nord (1997) Documentary Instrumental 
Toury (1980) Adequate Acceptable 
Venuti (1998) Resistant Fluent 
 
There are two problems. Firstly, the polarities differ in kind, whereas their tabulation 
suggests that they do not. Cicero (1997), for example, addresses how a translator 
deals with the ST, whereas Toury (1980) is interested in how the TT is perceived in 
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the target culture. The polarities are similar, of course, and are linked in family 
resemblance, but not in type. Secondly, to rely on polarities is to use an intellectual 
shorthand that ignores how most descriptions are not exclusive (Austin, 1962:83). To 
refer to the terminology of Christiane Nord (1997), for example: a translation may be 
documentary in one sentence and instrumental in another; or documentary in one 
part of a sentence and instrumental in another part; or both documentary and 
instrumental at once (Boase-Beier, 2006:27). Anscombe’s translation of a sentence 
in PI 38, discussed in 3.4, can serve as an example; ST and TT are given again as 
(106) and (107) respectively.  
  
 (106) 
Denn die philosophischen Probleme entstehen, wenn die Sprache   feiert. 
for     the philosophical      problems arise         when the language celebrates 
                                                                                                            idles 
                                                                                                            stops-work 
 
(107) 
 
For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.  
 
 
 
The first six words of (107) can be described as documentary translation because 
they instantiate dictionary meaning; whereas the final three words can be described 
as instrumental, because they go beyond dictionary meaning. To attempt to describe 
the whole sentence as either documentary or instrumental oversimplifies. As with 
Munday’s cline in (105), the solution offered is two-dimensional, whereas the ideal 
solution would be at least three-dimensional, just as Wittgenstein (PR 51-52) uses 
the colour octahedron (as opposed to a colour wheel) as an example of a surveyable 
representation. An example of translation as a cluster, of translation as *translation, 
is to be seen in the work of Hughes (2006), not just in the sense that Hughes 
translates many different types of ST, ranging from Classical Greek tragedy to 
contemporary Hungarian verse, but in the sense that he translates in different ways. 
Daniel Weissbort (2006:vii) asserts that Hughes often translates in a way that 
‘suggests a belief in the intrinsic ability of poetry to cross linguistic frontiers, 
provided the translator does not interpose himself overmuch’, as seen in his practice 
of reworking a gloss provided by an SL speaker, as described by Gaia Servadio 
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(Hughes, 2006:218). I give part of an Italian poem by Lorenzo de’ Medici (ibid.) as 
(108) with Hughes’ translation (2006:100) as (109). 
 
(108) 
 Quanto sia vana ogni   speranza nostra, 
how      is   vain  every hope       our 
quanto fallace      ciaschedun disegno, 
how     whimsical each           design 
 
(109) 
 
How futile every hope is, that we have, 
How illusory, all our designs, 
 
 
This translation illustrates the advocacy by Hughes and Weissbort (Hughes 
2004:200) for ‘translations that can be described as literal, though not literal in a 
strict or pedantic sense’. In his translations from Ovid, however, there is a different 
approach, as can be seen in his rendering (1997:81) of the description in the 
Metamorphoses of Narcissus falling in love with his reflection (2004:81). The Latin 
ST is given as (110) and the TT as (111). 
 
 
(110) 
 
Quisquis es,         huc      exi!   quid me, puer unice   fallis 
whoever you-are to-here come why me  boy  unique beguile 
quove      petitus abis?   certe        nec forma         ne   aetas 
to-where sought you-go certainly not  from-form  nor from-age 
est mea   quam fugias,    et    amarunt me quoque nymphae. 
is   mine  which you-flee and loved     me also       nymphs 
 
(111) 
 
Who are you? Come out. Come up 
Onto the land. I never saw beauty 
To compare with yours. Oh why do you always 
Dodge away at the last moment 
And leave me with my arms full of nothing  
But water and the memory of an image. 
It cannot be my ugliness 
Or my age that repels you, 
If all the nymphs are so crazy about me. 
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As Raphael Lyne (2002:263) points out, Hughes ‘discovers Hughesian moments in 
the Metamorphoses’. Thus: the idiom in the final line is distinctly colloquial; there is 
no attempt to convey the dactylic hexameter of the ST, three lines of Ovid becoming 
six lines in Hughes; the interjection ‘Oh’ is used in line 3 to heighten dramatic 
tension etc.  
Hughes can in turn be seen as part of a cluster of translations that have 
appeared around Ovid, as shown in Table 6. 
 
TABLE 6: OVID AS A CLUSTER OF TRANSLATIONS 
TT DESCRIPTION 
 
Tales from Ovid (Hughes (tr), Supple & 
Reade (eds), 1999) 
A working of Hughes (1997) for the stage by 
Tim Supple and Simon Reade. 
 
Ovid Metamorphosed (Terry (ed), 2000) A collection of 19 stories based on Ovid. 
 
Ovid in English (Martin (ed), 1998) An anthology of translations of Ovid into 
English from Chaucer to the twentieth 
century, representing 76 translators. 
 
After Ovid: New Metamorphoses (Hoffman 
& Lasdun (eds), 1994) 
An anthology of poetry inspired by Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, representing 42 translators. 
 
  
Michael Hoffman and James Lasdun (1994:xii) discuss their practice as editors: ‘We 
invited each contributor “to translate, reinterpret, reflect on or completely re-imagine 
the narratives” and got the full gamut’, i.e. the resulting book manifests a cluster 
both of practice and of product. In Martin’s anthology (1998:183), there is James 
Shirley’s 1646 translation, given as (112), of text (110). 
 
 (112) 
 What e’er thou art, come forth, and meet me here 
He cries; why dost deceive me with a look? 
What meanes that imitation? come neare, 
Leape from the depth of thy imprisoning brook. 
      Fold not thy arms like mine, or smile on me, 
      Unlesse I may enjoy thy company. 
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This poem is formally very different from the translation by Hughes given as (111). 
The Venus and Adonis stanza of Shirley contrasts with Hughes’ free verse, for 
example. Both forms reflect their time in their poetic form of life. And yet both 
translators can, I think, be said to be playing the language-games of Ovid. To detail 
how they do this is to move towards describing the TT, which is the subject of 4.2.  
 In this section, I have argued that Tymoczko, following Wittgenstein, is right 
to view translation as a cluster concept. We should attempt to see clusters and not to 
impose clines. The beetles, as opposed to the beetle, must be brought out of the box 
and described. After all, more than 4,000 different species of beetle have been 
categorised in Britain alone (Cooter & Barclay, 2006:xiv), and the taxonomy of 
translation may likewise be a demanding task. 
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4.2 Describing the surface 
 For Wittgenstein, meaning is on the surface, as argued in 2.1. To grasp 
meaning involves looking at form, as Nietzsche (2001:8) puts it in his praise of 
classical Greek culture: ‘Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live. What is required 
for that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance, 
to believe in forms, tones, words, in the whole Olympus of appearance. Those 
Greeks were superficial – out of profundity!’ In this section, I show how the surface 
can be described in order to produce a theory of the text. Following discussion in 
Chapter 1, I use the term theory to mean ‘view of’ rather than ‘doctrine about’. I 
begin by considering Wittgenstein’s application of his methods to mathematics, a 
subject outside philosophy, which may suggest by analogy how his methods may be 
applied to translation. 
Wittgenstein wrote at length on the problems of mathematics, chiefly in 
RFM, stressing not the subject-matter taught in schools or universities but the use of 
mathematics in ordinary life, what he calls its use ‘outside mathematics … the 
meaning of the signs, that makes the sign-game into mathematics’ (RFM V-2). 
Parallel to the language-game (the central concept in Wittgenstein’s later work on 
language, PI 7) is the ‘sign-game’ (such as a sum), which only makes sense in 
context, in how mathematics is carried out. As Monk (2007:287) comments, for 
Wittgenstein mathematics is ‘first and foremost the motley of techniques and 
practices we employ that use mathematical signs; we count out the money we give to 
the bus driver, we calculate how much money we will need to save to afford a 
holiday, we estimate how fast a car was going when it hit a pedestrian etc. etc.’: 
mathematics is viewed as a human practice, like language. 
 This unconventional view of mathematics explains what Wittgenstein means 
by the comment on translation (Z 69845) quoted as (113).  
 
 (113) 
Translating from one language into another is a mathematical task, and the 
translation of a lyrical poem, for example, into a foreign language is quite analogous 
to a mathematical problem. For one may well frame the problem ‘How is this joke 
(e.g.) to be translated (i.e. replaced) by a joke in the other language?’ and this 
problem can be solved; but there was no systematic method of solving it. 
                                                 
45
 The question about replacing the joke was discussed in 3.2. 
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The first sentence might suggest to somebody unacquainted with Wittgenstein’s 
views on mathematics that translating a poem is a mechanical task following a pre-
set procedure. Barnstone (1993:19), in my opinion, misleads his readers by giving 
only this first sentence as a motto for a subchapter, ignoring Wittgenstein’s 
description of mathematics as a process of agreeing practices rather than discovering 
truths. I may use a mechanical application if I want to work out the product of, say, 
(49 x 49), but there is no mechanical procedure involved if I am trying to work out 
how to save up for a holiday, but rather such considerations as: where I would like to 
go; other projects I wish to undertake; how long I want to be away for; how much 
money I have saved etc. The example from Wittgenstein in (113) is of translating a 
joke (cf. his remark in LWPP I 278 on how the correct translation of an English play 
on words may be a completely different play on words, as discussed in 3.4). 
Wittgenstein stresses that the problem can be solved, i.e. that translation is possible, 
but that there is no systematic formula for solving it. The same joke may be 
translated differently on different occasions, depending on the context, just as there 
are many ways of arranging my finances so I can go on holiday. Neither the sign-
game nor the language-game can be divorced from the form of life. Translation is by 
implication first and foremost the motley of techniques and practices we employ that 
use linguistic signs when we replace one text with another in a different language. 
 This later approach contrasts with the view of translation given in the T-LP, 
where the picture theory of meaning (the natural way we view language) implies a 
‘pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world’, which 
gives ‘a rule of translation’ (T-LP 4.014). The later Wittgenstein abandons the search 
for foundations in philosophy, i.e. absolutely certain premises from which to 
proceed, such as the Cartesian conviction that the thinking subject exists (Descartes, 
1968). Instead, Wittgenstein maintains that philosophy cannot give any foundation 
and stresses instead looking at practices (PI 124). Monk (2007:278) accordingly 
describes him as a ‘methodological anarchist’. It would analogously be an error to 
search for a rule to enable me to translate this joke into German. What is possible, 
however, is to describe the ways that people do translate a joke (a poem, a play, a 
novel) into German, descriptions that may in turn suggest to me ways of translating, 
as I learn from practices and am trained in techniques. 
   In PI 109, quoted as (114), Wittgenstein shows the consequences his position 
has for explanation. 
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 (114) 
All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place. And this 
description gets its light – that is to say, its purpose – from the philosophical 
problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through 
an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these 
workings are recognised – despite an urge to misunderstand them. 
 
 
 
The stress is on looking rather than on thinking, on considering phenomena rather 
than on imposing doctrine onto phenomena. The approach leads to the surveyable 
representation of phenomena (PI 122), just as a dictionary will show how a language 
is used, rather than prescribing use. 
 In Chapter 1, I argued that Wittgenstein’s work has had limited impact on 
translation studies, with certain exceptions such as DTS, to which I now turn. DTS is 
associated with the work of Toury, who cites Wittgenstein as a source (1980:17-18). 
Edwin Gentzler (2001:126) describes Toury’s project in the passage cited as (115). 
 
 (115) 
Toury suggests a different theoretical framework in which to conceptualise 
phenomena regarded as translation. Borrowing from Ludwig Wittgenstein the 
concept of family resemblances, Toury now views ‘original’ texts as containing 
clusters of properties, meanings, possibilities. All translations privilege certain 
properties/meanings at the expense of others, and the concept of a ‘correct’ 
translation ceases to be a possibility.  
 
 
 
Family resemblance, as discussed in 4.1, is a way of showing that such common 
notions of translation as transference or of translation as equivalence are wrong-
headed, because they oversimplify complicated phenomena. Because translation is a 
human activity (PI 23) and a cluster-concept (as argued in 4.1, following Tymoczko, 
2007), there are many ways of approaching it. The translation theorist can show his 
or her reader what is going on in the TT, while avoiding any suggestion of a correct 
model of translation underlying the process like a Platonic form. DTS represents a 
refusal to impose a paradigm onto the phenomenon of translation and its products: 
for example, by seeing translation as either instrumental or documentary (as 
discussed in 4.1), as if there were only two ways in which it could be described. The 
existence of many different sorts of polarities in the field of translation theory – 
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shown in Table 5 – is itself an indication that different people choose to describe 
things in different ways, and that things can in fact be described in different ways.  
Toury (1995:10) presents a map of translation studies, based on the outline of 
Holmes (2004). There is an initial division between pure and applied translation 
studies; pure translation studies is then divided into the theoretical and the 
descriptive (DTS); DTS is further divided into three approaches: product-oriented 
approaches; process-oriented approaches; function-oriented approaches. Toury’s 
map is a surveyable representation of the outline offered by Holmes and shows that 
translation theory is itself a cluster concept, because there are many different types of 
theory found in the field, ranging from the descriptive (Toury, 1995) to the mystical 
(Benjamin, 2004).  
Any attempt to describe translation from a Wittgensteinian point of view will 
investigate the language-games played by ST and TT as well as the ‘particular 
historical and cultural context of any translator, any translation event, and any 
translation movement’ (Tymoczko 2007:41), i.e. the form of life that produces the 
artefact. I again use the translation of Homer’s Iliad by Pope (1931) as an example, 
as in 2.3. Unlike the ST, which is written in unrhymed dactylic hexameter, Pope uses 
rhyming couplets in iambic pentameter. My last sentence is a description, not an 
explanation. This description can be extended by showing how the iambic 
pentameter was the dominant verse form of the eighteenth century, when Pope was 
writing. At this point we do have a partial explanation of what Pope was doing, for it 
is an error to assume that explanation and description are exclusive terms. Any 
description will contribute to our understanding. If I describe how a man fell from a 
window, for example, this may explain his broken leg, though there may be other 
causes, such as that he was pushed by his boss, who was angry with him etc. 
Wittgenstein places the phenomenon first and I do not think it is possible to ban 
explanation in the way an initial reading of PI 114 may suggest. Rather the 
insistence is on how we talk about things – the grammatical aspect, not the empirical 
as such – and on placing phenomena in context. Wittgenstein’s own work contains 
explanation: the story of the shopping trip in PI 1, for example, is elucidated. To 
return to Pope, there can be no question of a total explanation of why Pope wrote as 
he did, because style is a result of choice, ‘the perceived manner of expression’ as 
Katie Wales defines it (2001:371), and so for a total explanation we should need a 
total explanation of Pope’s mind. It is in this way that explanations ‘come to an end 
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somewhere’ (PI 1), as we turn to look at how we use words, expressions and texts. 
The concept of a total explanation remains illusory (Keil & Wilson, 2000). The more 
descriptions we can offer, however, the fuller our picture of any phenomenon may 
become and the more we may understand it, which is why Bertolt Brecht maintains 
that a person with only one theory is lost and that we should stuff many theories ‘in 
our pockets like newspapers’ (Makaryk, 1993:vii). 
The stress on description, rather than the putting forward of a doctrine, is 
typical of many of the classical texts of translation studies. As Barnstone (1993:61) 
asserts: ‘Before the second decade of our century translation theory, despite the 
name, was not so much theory as a history of the practice of translation’. The texts 
anthologised by Robinson (1977) illustrate this. His collection of pre-twentieth-
century texts from ninety authors is not theoretical in the way that, say, the writings 
of Benjamin (2004) are theoretical. Many of the texts are by practising translators 
who comment on their work or the work of others and justify strategies, as shown in 
Table 6, where I give five examples from Robinson (1997). The first four examples 
are of practising translators. The final example, Nietzsche, is of a philosopher 
examining the phenomenon of translation.  
 
TABLE 6: PRE-TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRANSLATION THEORY  
AUTHOR, TEXT, YEAR 
 
DESCRIPTION 
Jerome (23-30), ‘Letter to 
Pammachius’, 395 
 
A justification of sense-for-sense as opposed to word-for-
word translation. Jerome refers to the practice of the Gospel 
writers. 
 
Luther (84-89), from 
Circular Letter on 
Translation, 1530 
 
A justification of the sense-for-sense approach of his recent 
translation of the NT into German. Luther aims to write 
German as spoken in his place and time. 
 
Dryden (172-174), from 
‘Preface to Ovid’s Epistles’, 
1680 
 
A meditation on three possibilities available to the literary 
translator: ‘metaphrase’ (literal rendering); ‘imitation’ (free 
rendering); ‘paraphrase’ (middle way).  
 
Pope (193-195), ‘Preface to 
the Iliad’, 1715 
 
A description of his aim, when translating Homer, of 
preserving ‘that spirit and style which makes [Homer’s] chief 
character’ (1997:195). 
 
Nietzsche (262), from The 
Gay Science, 1882 
A description of the translation of Greek texts by Roman 
writers as a form of conquest. 
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The authors’ statements describe what is done in particular cases. Dryden, for 
example, puts forward possibilities of practice, rather than stating laws. It is 
analogous to putting forward possibilities open to somebody who wishes to go on 
holiday. Wittgenstein’s own stress on practice supports the value of such an 
approach. 
The descriptive tradition continues in the paratextual material often found 
accompanying the TT. The translation of Theodor Fontane’s German novel Effi 
Briest by Hugh Rorrison and Helen Chambers, for example, includes a Translators’ 
Note (2000:xxi-xxii), in which a number of points are made about their practice. In 
Table 7, I describe the main points paragraph by paragraph. 
 
TABLE 7: TRANSLATORS’ NOTE TO EFFI BRIEST 
PARAGRAPH FUNCTION 
 
1 (2000:xxi) Justification of the need for a new translation and setting out of the overall 
strategy: to retain the effect of the ST without anachronism. 
 
2 (2000: xxi) Description of the translation of style: to retain ‘echoes and patterns’, 
whilst producing a version with ‘a rhythmical flow and dynamic of its 
own’. 
 
3 (2000: xxi) Description of the translation of forms of address: some left in German, 
others translated by terms from Fontane’s English contemporary, Oscar 
Wilde. 
 
4 (2000: xxii) Description of how the translation aims to be both readable and reliable. 
 
5 (2000: xxii) Description of how translating Fontane has given the translators new 
insights into his work. The hope is expressed that the TT may bring new 
English-speaking readers to Fontane. 
 
 
In each paragraph, a problem is identified and a solution described in an approach 
reminiscent of that of the texts in Robinson (1997).  
Central to DTS is the case study. Toury (1995:113 ff.) offers an ‘assortment 
of case studies’ from Hebrew translation to illustrate a variety of genres and 
translation approaches: renderings of Shakespeare’s sonnets; indirect translation; 
mediation in translation; literary translation; interim solutions; translations of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet; translation of lexis; experimental translation; bilingualism 
and translation. Such stress on examples is a Wittgensteinian approach. The PI is 
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memorable for the stories Wittgenstein uses to illustrate his philosophy: the shopping 
trip (PI 1); the labourers (PI 2 ff.); the beetle in the box (PI 293) etc. In a 1935 letter 
to Wittgenstein, C.L. Stevenson comments: ‘I have learned over again what you 
often said, and practised in your classes – that clarity is almost all a matter of giving 
examples’ (McGuinness 2008:182). The use of a spectrum of cases avoids black-
and-white thinking. The case study can be used to train translators, e.g. the MA in 
Literary Translation at UEA (2010:np) introduces students to a variety of case 
studies and asks them to write one. 
In his study of Hebrew translation of Shakespeare’s sonnets (1995:114-128), 
Toury surveys work done between 1916 and 1993 in order to describe the evolution 
of translators’ attitudes. His strategy is to present the salient features of the 
translation under discussion. Historical facts are given, such as the author of a 
rendering and the circumstances in which it was written, followed by a presentation 
of those features of the translation that can be identified as ‘conspicuous 
characteristics’ (1995:123), a phrase paralleling Wittgenstein’s ‘surveyable 
representation’. For example, in discussing a 1929 translation by Avraham Shlonsky 
(1995:123-124), Toury first describes how it appeared and then discusses four 
stylistic features: form; title; rhyme scheme; language. The description focuses on 
the sonnet as translation, rather than as literature in its own right. Toury shows how 
Shlonsky’s work is a modernist rendering of Shakespeare: it does not set the poem 
out formally as a sonnet, for example. His description shows ‘another possible point 
of departure for translating Shakespeare’s sonnets into Hebrew’ (1995:124). 
To produce a description of a literary work is not straightforward, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. As Attridge (2004:156) asserts: ‘To engage in the process of 
“accurate description” is to make decisions about which of the myriad features of the 
work merit description – the use of archaic words? the use of polysyllabic words? the 
use of five letter words? the typeface? the colour of the ink? The list is potentially 
endless, and the choices made in any description will reflect a prior theory of what is 
relevant to an explanation of the work’s meaningfulness and power.’ One answer to 
the problem is to look at the context in which a description is made. The literary 
critic writing about the characterisation in a work may choose not to refer to the 
typeface. The scholar in book studies assessing the impact of a first edition on the 
reading public may choose to describe it in detail. Similarly, the description relevant 
in translation studies is that made by the translation theorist, whose primary 
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responsibility is to describe the text as translated. My case study of NT translation in 
4.5.2 is such a description.  
Translated texts are often described without being seen as translations, for 
example, in book reviews. Lasdun (2009), writing on the The Kindly Ones, fails to 
mention that it is a translation of Jonathan Littell’s French novel Les Bienveillantes 
(2006) by Charlotte Mandell (2009). His review is an exercise in literary criticism, 
dealing with Mandell’s translation as if it were a non-translated work in English. 
Within DTS, by contrast, the description can only be a surveyable representation if it 
describes the TT as translation. As Chesterman (1997:62) comments: ‘The minimum 
requirement is simply that a text is claimed to be a translation, and that it is accepted 
(by the client and/or the readers) as a translation in the target culture … the 
boundaries of the concept “translation” are not set by something intrinsic to the 
concept itself, but by the ways in which members of a culture use the concept’. To 
describe things in reference to other criteria is Wittgensteinian in its anti-essentialism 
(cf. PI 190). The way Chesterman references Wittgenstein frequently in the book 
from which this quotation is taken gives a rationale for his theorising on translation. 
As I have argued throughout this thesis, the possibility of using Wittgenstein for 
support in this way is the main justification for researching his relevance to 
translation. 
 Many texts in translation studies aim to do much more than to describe. 
Toury (1995:259 ff.), for example, moves on from description to his theory of 
norms, the ‘laws of translational behaviour’ he discerns operating in his case studies, 
such as the ‘law of growing standardisation’ (1995:265), which states that textual 
relations in the ST are often ignored in translation, in favour of target culture 
relations. Whether this is a law, however, seems to me debatable. It is certainly not a 
law in the sense that scientists speak of laws. Textual relations in the ST are often 
modified, according to Toury: if this were a law, they would always be modified. To 
speak of laws is to attempt to give an explanation when what is at stake is 
interpretation. Toury’s laws are not laws in the sense of hardcore theory (Iser, 
2006:5), because they have no predictive power. If I buy a new translation of Faust, I 
cannot use the law of growing standardisation to predict that the translation will 
modify ST textual relations. It is an error to force the study of literary translation into 
scientific patterns. What is worthwhile is to describe literary translation and then to 
interpret the description, because this approach may have an influence on practice. 
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Soft theories do not predict, but they indicate how things are done and they form a 
way in which practitioners can reflect on what they do, thus changing, confirming or 
refining the way they translate.  
 Twentieth-century translation theory is often seen as moving away from 
practice into obscure realms of no help to the practising translator. Benjamin’s essay 
‘The Task of the Translator’ (2004), for example, was written as the introduction to 
his own translation into German of the French of Baudelaire’s Tableaux parisiens, 
but does not reference the ST. Barnstone (1993:4) comments that the essay is ‘a little 
world made cunningly of theory, literary translation and language’ and that the 
German translations of Baudelaire ‘do not seem to be written by the same man who 
discusses theory and method in the prefatory essay’: there is ‘an absolute split 
between theory and practice’ (1993:61). The perception of this split perhaps explains 
why many practising translators are wary of theory. In dialogue with Chesterman 
(Chesterman and Wagner 2002:1 ff.), Wagner comments that most translators 
encounter theory as students and later forget it as they get to grip with practical 
work; she sees a gap between theory and practice greater than in other professions. 
For her, theory is useless because it fails to offer concrete advice, guidelines and 
doctrines. Chesterman’s response is to express sympathy with her complaint but to 
state that she has misunderstood the theoretical project. He makes an analogy with 
literary criticism, which is not expected to be used as a tool to produce creative 
writers, and claims that her desire for prescriptive theory misses the point, because to 
prescribe would be to ignore practice. Translation theory is primarily a descriptive 
project in which, as Pym points out, ‘scholars have set out to describe what 
translations are, rather than just prescribe how they should be’ (2010:65). In 3.1, for 
example, I argued that Berman (2004), whilst correctly diagnosing certain problems 
that have dogged literary translation throughout its history, is wrong to move on to 
prescribe ways of translating, because this is to ignore the context of any translation. 
The strategy he advocates, ‘literalism in translation’ (Berman, 2004:287), may only 
be suitable for certain contexts or certain functions. The descriptive project is a 
reaction against the prescriptive approach and against theory divorced from practice, 
and it represents a turn in translation studies, described by Tymoczko (2007:16) as a 
move away from a positivist, quasi-scientific position. 
  Wittgenstein’s refusal to advance any kind of theory (PI 109) should be seen 
in the context of his own work and not taken as a ban on theory in other areas, 
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including translation studies. Using Wittgenstein ought not to be a case of appealing 
to a philosophical police officer. In PI 123, he remarks: ‘A philosophical problem 
has the form: “I don’t know my way about”’. My contention is that his work 
provides tools for the translation theorist, who is enabled to find his or her way about 
by describing the TT, adopting a theory in the sense of taking a view of a text, not in 
the sense of forming a doctrine of what translation is. The project of theorising the 
TT after Wittgenstein would be anti-essentialist and anti-prescriptive. It would work 
through examples and case studies. It would aim at giving a surveyable 
representation of the TT as translated rather than as a work in its own right, which 
would be the task of literary studies. It would provide tools for analysing existing 
translation theories. It would enable the theorist to relate the TT to the form of life of 
the ST and of the translator. And it would be ‘bottom-up analysis’ (beginning with 
the text) rather than ‘top-down analysis’ (beginning with a theory), following Pym 
(2010:66). Refusing to advance theory is an insistence that the phenomenon precedes 
any intellectualising of it, and that looking precedes thinking.   
The phenomenon of literary translation itself can also be described, as well as 
individual texts. As Toury (1995:168) asserts, the term ‘literary translation’ is 
subject to ‘systematic ambiguity’, because it may refer to two different things: 
firstly, ‘the translation of texts regarded as literary in the source culture’; secondly, 
‘the translation of a text (in principle, at least, any text, of any type whatever) in such 
a way that the product be acceptable as literary to the recipient culture’. Sophocles is 
translated out of Greek because of his recognised dramatic and poetic genius, which 
is an example of the first phenomenon. The translations of Sophocles by Hölderlin 
(1952) are highly regarded because of the poetic genius of Hölderlin, not of 
Sophocles, and have even been translated into English (Constantine, 2001), which is 
an example of the second phenomenon. And both phenomena are clusters, a 
conclusion reached through description, not a priori theorisation. In addition, the 
practice of translation can be literary even when non-literary works such as 
advertisements are being translated (Boase-Beier, 2011:21), as discussed in 3.1. 
Theorising the TT begins with describing it as translation, which then allows 
work on that description. DTS, associated with the work of Toury, is an example of 
this approach, but the descriptive paradigm is wider; as Pym (2010:64) stresses, it 
has roots in texts from the history of translation studies and is now the dominant 
model of theorising about translation. Profundity can be attained by describing the 
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surface. Other paradigms of translation theory, such as polysystem theory or skopos 
theory, are similarly descriptive paradigms. The project of the humanities is itself 
descriptive (Winch, 2008), so that it is to be expected that theorists working within 
the humanities should have produced descriptive theories.  
As Boase-Beier (1998:33) asserts: ‘we still do not know how translation 
works. On the other hand, anyone who can speak more than one language – and that 
applies to the vast majority of people in the world – can, and does translate’. To 
explain translation, it would be necessary to know a great deal more about the mind 
than is currently the case. It would be a project in cognitive science.
46
 Wittgenstein’s 
insistence in PI 1 that explanations come to an end avoids infinite regression as 
every explanation demands another explanation. A hardcore theory involves 
description, interpretation, explanation and prediction. A soft theory involves 
description, partial explanation and interpretation. How could translation ever be 
explained? How could translation ever be predicted?  
Can description lead to the evaluation of the TT or of theories that have been 
produced to describe the TT? In 3.1, I referred to the use by Chesterman and Wagner 
(2002:5) of Hughes’ translation of Aeschylus from Greek to English (1999) as an 
example of literary translation, and the translation into English of the label on a 
packet of white powder in a Greek supermarket as an example of non-literary 
translation. By referring to these as the top and bottom ends of the market 
respectively, Chesterman and Wagner include value as part of the distinction, as 
Hermans (2007:77) notes. Value is customarily an element of how we describe 
something. It would be an odd description of a car that did not say whether it was a 
good car or not. It would similarly be odd for somebody to describe a work of art and 
not say whether they liked it or not, although it is not inconsistent to recognise that 
Klee, say, is a painter of genius while not being attracted to his work. Wittgenstein is 
anti-essentialist but not anti-evaluative, as can be seen from reading his life or his 
letters. He was fulsome in his praise of musicians, for example, referring to 
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and Beethoven as the ‘true sons of God’ (Monk 
1990:13). In 4.3, I turn to the project of the evaluation of texts, proceeding to the 
evaluation of theories in 4.4. 
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 Whether or not such a project could be successful is beyond the remit of this thesis. 
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4.3 Translated to our satisfaction 
The evaluation of translation can help the practice of translation, because to 
establish criteria about what makes a good translation (if there is any such thing) can 
help the translator who is trying to do this. It is of benefit to know what you are 
aiming for. What sort of issues arise when we evaluate translation? Can translation in 
fact be evaluated? My contention is that the work of Wittgenstein offers ways of 
representing translation that in turn facilitate evaluation and hence illuminate and 
influence practice, because to have a notion of what makes a good translation will 
make a translator choose strategies towards that end. 
In 1945, Wittgenstein wrote to Malcolm: ‘My landlord has a modern 
American translation of the Bible. I dislike the translation of the NT (by a man E.J. 
Goodspeed) but the translation of the OT
47
 (by a group of people) makes a lot clearer 
to me and seems to be well worth reading’ (McGuinness, 2008:385). The latter is the 
sort of effect most translators hope their work will have: that readers will find it well 
worth reading. It is significant that Wittgenstein was drawn to the translation because 
it made things clearer for him. He saw it as a surveyable representation, something 
that he recognised as a translation and that made clearer to him (because he could not 
read Hebrew) aspects of the network of Bible translation, presumably by his cross-
referencing it to other translations he had read. By contrast, the Icelandic novelist 
Halldór Laxness made the following complaint in a letter written to Johannes 
Lindberg in the same year: ‘I had the misfortune of being introduced in Sweden … 
by a rotten translation from the Danish of my novel Salka Valka’ (Ringmar, 
2009:262). This condemnation is stronger than Wittgenstein’s expression of dislike 
for the NT translation, because Laxness expresses a judgement that there is 
something qualitatively wrong with the translation of his work.  
The examples from the letters of Wittgenstein and Laxness make clear that 
the evaluation of translation is itself a practice that can be related to the 
Wittgensteinian notion of the form of life. How we evaluate is based on: other works 
we have read; evaluations made by other people; literary norms etc. As Wittgenstein 
remarks in RFM III-85, quoted as (116), people want to know that the translation 
they read is in some sense reliable.  
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(116) 
 
(Who says that this English poem can be translated into German to our 
satisfaction?!)  
 
 
There are two issues here, of authority and of judgement. I begin with the question of 
judgement. If a literary translation is a surveyable representation, as argued in 
Chapter 3, then the surveyable representation itself must be seen as such, that is, it 
must be shown. 
For something to be a surveyable representation depends on the context. 
Wittgenstein’s exemplar, the colour octahedron (PR 51-52), can be categorised as a 
surveyable representation because it can be related to something we know from 
everyday life, i.e. colours, of which it is one possible scheme. Wittgenstein 
categorises it as a grammatical representation (PR1). In translation, the form of life 
of the TT may surveyably represent the ST. Catullus, for example, wrote a poem in 
homage to the Greek poet Sappho (Jay & Lewis, 1996:30). His lyric signals itself as 
translation both through the use of the same Sapphic verse form and through the lyric 
being addressed to Lesbia. (There is no named addressee in the ST, but Sappho came 
from Lesbos.) The community in which Catullus’s poem was circulated was aware 
of the poetry of Sappho and would have recognised the homage (Wheeler, 
1934:112). Contemporary translations often signal themselves through the use of 
paratextual material, such as: the name of the translator; a translator’s introduction; 
translator’s notes. The translation of Fontane by Rorrison and Chambers (2000), 
discussed in 4.2, has all three. Wittgenstein (McGuinness 2008:385) was aware that 
he was reading a translation of the Bible (which is not always the case with Bible 
readers, as will be discussed in 4.5) and paratextual material can make the position 
clear to readers. Many introductions by translators, however, fail to show the 
strategies of translation used. Rorrison and Chambers (2000:xxi-xxii) give only one 
German example (of the translation of a title) in their translators’ note, so that the 
reader is not shown how their translational strategies on rendering style, for example, 
are worked out in practice. By contrast, Joyce Crick’s note on her translation of 
Kafka gives a detailed discussion with examples of how she has approached the 
problem of translating Kafka’s complex style (2009). 
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Venuti (2008) identifies resistance to translation as endemic in the 
Anglophone literary field, where many TTs are effectively disguised as original 
work, both in how they are written and how they are presented. The story told in the 
PI is one that can break down this resistance. By undermining the dualist view of the 
self, Wittgenstein militates against an atomised view of the individual living in his or 
her monolingual world. It is significant that Wittgenstein came from a multi-lingual 
Vienna and served in a multi-lingual army in the First World War (Eagleton, 2008). 
Many people in the world live at some sort of linguistic interface, for example, India, 
Luxembourg or Quebec, and most people speak more than one language (Boase-
Beier, 1998:33). The typical linguistic situation is dynamic and not static. The 
organisation of translation in Anglophone cultures may be based on an incorrect, 
atomised mind-set. Wittgenstein insists that justification consists in appealing to 
something independent, which is why there is no point buying several copies of the 
morning paper to check that what it says is true (PI 265). He shows that people 
constitute each other linguistically and that language forms a human practice. His 
view in turn has implications for how the presentation of translation can be 
organised. The view we take of language therefore influences practice. 
At the very least, a reading of the later Wittgenstein supports the bilingual 
edition as opposed to the monolingual, as discussed in 3.3, so that the reader may 
compare ST and TT, as in the Visible Poets series from Arc Publications (e.g. Stone, 
2005). The Wittgensteinian view pushes further to support more ambitious 
presentations, such as that by David Luke (1997:105) of Mörike’s poem ‘Das 
verlassene Mägdlein’ (‘The Abandoned Maid’), which offers ST, Luke’s English 
translation and a Scots translation by Gilbert McKay. The whole is a surveyable 
representation that shows, through its layout, two of the many ways of translation 
that are available. As Bell (2000:972) comments, it provides ‘an interesting and 
valuable insight into the comparative opportunities for translation offered by 
different but related idioms and vocabularies’. Influenced by Luke, I offer a similar 
surveyable representation on page 184 of the poem by Mörike discussed in the case 
study in 2.5, ‘Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag’. My representation, text (117), combines: 
ST (top left); gloss (bottom left); poetic translation (top right); relocation (bottom 
right).
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(117) 
 
EIN STÜNDLEIN WOHL VOR TAG 
 
Derweil ich schlafend lag, 
Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag, 
Sang vor dem Fenster auf dem Baum 
Ein Schwälblein mir, ich hört’ es kaum, 
Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag. 
 
‘Hör an, was ich dir sag! 
Dein Schätzlein ich verklag: 
Derweil ich dieses Singen tu, 
Herzt er ein Lieb in guter Ruh, 
Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag.’ 
 
Oh weh, nichts weiter sag! 
O still, nichts hören mag! 
Flieg ab, flieg ab von meinem Baum, 
Ach Lieb und Treu ist wie ein Traum 
Ein Stündlein wohl vor Tag. 
 
 
EIN STÜNDLEIN WOHL VOR  TAG 
a     small-hour       well      before day 
 
Derweil ich schlafend lag, 
while     I     sleeping   lay 
Ein Stündlein    wohl vor      Tag, 
a     small-hour well   before day 
Sang vor      dem Fenster auf dem Baum 
sang before the   window on  the   tree 
Ein Schwälblein    mir,    ich hört’  es kaum, 
a    small-swallow to-me I     heard it hardly 
Ein Stündlein  wohl vor     Tag. 
a    small-hour well before day 
 
‘Hör an, was   ich dir       sag! 
hear on  what I     to-you say 
Dein Schätzlein       ich verklag: 
your small-treasure I    accuse 
Derweil ich dieses Singen  tu, 
while      I    this     singing do 
Herzt     er ein Lieb in guter Ruh’, 
cuddles he a    love  in good peace 
Ein Stündlein   wohl vor      Tag.’ 
a     small-hour well  before day 
 
Oh weh, nichts   weiter   sag! 
oh alas  nothing further say 
O  still, nichts     hören    mag! 
o  quiet nothing to-hear desire 
Flieg ab,    flieg ab      von  meinem Baum 
fly     away fly    away from my         tree 
– Ach Lieb’ und Treu’   ist wie ein Traum 
   ah   love    and loyalty is  like a    dream  
Ein Stündlein   wohl vor      Tag. 
a     small-hour well  before day 
 
 
AN HOUR BEFORE THE DAY 
 
In deepest sleep I lay, 
an hour before the day: 
and, as I slept, from the nearby tree 
a swallow sang a song to me, 
an hour before the day. 
 
‘Now listen to what I say! 
Your love has gone astray. 
And while I sing, as swallows do, 
he holds a girl who is not you, 
an hour before the day.’ 
 
Oh no, what’s that you say? 
My swallow, go away! 
Before your singing from the tree 
I’d dreamed of love and loyalty, 
an hour before the day. 
 
 
AN HOUR BEFORE I LEFT FOR WORK 
 
I was listening to Britney Spears,  
a singer I really can’t stand, 
just too tired to drag myself from bed 
to turn the fucking radio off 
an hour before I left for work. 
 
‘Hey,’ she sang in a voice so fucking     
     dreary, 
are you really so sure of your man? 
He said he was ill? Well, he’s in bed 
with a girl from his firm. The truth is  
     rough, 
an hour before you leave for work.’ 
 
And a day can start in tears. 
They ought to have a fucking ban  
on Britney Spears. I stayed in bed 
with a glut of Friends and a packet of  
     stuff 
for an hour before leaving for work. 
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Such a representation seems to me to be a successful way of presenting literary 
translations of poems, because the reader is enabled to see what is going on in the ST 
– by being presented with the ST and a means of accessing it through the gloss – and 
is given two renderings of it in translation.  
A similar representation on a larger scale is by Peter Jay and Caroline Lewis 
of the lyrical fragment by Sappho ‘Φαίνεταί μοι κήνος ἴσος θέοισιν’ [‘Phainetai moi 
kênos isos theoisin’] (‘That man seems to me to be level to the gods’) (1996:28 ff.). 
They include: the ST; the transliterated glossed ST; a selection of translations of the 
lyric, including Catullus (referred to above). The internet also raises numerous 
possibilities for the surveyable representation of texts. The website Classic 
Persuasion (2010), for example, includes: the ST of ‘Φαίνεταί μοι κήνος ἴσος 
θέοισιν’; a plain prose translation; renderings by different translators; links to other 
sites of interest on Sappho. The internet has a number of advantages over a book: it 
can be updated, as new translations are written; it can be linked to other sites; there 
are no constraints on space; it is interactive, so that readers can contribute their own 
translations or translations they have discovered. Translation after Wittgenstein may 
come to flourish online, with the internet as a space for multiple translations.  
With respect to the printed word, however, practical considerations bring 
limitations for bilingual editions. Even though many publications of translated poetry 
are available in bilingual editions, as well as some prose works where the reader may 
want to check the ST (such as the English editions of Wittgenstein), it is unrealistic 
to expect publishers of prose works to bring out bilingual editions, due to 
considerations of cost and bulk. One possibility is to include at least some of the ST 
alongside the TT, which is the approach of Joseph Wright (1917:200ff) in his 
Grammar of the Gothic Language, who appends excerpts of the fourth-century 
translation of the NT into Gothic by Wulfila
49
, together with some pages of the HG 
ST, in what is a surveyable representation. The interested reader can easily obtain the 
NT in HG to match those Gothic sections with no facing ST. Another solution is to 
link printed translations with online material, to enable translators to write at greater 
length about their work, which might not be possible in printed notes due to lack of 
space. The Italian website La nota del traduttore (The Note of the Translator) 
(2011), for example, offers such an opportunity. 
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 Wulfila (Gothic) is sometimes referred to as Ulfilas (Latin).  
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In terms of organisation, the surveyable representation could also influence 
how books are marketed. The design of TT and bibliography can fight against the 
invisibility of the translator, just as the colour octahedron can make people see the 
grammar of the spectrum in one particular way, other views being possible. In my 
translation of Wuilmart (Wilson, 2009:40), I used a translator’s note to reference: 
Wuilmart’s anonymous ST; Wuilmart’s French TT; the English TT by Philip 
Boehm. The bibliography to this thesis credits all translators where possible.
50
 The 
practice of reviewing, similarly, can reference the translator. In 4.2, I referred to a 
review by Lasdun (2009), in which he never mentions that the novel under review is 
a translation (by Mandell of Littell). By contrast, Anthony Beevor (2009), in his 
review of the same work, comments that it is a translation and discusses Mandel’s 
translation of style, even if at an uninformed level: ‘This Anglo-American 
translation, which is certainly faithful, cannot quite capture the stunning use of 
language in the French original, in which harsh-sounding German ranks and 
technical terms strike the ear like the crack of a whip’. The ideal, to which Beevor’s 
review is at least a step, would be the review that acknowledges a work as translated 
and goes on to discuss it in an informed way. 
There are therefore ways of presenting translation so as to facilitate 
evaluation. The existence of a surveyable representation may show that the TT is 
designed to function as a literary text, but does not in itself make the TT literary. 
There is an analogy here with the contrast between surface and deep grammar 
discussed in Chapter 2. It is fitting to organise the surface grammar of the TT so as to 
alert the reader that what is aimed for is the deep grammar of literary translation. But 
the deep grammar will only be literary if two conditions are fulfilled: that the TT 
produces literary effects on the reader and that these effects result from a TT that is a 
surveyable representation of the ST. Twm Morys (Minhinnick, 2003:xi) comments 
that whenever he has seen translations of his cynhanedd, the formal Welsh verse he 
writes, he has ‘only dimly recognised them, like friends who’ve been in some 
terrible accident’. In Wittgensteinian terms, a translation that fails to play the same 
language-games as the ST will not be a literary translation, no matter how much 
paratextual material accompanies it offline or online, or no matter how skilfully 
written it is. Literary translation, as discussed in 3.1 with respect to the claims of 
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Berman (2004), can fail, a situation captured by Wittgenstein’s image in PI 430: ‘It 
is as if we had imagined that the essential thing about a living human being was the 
outward form. Then we made a lump of wood into that form and were abashed to see 
the lifeless block, lacking any similarity to a living creature’.  
That such wooden blocks exist in translation is often asserted (Berman, 
2004), which leads some to advocate against the very practice of literary translation. 
Morys (Minhinnick 2003:xi) vetoes any translation of his verse, while Scott 
(2008:16) argues that literary translation ‘designs a text to be read by someone in no 
position to judge either its reliability or its quality’, so that it aligns itself ‘with the 
arts of forgery, a logic borne out by the lure of pseudo-translations’. The aptness of 
the term ‘forgery’ is disputable, because the translator of a novel does not set out 
with the intention of deceiving his or her readers in the way that a forger of, say, a 
Klee painting hopes to deceive a prospective purchaser. Translations do usually 
advertise themselves as such in some way.
51
 Scott’s point addresses the fact that the 
TT has a different author from the ST, a fact that often goes unremarked in everyday 
life. When Chris buys the Penguin Classics translation of Jacques le fataliste, he 
may believe he is about to read a literary work by the great eighteenth-century 
philosopher Diderot; in fact he will read a work by Henry (1986). If a poem cannot 
be decoded, as argued in Chapter 2, it seems to follow that a poem cannot be 
translated, either. Literary translators may as well give up. The logical conclusion of 
Scott’s position is that Chris needs to learn French if he wants to read Diderot. 
Untranslatability becomes an integral aspect of the literary text. 
Scott’s position seems reasonable because surveying the relationship between 
ST and TT is only possible for somebody who can read both. (Outside academia 
such a person might moreover be unlikely to be reading both.) Louis Sass (1994:28) 
notes, for example, how Daniel Paul Schreber’s memoirs of his mental illness have a 
‘tentative, non-literal quality’ more apparent in the German ST (Schreber, 2003) than 
in the English TT (MacAlpine & Hunter, 2000), where the translators omit ‘many 
frequently used phrases and particles that would have been translated in English as 
“in part”, “on the other hand”, “so to speak”, “up to a point” and “in a way”’. Their 
strategy has the effect of making Schreber seem less aware that he is mentally ill in 
the TT than in the ST, and hence deforms a significant account of mental illness; it 
                                                 
51
 Of over 70 translations used for this thesis, for example, only one did not indicate a translator: Marx 
& Engels (1970). This is shown in the Bibliography. 
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shows the typical Platonising transference of meaning and consequent failure to 
render style that was discussed in 3.1. Sass accordingly questions the value of the 
TT, arguing that to ignore phrases and particles is a reasonable strategy if the only 
concern is with the content of Schreber’s delusional world, but that it is 
unsatisfactory if one wishes to grasp the form of that world. Having read Schreber in 
English and German, I agree with Sass, but am only in a position to do so because I 
can read the ST. If Scott’s implicit stipulation is accepted that every reader must be 
in a position to judge every ST, then the practice of literary translation is 
questionable, hence the analogy with pseudo-translation. The eighteenth-century 
poems by James Macpherson (2003), for example, were believed by most 
contemporary readers to be translations from an earlier Gaelic ST by the poet Ossian, 
yet are now known to be forgeries, Ossian never having existed: hence their status as 
pseudo-translations (Bate, 2011:45). Only scholarly work was able to establish 
whether Macpherson’s texts bore relation to any ST or not. The poetry is by no 
means without literary merit: Fiona Stafford (2003:vii) refers to its ‘extraordinary 
power’, for example. As a translation, however, it fails to be a surveyable 
representation because there is nothing to represent. When Matthew Arnold 
(1960:99) argues that Pope’s translation of the Iliad is not Homer, despite its ‘power 
and attractiveness’, he is making a similar point, although there is no doubt that Pope 
(1931) worked from the ST. 
 The readers who evaluate translations, as Chesterman points out, are 
therefore ‘not general ones, but a particular subset of them: scholars, critics and 
teachers’, unrepresentative of ‘the wider readership for whom a translation is 
intended’ (Chesterman & Wagner, 2002:83). Arnold asserts that ‘all the poetic 
feeling in the world will not enable a man who is not a scholar to judge [the 
translator] truly’ (1960:117). But does this matter, given the role translated texts play 
in our lives? Wittgenstein (OC 471) comments that it is difficult to know where to 
start with an inquiry: ‘it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go 
further back.’ To speak of literary translation as forgery is to go back too far, to try 
to reach the land before Babel, before translation. As is stressed by Steiner (1998) in 
both the title and the text of After Babel, this is not possible. We live in a world 
where certain translations have been accepted as literary, where, to use 
Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance, certain translations resemble others in 
a literary way. The discipline of translation studies produces experts whose 
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pronouncements will change the field. Tymoczko (2007) aims at reformulating the 
way we look at translation so as to include non-western perspectives, for example. 
Such transformation can come about through description rather than through 
prescription. Wittgenstein stresses that philosophy leaves everything as it is (PI 124): 
but what is changed totally is the way the philosopher sees things. To leave 
everything as it is, is therefore to change everything (Monk 1990:533). A translation 
of the literary will fail to be a literary translation when it does not display literary 
features itself, i.e. when it has been translated as if it were a non-literary text (as 
discussed in 3.1), or when it fails to represent a text (as with Macpherson), despite 
displaying literary features. The reading of Wittgenstein is one means by which the 
translation theorist can be trained to make such judgements. It is again a question of 
work on oneself (CV p.24), as discussed in 3.3 with respect to the translator. To 
change the field will change the way translation is presented, criticised, written. 
 Wittgenstein (RFM III-85) asks who can say that the poem has been 
translated to our satisfaction. The answer is the translation theorist, a blurred term 
that can be extended to include the poet, the literary scholar, the academic, the critic, 
the ordinary reader. Where does authority come from? For Wittgenstein, as 
discussed in 3.3 with respect to the form of life of the literary translator, it comes 
from the form of life of the translation theorist, from the practice of the evaluation of 
literary translation: in this sense, anybody who has a view of a translation. The 
translation critic (for example, the reviewer) is rarely a translation theorist in the 
sense of being an academic teaching or researching translation studies. The field 
includes poets, literary scholars and academic specialists. In 4.2 and in this section, I 
have referred to reviews by Lasdun (2009) and Beevor (2009) of a translation by 
Mandel (2009): Lasdun is a professional poet and Beevor is a professional historian. 
The crucial point is that critics be informed readers, in the sense used by Fish (1996), 
which Lasdun does not seem to be. When the ordinary reader is in turn enabled to 
make judgements – for example, by being offered a bilingual edition – he or she is 
no longer an ordinary reader, which is the rationale for including paratextual 
material: to make informed readers. The field of translation is a complicated cluster: 
any rules are generated from forms of life – of texts, of translators, of theorists, of 
readers (cf. PI 202). To argue like this is to respond to Scott’s criticism and, I think, 
to overcome it. 
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 By evaluating translation, we move beyond description. As Malmkjaer 
(2004) argues, the TT-oriented philosophy of DTS makes it difficult to justify 
evaluation theoretically, because any translation choice may have been the result of 
following a norm, however bizarre. Malmkjaer distinguishes between identifying 
patterns of manipulation and identifying errors, and appeals to the notion of semantic 
fields as a way of doing this (2004:142), just as Wittgenstein describes how the 
metrical system can only function when appeal is made to the standard metre in Paris 
(PI 50). We have to look outside the text to understand it. Appeal to semantic fields 
is one way of doing this, as is the appeal to language-games, and they are not 
exclusive. 
 In 4.4, I examine how translation theories can be evaluated from a 
Wittgensteinian point of view. Here I examine how one text can exemplify the 
evaluation of translation: the commentary by Weinberger (Weinberger & Paz, 
1987:2 ff.) on the translation of the poem ‘Lù Zhái’ (‘Deer Grove’) by Wang Wei. 
How this can be read as Wittgensteinian is represented in Table 8.  
 
TABLE 8: READING WEINBERGER AS WITTGENSTEINIAN 
WITTGENSTEINIAN FEATURE  EXAMPLE (Weinberger & Paz, 1987) 
The stress is on practice. 
 
12 renderings of the ST are given with 
descriptions (8-31). 
 
There is a surveyable representation of the 
ST. 
 
The ST is given in Chinese, transliteration 
and gloss (2-7). 
 
There is close reading of the ST. 
 
An ‘absolute humility towards the text’ (17) 
is demanded. 
 
Literary translation is not about transfer.  
 
Translation ‘is more than a leap from 
dictionary to dictionary; it is a reimagining 
of the poem’ (43). 
 
Deforming tendencies in translation are 
noted and condemned. 
 
It is shown how translators tend to feel they 
must improve on the ST (9). 
 
There is evaluation of translation. Weinberger (29) comments on the 
translation by G.W. Robinson (28) that it is 
‘unhappily’ widely available. (Robinson 
introduces a group of people to the TT 
where there is none in the ST, which 
Weinberger sees as a deformation.) 
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Description of texts, description of translation practice and evaluation of texts are 
linked, criss-cross. The practice is Wittgensteinian without being Wittgenstein. Cook 
and Read (2010:482) similarly offer a reading of the poet Wallace Stevens ‘as “a 
Wittgensteinian”’, because Stevens is ‘making, through his “strong-grammared” 
poetry, a set of moves that invite the reader to learn almost exactly the kinds of thing 
about themselves and about their tendencies to mire themselves in misunderstanding 
and delusion that Wittgenstein invites his reader to learn, through his therapeutic 
writing, his philosophy of delusion and its overcomings’. Here, I offer a reading of 
Weinberger as a Wittgensteinian, using Wittgenstein to confirm my intuitive positive 
reaction to Weinberger’s work. My reading of Wittgenstein becomes a way of 
evaluating texts on translation and also a way in which my own views on translation 
can be formulated as the result of philosophical deliberation and not solely as the 
result of intuition, which recent research shows to be unreliable (Chabris & Simons, 
2011). Following Cook and Read, there is a crucial difference between reading an 
author as a Wittgensteinian and giving a Wittgensteinian reading of a text. The latter 
can be done of any text; the former only of certain texts. 
 The question of reliability, of whether one can trust the translated words on 
the page or whether a certain TT makes anything clearer, also raises the question of 
accuracy. In the 2009 AQA foundation reading test for GCSE French, for example, 
candidates were asked the question given as (119) about the text given as (118) 
(AQA, 2010). The text was not glossed for the candidates, who were not allowed a 
dictionary.  
 
 
(118) 
 
C’est au       premier étage. 
it  is   at-the first       floor. 
 
(119) 
 
On which floor is the flat? 
 
 
No matter how imaginative the guesswork, no matter how poetic the candidate’s 
answer, a candidate who does not know that au premier étage is French for ‘on the 
first floor’ is going to lose the mark (cf. Arnold, 1960:117). It was stressed in 
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Chapter 3 that literary translation is not about transfer, but it is problematic to see 
how a literary translation can be produced at all where the translator has failed to 
understand the text. Barnstone (1993:118) discusses a Spanish translation of a poem 
by Dylan Thomas, in which the Argentine translator renders ‘she bore angels’ as 
‘ella aburrió a los angeles’, which means ‘she bored angels’ and he concludes that 
this is not free interpretation of the English verb ‘to bear’ but a mistake, caused by 
ignorance of English. Again, as with the case of failed literary translation and 
pseudo-translation, such discoveries are the privilege of informed readers. Here, in 
contrast to my comments above on Sass, I am reliant on Barnstone as scholar, 
because I cannot read Spanish. Barnstone (1993:121) notes that translations will 
have howlers, just as typographical errors are found in printed books, but that this 
does not necessarily destroy the worth of a translation: ‘Better a magnificent 
translation by a Borges or a Camus with a few mistakes than an “accurate”, 
ponderous translation unredeemed by art’ (1993:121).52 In his translation of 
Sophocles (1994:34), Hölderlin (1952:219), for example, translates the dative noun 
οἰδμασιν [oidmasin] (‘swellings’) as Häusern (‘houses’), possibly mistaking it for a 
similar Greek word with this meaning, for example, οἰκαις [oikais]. This and many 
other howlers do not prevent the translation being highly regarded, even though (to 
use Malmkjaer’s terms) we seem to be identifying error not manipulation. Berman 
(2004:276), for example, praises Hölderlin’s work for the way in which it ‘reveals 
the strangeness of the Greek tragic Word
53, whereas most “classic” translations tend 
to accentuate it or cancel it’. In contrast, the translations of Thomas Mann by Lowe-
Porter show many misunderstandings of the SL that contribute to the overall failure 
to represent the texts creatively (Gledhill, 2007). It is a question of judgement. 
 Creative translations such as Hölderlin’s can also be valued because they 
form part of a cluster and do not stand as the sole representation of the ST. The Loeb 
classical texts (e.g. Lloyd-Jones, 1994) place a Greek or Latin ST opposite a plain 
prose English translation. By contrast, Christopher Logue (2001) makes significant 
deviations in his translation of the Iliad: anachronistic referencing, such as 
helicopters (2001:230); quotation from English literature, such as from Shakespeare 
                                                 
52
 Barnstone’s comment is reminiscent of the adage of Edward FitzGerald (1980:335) about 
translation, that it is better to have ‘a live Sparrow than a stuffed Eagle’, which is itself another 
variation on the proverb considered in 3.4. 
53
 In the sense of the λόγος [logos], the creative word. 
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(2001:23); a stress overall on Homer’s depiction of warfare, playing down the 
redemptive aspects of the ST (Naffis-Sahely, 2011:59). We can, however, accept 
Logue within the field because there are other translations – Fagles (1990), for 
example – that render style and content without anachronism etc. The cluster is part 
of the context. The attack on Logue by André Naffis-Sahely (2011) is written as if 
Logue were the only English translation. As George Szirtes (forthcoming) notes, if 
no other translation is available, a translator has an obligation to produce ‘a kind of 
inspired imitation’, whereas with better known authors (such as, in this case, Homer) 
there is ‘more scope’ for free play.  
By contrast, Mandell (2010:i) stresses that her translation of Littell (2006) is 
the ‘sole English language version’, which will presumably remain the case for some 
time because of copyright law. There are inevitably more English language 
renderings of older classics, for which copyright has run out, than of modern 
classics. However, even a relatively recent work such as the 1953 PI was republished 
in 2009 with a revised English translation in order to maintain the English edition as 
a surveyable representation. Hacker and Schulte (2009) describe how the new 
translation was necessary in order to: correct misprints; standardise terminology and 
punctuation; correct translation errors etc.  
 The notion of representation explains why Matthew Sweney (2010) takes 
issue with the translation of a collection by the Czech poet Vítĕzlav Nezval by Ewald 
Osers (2009), noting among other things: misprints; omitted dedications; 
unacknowledged abridgement; omission of ST poems. He concludes that the reader 
is being offered a ‘botched job’ due to poor editing, because there has been no 
comparison of input and output (2010:98). An anecdote about Wittgenstein comes to 
mind here. Fania Pascal (1984:28-29) recounts how Wittgenstein was disgusted with 
her for saying (after an operation) that she felt like a dog that had been run over, 
Wittgenstein commenting that she had no way of knowing what a dog that has been 
run over feels like. In a discussion of this incident, Harry Frankfurt suggests that 
Pascal’s Wittgenstein is angry not because she is lying but because she offers a 
description of a state of affairs without submitting to the constraints imposed by the 
attempt to describe reality accurately: ‘Her fault is not that she fails to get things 
right, but that she is not even trying’ (2005:32). Similarly, the apparently unedited 
edition of Nezval is not even trying. 
194 
 
 Advocating a Wittgensteinian approach is not intended to turn the translation 
theorist into a literary inquisitor, finding and accusing bad translations. Tymoczko 
(2007), for example, uses her reading of Wittgenstein as a means of broadening the 
scope and possibilities of translation and of empowering translators. To demonstrate 
that non-literary translation of any ST is a possibility is potentially liberating, in the 
way that the Wittgensteinian therapy of the PI is liberating, because the fact that 
things can be done badly is the concomitant of the fact that they can be done well. 
Sedivy (2004) uses her reading of the PI to argue that Patricia Rozema (1999) goes 
too far in her filming of Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park by modifying aspects of that  
novel in order to make points about the slave trade, a view in line with general 
reception of the film (Walker, 2006:708). However, this does imply that a successful 
intersemiotic translation of the novel could be done. 
Wittgenstein’s comments on translation are not dogmatic. His remark (LWPP 
I 278) on the correct German translation of an English play on words being ‘maybe a 
completely different play on words’ is qualified by the use of ‘maybe’, for example. 
There is no prescription. It is worth noting again his advice: ‘Say what you please, so 
long as it does not prevent you from seeing how things are’ (PI 79). Within 
constraints, within the views put forward in the PI of how language actually works, 
there is the freedom that comes from clarity. So where does this leave evaluation? 
 Chesterman (Chesterman & Wagner, 1995:83-84) states that there are four 
basic approaches to the evaluation of translation quality in translation studies. I sum 
these up in Table 9, together with the support that could be offered to each from my 
reading of Wittgenstein. 
 
TABLE 9: THE EVALUATION OF QUALITY IN TRANSLATION STUDIES 
APPROACH WITTGENSTEINIAN SUPPORT 
 
Comparing the TT with the ST. 
 
The notion of the surveyable representation 
is based on comparison, contextualisation 
and family resemblance. 
 
Comparing the TT with parallel texts. 
 
The notion of the cluster concept recognises 
there is no one definitive translation or way 
of translating. 
 
Measuring the reactions of general, typical 
readers. 
 
The reader’s form of life can be described. 
The reader can become informed.  
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Trying to get at the decision-making process 
within the process of translation. 
 
Paratextual material can be seen as 
facilitating the surveyable representation. 
 
 
There is an analogy with the practice of law. Kerr (2008: 92-3) notes how law courts 
reach judgements that do not match the standards of proof and verification that are 
expected in science, such as in engineering, but that it does not follow that such 
judgements should be regarded as flawed. Similarly, the translation theorist 
approaching literary translation will use a variety of strategies in what is not a 
scientific procedure. Wittgenstein, as noted in Chapter 2, offers ‘a phenomenology of 
the experience of reading literature’ (Cook & Read, 2010:473), which can be 
extended to a phenomenology of the experience of reading translated literature. By 
asking if a poem can be translated ‘to our satisfaction’, Wittgenstein (RFM III-85) 
implies that there is no objective criterion here, but rather criteria determined by our 
forms of life. The surveyable representation of Sappho by Jay and Lewis (1996), for 
example, shows that this is the case. Some literary translations have been done to our 
satisfaction, such as Hölderlin (1952), praised by Steiner (1998:340). Other works 
have the appearance of literary translations and yet fail to be such because there is no 
ST (pseudo-translations), such as Macpherson (2003). Others claim to be literary 
translations yet fail to be such, because they fail to work as literature: Benjamin 
(2004:75) asserts that ‘… any translation which intends to perform a transmitting 
function cannot transmit anything but information – hence, something inessential’ 
and that this is the ‘hallmark of bad translations’, like the targets identified by 
Berman (2004). Wittgenstein’s work supports such judgements. 
 It also indicates a further move that can be made in evaluation. Robinson 
(2003) stresses that translation is about people, not least at the level of the project. 
The TT on sale in a bookshop is a collaborative product that has been commissioned, 
translated and edited. Translation scholars often write as if the translator alone is 
responsible for the decisions in the TT, some of which may have been taken at the 
editorial level, as anybody who has ever translated a text is aware. The recent 
translation of Clemens Meyer by Katy Derbyshire (2011:243) credits the whole team 
behind the book, including the editors, which is a move that Wittgenstein’s work, 
which stresses how we constitute each other, would demand. 
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 Throughout this chapter I address primarily the translation theorist and show 
how a reading of Wittgenstein may place him or her in a better position to comment 
on why and how we evaluate translations and to evaluate translations in his or her 
turn. He or she will be able to decide whether a Bible translation is well worth 
reading or not (cf. Wittgenstein, McGuinness, 2008:385), and to investigate whether 
Laxness (Ringmar, 2009:262) was right to say that he had been represented in 
Swedish by a rotten translation. He or she will be able to describe why people make 
such comments. It is a question of clarity and one that in turn affects practice. 
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4.4 Grammatical investigations 
 The grammatical investigation is fundamental to Wittgenstein’s approach to 
philosophy (PI 90), a tool in his battle against what he sees as our bewitchment by 
language (PI 109), as discussed in 2.4, where it was shown how the method is used 
to show both the dichotomy between our idea of how we believe that a concept 
works and the way that it works in practice, as well as the many different ways in 
which a concept can be used (McGinn, 2008:14). 
 In this section, I look at how the grammatical investigation can make issues 
clearer in the field of translation studies. I begin with an example from Schroeder 
(2006:157) of how this Wittgensteinian tool can be applied. Schroeder postulates 
that the grammatical investigation is a philosophical and not a linguistic exercise 
(such as compiling a dictionary) and investigates a text from F.H. Bradley (1893:19-
20), in which the apparent paradox is advanced that sugar is white but is not identical 
with white, so that we can say, ‘Sugar is white’, but cannot say, ‘White is in the 
bowl’, whereas to say that ‘Sugar is sugar’ is uninformative. Bradley sees a dilemma 
here: ‘If you predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject what it is not; and 
if you predicate what is not different, you say nothing at all’. For Schroeder 
(2006:157), the paradox is easily dissolved ‘by recognising that a word is used in 
two different ways’. There is a fundamental difference between the deep grammar of 
examples (120) and (121), despite the similarity of surface grammar. 
 
 (120) 
 George Orwell is Eric Blair. 
 (121) 
 Sugar is white. 
 
In (120), we use the word ‘is’ to mean ‘is the same as’, because the novelist Eric 
Blair published under the pseudonym George Orwell. In (121), the verb ascribes 
only a property or a relation. As Wittgenstein puts it, philosophical problems 
disappear under correct analysis (PI 122). My intention in 4.4.1 is to investigate 
grammatically some common terms in translation studies, in order to see whether 
such an investigation can lead to any conclusions about how the terms are used. I 
then look in 4.4.2 at translation theories after Wittgenstein. 
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4.4.1. Investigating the supermemes 
 I have chosen five terms from Chesterman (1997:7-14), referred to in 3.3, 
which he has identified as ‘translation supermemes’ because of the regularity with 
which they appear in translation studies, from the earliest writings to the present day, 
ideas ‘of such pervasive influence that they come up again and again in the history of 
the subject, albeit in slightly different guises’. The term supermeme is adapted from 
the coinage ‘meme’ of Richard Dawkins (1976:5) to indicate a ‘unit of cultural 
transmission’. The five translation supermemes identified by Chesterman are: 
source-target; equivalence; untranslatability; free-versus-literal; all-writing-is-
translation. What follows is not intended to be a commentary on Chesterman. While 
I use some points he makes, I do so only when they represent a Wittgensteinian 
stance. The aim is to conduct a grammatical investigation of the terms. 
 
4.4.1.1 Source-target 
Chesterman defines source-target as ‘the idea that the translation is 
directional, going from somewhere to somewhere’ (1997:8). We see the twenty-first-
century translation of Faust by Constantine (2005) as coming from the eighteenth-
century work by Goethe (1972), for example, so that the direction is from Goethe to 
Constantine, from the earlier text to the later, from ST to TT, which seems to be 
common sense, as it is difficult to refer to translation in any other way in ordinary 
usage. The meme may either indicate that source-target relationships resemble others 
or that people have tended to see a source-target relation as always present in 
translation. 
However, the metaphor of direction implies that the ST moves, which is not 
the case. As Chesterman (1997:8) notes, a text does not vanish from the source 
culture when it appears in the target culture. The supermeme also fails to recognise 
that translation is a cluster concept. There are many English translations of Faust on 
the market, for example, and Goethe’s Faust itself is part of a cluster. Gledhill 
(2007:111) describes the numerous portrayals of the Faust legend that exist in 
various genres, of which Goethe’s work is one. The portrayals exist in a relationship 
of family resemblance, a relationship that is multidirectional. A child is often said to 
resemble a parent, for example, but a parent may be described as resembling a child. 
The supermeme ‘source-target’ has the effect of devaluing the translation by 
privileging the source. Toury (1995) counters this by his Wittgensteinian descriptive 
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approach, because his analysis begins with the TT. Furthermore, it is possible to 
approach a text through its translation, something that second language learners 
frequently do, which reverses the direction of this supermeme. Parks (2007), for 
example, uses translations to show aspects of the style of literary works, in a 
translation approach to literature.  
 The source-target supermeme implies there is an essential relation between 
source and target, rather than one constructed for the sake of convenience. The 
relation is furthermore implicitly directional, because of the semantics of ‘source’ 
and ‘target’: something comes from a source and aims at a target. Grammatical 
investigation prevents the theorist being held captive by a picture and enables him or 
her to use a term with clarity. I am not suggesting that the terms source and target be 
abolished – unlike Barnstone (1993:228), who advocates replacing ‘target’ with the 
less belligerent ‘receptor’ – simply that we become aware that there are 
consequences in choosing to use them. A grammatical investigation, by taking in the 
meaning of the words used, can show us what these consequences are. 
 
4.4.1.2 Equivalence 
Chesterman defines equivalence as the expectation that ‘a translation is, or 
must be, equivalent to the source, in some sense at least’ (1997:9). This definition is 
circular, because it begs the question of what is meant by equivalence, which is a 
problematic term, as discussed in 3.3. In mathematics, for example, it makes sense to 
say that (2+2) is equivalent to 4, because the two expressions can be interchanged. In 
language, however, even a single word may have its own form of life, which means 
that an equivalent may not be found automatically. Raymond van den Broeck 
(1978:36) argues that if ‘we take into account the fact that expressions in context not 
only have conceptual meanings but also convey connotative, stylistic, affective, 
reflected and collocative meanings, it will in fact be difficult to discover any pair of 
expressions in actual speech which are really equivalent’. The point applies within a 
language and, by extension, across languages, and is both Wittgensteinian and in line 
with contemporary linguistics (Malmkjaer, 2005:24). The same is true when viewing 
things at the level of whole works. It would be misleading to assert that, say, 
Constantine’s Faust (2005) is the English equivalent of Goethe’s Faust (1972), in 
virtue of being its translation, or that Christopher Marlowe’s play Doctor Faustus 
(1986) is the English equivalent, in virtue of being an English dramatisation of the 
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Faust legend. Constantine cannot be equivalent because, as Parks (2007:244) notes, 
even the best translation ‘is a total transformation’. Marlowe cannot be equivalent 
because the two poets treat the legend in very different ways, Marlowe linking it to a 
Renaissance form of life and Goethe to an Enlightenment form of life.  
 Does this mean that the concept of equivalence should be banned from 
translation studies? Not necessarily, as long as care is taken with what is meant when 
using the term, following Wittgenstein’s notion that meaning is use (PI 43). As 
Wittgenstein notes in PI 79, meaning is not fixed, as quoted in (122). 
 
 (122) 
And this can be expressed as follows: I use the name ‘N’ without a fixed meaning. 
(But that impairs its use as little as the use of a table is impaired by the fact that it 
stands on four legs instead of three and so sometimes wobbles.) 
 
 
 
Chesterman (1997:9) uses Wittgenstein’s family resemblance to see equivalence in 
terms of similarity, following Toury (1980:9). The two sentences ‘Il pleut’ (French, 
‘it rains’) and ‘It is raining’ can be said to be similar, and therefore equivalent 
because they can often be used to the same purpose. There are important differences, 
however: the English is present continuous, a tense that does not exist in French; 
there are more syllables in the English etc. To speak of similarity does not rule out 
difference. If I say that Anna is similar to Chris, this makes sense, even if it is 
pointed out that Anna is female and Chris is male, because it can be presumed that I 
am referring to one particular aspect of their character or of their appearance. 
Constantine’s Faust can be said to be similar to Goethe’s, even though the former is 
written in English and the latter in German, whereas Marlowe’s Dr Faustus is, I 
think, a very different work from Goethe’s Faust, despite both being part of the 
cluster of creative work around the Faust legend. There are things that you will not 
say, as Wittgenstein notes (PI 79). Barnstone uses the notion of similarity within 
constraints as a description of the activity of translation: ‘creating related difference’ 
(1993:18). 
Tymoczko (2007:41), following Wittgenstein, asserts that equivalence is best 
seen as ‘a relation constructed by the translator … a similarity relationship – 
involving both likeness and difference – and as such … contingent on many cultural 
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factors’, having ‘an a posteriori value, rather than a positivist or absolutist value’. 
Thus many translations are possible of any ST. As was argued in Chapter 3, one of 
the most misleading pictures that face a translator is that there is a decoding process 
to be gone through in literary translation in order to establish an a priori equivalence. 
Equivalence is in any case a concept that has come out of a western view of the 
world, due to the rise of the printing press making it possible to have stable texts, 
and it comes from a form of life that does not apply in other cultures (Pym, 
2010:22). 
 The supermeme is misleading because of its use in the language-games of 
mathematics and science, which tends to be taken over into ordinary language and 
then used in translation studies, where it can suggest an essentialist function of 
carrying meaning across, linked to the view of ‘translation’ as ‘carrying-across’ 
suggested by its etymology (as discussed in 3.1), and it therefore demands careful 
definition in context by writers who choose to use it. It would only make sense to 
speak of one translation being equivalent to another in a legal context. Hermans 
(2007b:12), for example, describes how the French, German and Dutch versions of 
the Belgian constitution are deemed by Belgian law to be equally authoritative. In a 
Belgian court, a lawyer cannot appeal to, say, the Dutch version of the constitution 
as expressing a meaning not found in the German and French versions. It is not 
possible to play that language-game. In the language-game of the Belgian court, 
these three texts have been authenticated as equivalent. And this illustrates 
Wittgenstein’s case. A term such as equivalence makes sense in certain language-
games and not in others, unless re-defined. As Hermans (2007b: 24) concludes: 
‘Rather than being an inherent feature of relations between texts, equivalence is 
declared’. 
  
4.4.1.3 Untranslatablity 
Chesterman defines untranslatability by referring to equivalence: ‘if 
translation is defined in terms of equivalence, and … equivalence is impossible, 
translation must be impossible’ (1997:10). However, as argued above in 4.4.1.2, if 
the term equivalence is used with clarity and care (as by Tymoczko, 2007:41), then 
the idea of the perfect translation becomes untenable and with it the notion of 
untranslatability, as argued in 3.2. There is no more a perfect translation that there is 
a perfect literary work (cf. Ricoeur, 2006:5). The Wittgensteinian stress on practice 
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is a useful counterweight to any insistence on the impossibility of translation, 
because people do translate and there exists a documented history of translation 
(Bellos, 2011:34). It is also the case that texts are not avoided by translators because 
of being untranslatable. Difficult texts, such as the lipogrammatic novel by Perec 
(1969), discussed in 3.4, seem to inspire rather than confound their translators. There 
is a form of life of translation. If equivalence is no longer seen as Platonic form, then 
translation can take place. Whether it will always be done well is, of course, a 
different question, but ridding oneself of the notion that literature is untranslatable is, 
is seems to me, a necessary concomitant of literary translation. 
 The supermeme may be used to try to show that what passes as a literary 
translation is in fact a forgery, to cite Scott (2008:16), as discussed in 4.3. The reader 
who picks up Constantine (2005) is being duped into thinking that he or she is 
reading Goethe (1975), whereas he or she is reading Constantine: if he or she wishes 
to read Goethe, then the only course of action is to learn German. There are a 
number of issues here: Constantine is not trying to dupe anybody, for he advertises 
his work as a translation; it is trivially true that to read Constantine is not to read 
Goethe; and anybody who is passionate about Goethe would benefit from learning 
German. But to maintain that Goethe is untranslatable in the sense that there is a 
metaphysical core in Goethe that cannot be recreated in English is again to be in 
thrall to the Platonic myth. Translation is a language-game according to Wittgenstein 
(PI 23), who sees meaning as part of the way we interact as humans, not as 
something that is found outside the human form of life, whether in the Platonic 
Forms or in the canonical writings of Goethe. The reader has to be willing to play the 
game. It remains a possibility to refuse to play, but one that goes against the best of 
human practice. 
 
4.4.1.4 Free-vs-literal 
Chesterman refers to the ‘binary opposition between free and literal 
translation’ (1997:12). Such an opposition is found in Jerome (1977:25), who 
opposes translation as ‘sense for sense’ (i.e. free) and ‘word for word’ (i.e. literal). 
Grammatical investigation questions the tendency to think in polarities, as argued in 
4.1, because even a single translated sentence can display different styles of 
translation. There are problems of definition at the level of the text, also. If all 
translation is transformative, then all translation is free. If all translation is about 
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letters, then all translation is literal. The problem with this polarity, as with many 
polarities, is that it presents a three-dimensional cluster as something two-
dimensional, and hence fails to be a surveyable representation. Grammatical 
investigation can also clarify the different uses of terms such as ‘literal’. Berman 
(2004:288), for example, uses it to signify ‘attached to the letter (of works)’, i.e. the 
restoration of ‘the particular signifying process of works (which is more than their 
meaning)’, which contrasts with the sense of literal as ‘word for word’ as used, for 
example, by Vladimir Nabakov (2004:121). To assert that both Berman and 
Nabakov recommend literal translation is therefore both true and, without 
explanation, highly misleading. 
 Behind this supermeme is the notion of fidelity. As Louis Kelly (1977:24) 
notes, by the seventeenth century, translation was being assessed by the faithfulness 
of the translator to the spirit of the ST author. The Translators Association still sees 
fidelity to the ST as the golden rule of translation (Society of Authors, 2011:np). 
There seems to be a misuse of a word here. One can be faithful to one’s partner but 
not to one’s ST. The wrong language-game is being played. The Penguin translation 
of Thomas Mann’s Doctor Faustus, for example, includes Lowe-Porter’s translator’s 
note that begins with the French proverb that translations are like women: when they 
are beautiful, they are not faithful, and when they are faithful they are not beautiful 
(Lowe-Porter, 1992:xxxix). It does not make sense to speak of translations as being 
unfaithful in the same way that a woman is unfaithful, because the issues are 
completely different: two separate language-games are being mixed-up. Pushing this 
further, the proverb can be seen as offensive to women. When the feminist critic 
Susanne de Lotbinière-Harwood (1991) attacks the related image of ‘les belles 
infidèles’ (‘the beautiful unfaithful-women’), she is performing a Wittgensteinian 
task: the image is degrading because of the patriarchal form of life that it evokes.  
 Translation after Wittgenstein shows the sterility of continuing the ‘word for 
word’ versus ‘sense for sense’ debate in translation that Jerome (1977) raised in 395, 
that still trapped Luther (1977) in 1530, and that lives on as a supermeme, for 
example, in Lowe-Porter (1992). A reading of Wittgenstein shows that it is a false 
dichotomy and supports calls by translation theorists for an ending to the conflict 
(Bellos, 2011:114). The sense of literature is in the words. The meaning of literature 
is in the style. To set out to do either a free or a literal translation is to be bewitched 
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by our language. Wittgenstein can offer tools, so that we can look at the use of the 
words and evaluate the consequences of that use. 
 
4.4.1.5 All-writing-is-translation 
Chesterman defines this supermeme as follows: ‘Semiotically speaking, all 
writing, including translating, is the mapping of signifieds onto signifiers’ (1997:13). 
The supermeme therefore opposes the view (categorised as Platonic in 3.1) that 
meanings are somewhere ‘out there’, and supports the view that ‘meaning is 
something that is negotiated instead’ (Chesterman 1997:14), which harmonises with 
the story told of language in the PI, where meaning comes about through 
transactions within forms of life, so that a language is mastered in the same way that 
somebody can be said to have mastered the rules of chess (PI 31). When I play 
chess, I do not look outside the practice of chess to make my next move, but rather 
look at the position of the pieces on the board and at the possibilities that I have for 
moving my own pieces according to the rules agreed over more than a thousand 
years. To speak of all writing being translation is to stress the transactional. It also 
shows, as noted above, that the cluster of reference is huge. It is impossible to sit 
down and write something original in the sense of being without influence or 
constraint of any kind (Boase-Beier & Holman, 1999), and in this sense all writing 
can be seen to be translation. 
On the other hand, the supermeme invites misunderstanding in everyday 
usage. To label Fontane’s novel Effi Briest (2000) as a translation is to invite a 
question about the identity of its ST, and there is none. Therefore Ossian 
(Macpherson, 1807) has been categorised as a pseudo-translation rather than as a 
translation: it advertises itself as a translation but has no ST, as discussed in 4.3. The 
word ‘translation’ is itself dangerous unless defined. A film can be seen as a 
translation of a book (Cronin, 2009) and a relocation of a novel can be seen as being 
as much a translation as a TT that does not relocate (Hunter, 2000a, 2000b). Context 
is crucial, which is one of the key points of the PI. It comes down to how things are 
seen, how they are represented, and how that representation is shown. As 
Wittgenstein (PI 66) recommends: ‘don’t think, but look!’ 
The semiotic notion of mapping the signifier onto the signified is ultimately a 
formulation of the Augustinian paradigm criticised by Wittgenstein (PI 1-8). 
Language is more complex. The scenario described by Wittgenstein to represent an 
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Augustinian language depicts builders who only know four terms, and Wittgenstein 
argues that for them to construct anything, they would have to have an extended 
vocabulary that would no longer be merely ostensive but one in which there would 
be many different kinds of word, the classification of which would depend upon their 
use in context. Translation after Wittgenstein would similarly stress physiognomy 
rather than mapping. 
 
            4.4.1.6 Conclusions about the supermemes 
Any term can be a source of confusion unless clearly defined. To assert this 
is not to argue against concepts being blurred (PI 71); but once we are aware that 
they are blurred, that there is no essentialist nature to any term, we can use them 
carefully. Malcolm (1984:63) comments that Wittgenstein’s conception that words 
are used without fixed meanings produced in some of his students the tendency to 
assume that ‘precision and thoroughness were not required in their own thinking, 
which led to philosophical work of poor quality’. Care must be taken when 
importing terms into translation studies – and as an interdisciplinary activity, 
translation studies will always be in the business of importing – because the meaning 
of any term is found in a cluster of options and, as Malcolm notes, failure to be 
precise will result in slovenly work. The correct process is described in CV p.44: 
expressions sometimes need to be withdrawn from language and given a cleaning 
before being returned to circulation. It is a contention of this thesis that ‘translation’ 
is one such term and that the writings of the later Wittgenstein provide one set of 
tools with which the process can be undertaken. 
There is a tendency to use Wittgenstein’s philosophy ‘to police the borders 
between sense and nonsense, issuing tickets to those philosophers, psychologists and 
linguists’ who transgress ‘the bounds of sense’ (Baker, 2004:1). Hacker (2010a:np), 
for example, advocates setting up ‘a Tribunal of Reason, before which scientists and 
mathematicians may be arraigned for their transgressions’. My own view is that to 
set up a Tribunal of Reason for translation studies would be to go too far and would 
be against the spirit in which Wittgenstein wrote. Wittgenstein claimed that his 
project was descriptive and did not involve interfering with the actual use of 
language (PI 124). Words are brought back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday use as part of the anti-essentialist project, as discussed in 3.1, and are not to 
be treated as having an inherent meaning. To do that is the flaw Wittgenstein 
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discerns in Augustine (PI 1 ff.). Words have an everyday use, which is blurred and 
not fixed, but that can become clear when care is taken. The project is one of 
restoration. It also furthers dialogue, because clarity can ensure that terms are used in 
such a way that confusion is avoided, so that both sides in a debate are speaking 
about the same thing. Berman (2004), for example, facilitates dialogue in translation 
studies by showing how the term ‘translation’ functions differently when used for 
literary texts than when used for non-literary texts. The metaphysical is rejected for 
the everyday, which is to be understood as how things are done in practice. 
Wittgenstein destroys the concept of the hermit in the head, for example, by 
describing a shopping trip (PI 1ff.). 
 Robinson (1991:259) concludes that equivalence, the second of the 
supermemes, is ‘an interpretive fiction that helps the translator work toward the true 
goal of translation, a working TL text – and is only one of many such fictions’. I find 
this to be true. The account of meaning in the PI shows that terms such as 
‘expectation’ are indeed fictions, and have their meaning in the context in which the 
fictions are told. As Wittgenstein states in PI 307: ‘If I do speak of a fiction, then it 
is of a grammatical fiction’. The same applies to the terms used in translation theory, 
such as the five supermemes. The method of Wittgenstein enables these fictions to 
be handled with care, so that they are not assumed to be objective realities. They 
may, if the theorist chooses, become useful fictions, such as source-target, 
equivalence and all-writing-is-translation; or they may be rejected as harmful 
fictions, such as untranslatability or free-versus-literal. The story can then have a 
happy ending. But it matters that we know that it is a story. Similarly it matters that 
one knows that one is playing a language-game if one is to play it well. This chapter 
is written from the point of the translation theorist. The form of life of the translation 
theorist is a broad one. As well as academics who theorise about the phenomenon, it 
also includes practising translators. The fields are not exclusive. Every translator 
inevitably theorises his or her own text, simply by having a view about it, as Boase-
Beier (2010a:xii) notes: ‘Translators almost always tell you their theory – perhaps 
without realising – in the introductions to their translations’. To be clear about our 
use of terminology and to be exact in description will ultimately affect and improve 
practice, because how we see things changes how we do things.  
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4.4.2. Translation theories after Wittgenstein 
In contrast to the description of individual practice that characterises texts on 
translation produced before the twentieth century, the twentieth century itself saw the 
production of various theories about translation as a phenomenon (Barnstone, 
1993:1997). What happens to these theories after Wittgenstein? Given 
Wittgenstein’s hostility to theory (PI 109), should they be escorted to the border and 
shown on their way, following Plato’s treatment of the artists (514a)? I do not think 
so, for three reasons. Firstly, to take such as attitude is again to turn Wittgenstein 
into a police officer, which I argued above to be against the spirit in which he wrote. 
Secondly, the major theories are descriptive, being soft theories, not hardcore 
theories, as argued in 1.3, and can be aligned with the Wittgensteinian project of 
description, even if they address large-scale phenomena rather than particular cases. 
Thirdly, they operate in ways that differ from Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach. 
Skopos theory, for example, sees the dominant factor of any translation as its purpose 
(Reiss & Vermeer, 1984:100), and can be seen as an attempt to explain translation 
sociologically. It is not possible to sit down and to write a skopos translation. Skopos 
theory is not a tool, but an explanation. It operates at a different level from a tool. As 
Wittgenstein (Z 234) asserts, when we interpret, we step from one level to another. It 
is an error to condemn a non-philosophical theory for not being philosophy. 
The major translation theories can be supported by Wittgensteinian tools, in 
line with the second relation between philosophy and translation studies identified by 
Pym (2007:24) and discussed in 1.2: translation theorists can refer to philosophical 
discourses for support and authority for their ideas. To apply Wittgenstein’s work to 
translation theories in detail would go beyond the scope of this thesis, but in Table 
10 I offer a sketch of how such an inquiry might proceed, giving an example of a 
theory in the first column, a brief description of it in the second and an example in 
the third column of a Wittgensteinian tool that could be used in support. 
 
TABLE 10: A SAMPLE OF MAJOR TRANSLATION THEORIES 
THEORY DESCRIPTION WITTGENSTEINIAN  
TOOL 
 
DTS (Toury, 1980) Translations are described, 
rather than the process of 
translation being analysed. 
DTS is influenced by the 
Wittgensteinian contention 
that the task of philosophy is 
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to describe (PI 40). 
 
Linguistic theories 
(Malmkjaer, 2005) 
Linguistics is seen as a 
source for modelling 
translation. 
The PI is a philosophical 
investigation of how 
everyday language works (PI 
1 ff). 
 
Equivalence theories (Nida 
& Taber, 1969) 
Translation is viewed as a 
process of finding 
equivalences. 
Meaning is seen as use (PI 
43), so that equivalence can 
be seen as something that is 
constructed. 
 
Skopos theory (Reiss & 
Vermeer, 1984) 
Translations are analysed 
according to their role. 
The form of life (PI 19) in 
which a translation is used 
can be discussed. 
 
Polysystem theory (Evan-
Zohar, 1990) 
Translations are placed 
within literary systems. 
Family resemblance and the 
cluster-concept (PI 67) can 
be used to describe systems. 
 
Feminist theory (Simon, 
1996) 
Insights from feminist theory 
can describe translation. 
Wittgensteinian tools can 
facilitate feminist analysis 
(Scheman & O’Connor, 
2002)’. 
 
Post-colonial theory 
(Bassnett & Trivedi, 1999) 
Insights from post-colonial 
theory can describe 
translation. 
Wittgensteinian tools can 
facilitate political analysis 
(Holt, 1977). 
 
Relevance theory (Gutt, 
2000) 
Translation is related to what 
is relevant in 
communication. 
 
Communication (PI 1 ff.) is 
described as a practice. 
 
Stylistics (Boase-Beier, 
2006b) 
Literary meaning is viewed 
as being in the style of a 
work. 
 
Meaning is seen as a 
physiognomy (PI 128). 
 
 
Nobody would suggest, for example, that Wittgenstein would be a primary resource 
for a feminist theory of translation, but the articles collected by Naomi Scheman and 
Peg O’Connor (2002) show how his work can sharpen feminist analysis, because 
‘Wittgenstein and feminist theorists have mutually illuminating and substantively 
constructive things to say to each other’ (Scheman, 2002:1). The role of philosophy 
becomes dialogical, rather than autocratic, in line with the call by Antoinette Fawcett 
and Karla Guadarrama García (2010:13) for a dialogue between models of 
translation rather than a replacement of one model by another.  
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Readers of literature in translation encounter theory in the form of paratextual 
material by translators in published translations, as noted by Boase-Beier (2010:xiii). 
Such material is frequently apologetic in nature (Fawcett & Guadarrama García, 
2010:10): when Lowe-Porter (1992:xxxix), for example, prefaces the ST with the 
proverb about the impossibility of beautiful women being faithful and vice-versa, she 
immediately sounds a note of apology for what she is doing. The tools of the PI offer 
support not only for formal theories of translation such as polysystem theory but also 
for theories expressed informally in paratextual material, and can help theorists (in 
all contexts) to write with confidence about the practice of translation and to stop 
apologising for what they are doing. 
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4.5 Case study: New Testament translation 
The aim of this case study is to show how Wittgensteinian methods can be 
brought to the study of NT translation. How can Wittgenstein’s work clarify aspects 
of the project? I argue that tools from the PI can be used by the theorist who wishes 
to survey the field of NT translation or to describe an individual translation. The case 
study, following the arguments of 4.1 and 4.2, is primarily descriptive and can be 
seen as an exercise in DTS, which links it to translation theory.  
 
4.5.1 New Testament translation: a cluster concept 
There exist a vast number of translations of the NT, usually as part of a 
translation of the whole Bible (Barnstone, 1993:153 ff.). The issue of what is meant 
by translation here is complex: as Boase-Beier and Holman (1999:3) assert, the Bible 
‘is a text that blurs the distinction between original and translation in that it is 
available to the vast majority of its readers worldwide only in translation, but rarely 
regarded as anything other than an original work in the particular language of the 
individual reader in question’. This assertion can be supported by Wittgenstein’s 
notion of how concepts are often blurred rather than sharp: in PI 71, he notes that 
‘game’ is a concept with blurred edges, as discussed in 1.5, so that it is very difficult 
to define a game without excluding certain activities definitely held to be games, and 
asks: ‘Is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? 
Isn’t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?’ In PI 19, he argues that use has 
to be seen within a form of life. Thus for many Christians, the Bible is a holy text in 
the sense of being a foundational document and is original in the sense of how it 
functions, of how it is used in their lives. Within translation studies, it can be shown 
that the NT is situated within a complex web of translation, and a task of the 
translation theorist is to describe the web. To this end, the work of Wittgenstein 
offers useful tools. 
In PI 77, Wittgenstein extends his investigation of the blurred concept, as 
cited in (123). 
 
(123) 
In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word 
…? From what sort of examples? in what language-games? Then it will be easier to 
see that the word must have a family of meanings. 
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Wittgenstein’s investigation can be applied to our understanding of what a 
translation is. We meet translations within forms of life. We learn how to read them, 
how to use them and how to recognise them (or else we fail to recognise them). A 
translation can be done in many different ways, for there are many different forms of 
life, and this in turn results in many different types of TT (Bellos, 2011:182). As 
Wittgenstein (PI 68) notes, there are no rules in tennis about how high one should 
throw the ball when serving or how hard one should hit the ball, but this does not 
mean that tennis cannot be played. Similarly, a translator works within certain 
constraints, such as: the TL specified in a commission; the expectations of a 
particular market; the range of meanings attached to a particular word. Such working 
practices can be described as ‘rules’, but there are no rules that determine just how a 
particular word – and, by extension, a particular text – must be translated, and 
translation is none the worse for that. Rules emerge in so far as they are useful; they 
are not imposed. They are practices. 
The cluster concept, discussed in 4.1, can be used to describe the situation in 
NT translation, following Tymoczko (2007) and drawing on the Wittgensteinian 
notion of family resemblance. In Table 11, I offer a selection of ten NT translations 
that can be linked in family resemblance, despite considerable differences. The table 
begins with three editions of the HG NT and then lists seven translations in 
chronological order of composition. The choice of texts has been made specifically 
to illustrate variety, and the table could be extended. 
 
              TABLE 11: SOME NT TRANSLATIONS 
TEXT 
 
DESCRIPTION 
The Greek New Testament (Aland et al., 
1968) 
 
An edition of the earliest surviving Christian 
scriptures accepted as canonical, written in 
HG in the first century and used by many 
translators as the ST (e.g. King, 2004). 
 
The New Greek-English Interlinear New 
Testament (Brown & Comfort, 1990) 
 
An example of what Barnstone (2009:1289) 
calls ‘the Rosetta Stone of Bible 
translations’: an interlinear gloss of the ST 
with a marginal English translation to enable 
the reader to cross-reference meanings. 
 
NT Gateway (2012) This internet site includes the HG ST: words 
can be clicked on to show their English 
meaning, including the grammar of nouns 
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and verbs where applicable. A virtual 
interactive extension of the interlinear 
translation. 
 
Nouum testamentum latine (New Testament 
in Latin) (Jerome, 1911) 
 
The fourth/fifth-century Latin translation by 
Jerome that acquired great prestige and 
canonical authority in the Catholic Church as 
the Vulgate (from the Latin versio vulgata, 
‘version commonly-used’). 
 
Die Bibel (The Bible) (Luther, 1999) The 1522 German translation by Luther, 
which he describes as an attempt to render 
German as commonly spoken (Luther, 
1987:87).  
 
Rheims-Douai (1582) 
 
A Counter-Reformation English translation 
of the NT by exiled English Catholics in 
1582 that helped to formalise the identity of 
the Catholic community in Reformation 
England. 
 
The Bible: Authorized King James Version 
(2008) 
Published in 1611 under the authority of the 
Church of England as a Bible in English for 
use in Anglican worship.  
 
The New Testament (King, 2004) A modern translation that can be described 
as a surveyable representation because it 
contains an interactive study guide, in the 
form of commentary and questions 
addressed to the reader, interspersed with the 
NT text. The work is designed to be used as 
a devotional tool. 
 
Die Bibel in gerechter Sprache (2006) A German translation that aims to avoid 
exclusive or offensive language, e.g. the 
masculine nominative plural noun in John 
20:19, ‘οἱ μαθηταὶ’[hoi mathêtai] (‘the 
disciples’) is rendered as ‘Die Jüngerinnen 
und Jünger’ (‘the female-disciples and male-
disciples’).  
 
The Restored New Testament (Barnstone, 
2009) 
 
A modern translation that includes non-
canonical Gnostic writings and aims to 
convey the poetic style of the NT.  
 
 
All of these texts can be described as translations. The HG NT, on investigation, is 
no more original than any other translation, because at some point the words of Jesus 
must have been translated from Aramaic to HG, probably by Mark, whose Gospel is 
described by Maurice Casey (2010:63) as ‘an unrevised translation of an Aramaic 
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source’. No ST for the NT has yet been discovered and Barnstone (1993:157) argues 
that a better title for the NT would be ‘Scriptures in Greek translation’.  
 The texts in Table 11 are therefore orphans. There is no common 
denominator and they can be seen as exhibiting family resemblance. Even if the HG 
is taken to be the ST, certain texts here were not translated from it. The Authorised 
King James Version, for example, is best described as a revision of previous 
translations into English, as is stated in its Preface: ‘wee never thought from the 
beginning, that we should neede to make a new Translation, nor yet to make of a bad 
one a good one … but to make a good one better, or out of many good ones, one 
principall good one’ (2008:12). Or the Rheims-Douai was translated from the Latin 
Vulgate of Saint Jerome, because of the prestige in which Jerome was held by the 
Catholic Church in the sixteenth century, as shown in the sub-title: The Nevv 
Testament of Iesvs Christ, Translated Faithfvlly into English, out of the Authentical 
Latin. Jerome himself did not translate the NT from the HG, his translation being 
‘chiefly a revision of an existing Latin text of the NT with occasional corrections 
based on Greek manuscripts’ (Bratton, 1967:230). Yet each text links to others in the 
table by family resemblance. 
 As indicated in the descriptions in Table 11, each translation has a form of 
life that lies behind it and each translation cannot be described without reference to 
this form of life. The texts can often be described along confessional lines: the 
Catholic Rheims-Douai places itself in the tradition of Jerome, patron saint of 
translation, whose rendering was seen as authoritative, whereas Luther’s translation 
is from HG in deliberate reaction against Catholic tradition. Luther’s translation 
remains in print (in updated German) because it has in its turn acquired canonical 
status within the German-speaking Lutheran Church. Non-confessional factors are 
also involved, however: Luther’s attempt to write the German of ordinary people is 
typical of the affirmation of ordinary life that characterises the early modern world 
(Taylor, 1989:211 ff.). Die Bibel in gerechter Sprache (2006), while produced by a 
team of Lutheran theologians and translators, aims to accommodate the sensibilities 
of modern liberal democracies where such issues as inclusive language are taken 
very seriously, and breaks with the received Lutheran tradition (whilst following 
Luther’s example) by translating from the HG, rather than merely making a 
politically correct revision of Luther’s German.  
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The cluster can be extended to include radical translations as well as non-
textual adaptations, i.e. what Jakobson (1959:233) calls intersemiotic translations or 
‘the interpretation of verbal signs by means of nonverbal sign systems’. The 
extension is shown in Table 12. The texts are listed in chronological order of 
composition. 
 
TABLE 12: EXTENDING THE CLUSTER 
TEXT 
 
DESCRIPTION  
The Woman’s Bible (Stanton (ed), 1985) 
 
An edition of the Bible published in 1895 
that includes only passages of interest from a 
Christian feminist point of view. Scriptural 
texts are followed by commentary by the 
editor, Elizabeth Cady Stanton. 
 
The Gospel in Brief (Tolstoy, 1997) 
 
A Russian Gospel harmony written by 
Tolstoy in the early twentieth century with 
all supernatural events (such as the miracles 
or the Resurrection) omitted.  
 
Il Vangelo secondo Mattheo (The Gospel 
According to Saint Matthew) (Pasolini (dir), 
1964)  
 
An Italian filmic version of Matthew’s 
Gospel, which preserves the narrative. 
 
The Last Temptation of Christ (Scorsese 
(dir), 1988) 
 
A film based on the 1960 novel by Nikos 
Kazantzakis (1975), in which the dying 
Christ wonders if his life was a dream, and 
which introduces the Nietzschean possibility 
that Christianity is the invention of Paul. 
 
The Illustrated Children’s Bible: The New 
Testament (Hastings, 1994) 
 
Illustrated stories retold in simple language 
for children whose reading age would form 
an obstacle to reading translations in 
common use.  
 
Ee By Gum, Lord! (Kellett, 1996) Retelling of key Gospel texts in Yorkshire 
dialect, aiming to combat the declining use 
of Yorkshire dialect. 
 
The Tabloid Bible (Page, 1998) 
 
Bible narratives as front pages from the 
British popular tabloid press, e.g. the Sun.  
  
L’Évangile de Jésus-Christ (The Gospel of 
Jesus Christ) (Berthier et al., 2004) 
 
A French BD (graphic novel) harmonising 
all four Gospels to give a presentation of the 
life of Jesus, aimed at fans of the BD genre. 
 
Christ the Lord: The Road to Cana (Rice, 
2006) 
A novelisation of part of Christ’s life by 
Anne Rice, author of popular Gothic novels. 
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The Green Bible (2008) 
 
A Bible designed to raise awareness of the 
need for stewardship of the natural 
environment and the integrity of creation. 
 
 
These very disparate works are surveyable representations of the NT that aim to 
make aspects of the NT phenomenon clearer to readers, a phenomenon that is wider 
than any single ST, because the NT is a cluster of translation, a blurred concept. We 
are dealing with the Christian story as represented in the HG translation of a lost 
Aramaic collection of sayings and stories that has come to exist in a family 
relationship of texts in translation and accompanying commentary and tradition over 
two thousand years. The cluster would still remain, even in the unlikely event of the 
finding of an Aramaic ST. The film by Martin Scorsese (1988) depicts scenes not in 
the NT but it addresses theological problems about the nature of Christ, and is in turn 
based on a novel (Kazantzakis, 1975). To attempt to understand the ST of Scorsese, 
it would be necessary to refer to: the translation that is the NT; the novel by 
Kazantzakis; other films made on the life of Christ (e.g. Pasolini, 1964); 
Christological traditions; the life and philosophy of the director; criticism written 
about his work. Everything is multidirectional.  
The Green Bible (2008) can similarly be seen as a surveyable representation. 
It is not a new translation, because it uses the text of a published and widely-read 
translation (The Bible: New Revised Standard Version, 2007
54
), but it presents this 
text in such a way as to make a theological case for environmentalism: it is the first 
English Bible to be printed on environmentally sustainable FSC paper; its cover is 
made from renewable cotton linen; it includes paratextual material on the theological 
theme of justice and the integrity of creation; it highlights in green soy-based ink 
those passages that have a creation theme, for example, the story of Jesus’s baptism 
(Mark 1:10). 
The issue is what can be held to be a translation. It is a question of the use of 
the term. It is possible to refer to these texts as translations, because, as Wittgenstein 
notes, there are countless kinds of use for many expressions, and ‘new types of 
language, new language-games … come into existence, and others become obsolete 
and get forgotten’ (PI 23). As discussed in 4.4 with respect to the supermeme of all-
writing-is-translation, it is important not to use terms indiscriminately. The fact that 
                                                 
54
 Itself a revision, as indicated by the title. 
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some concepts are blurred is not an excuse for blurred thinking. It would be absurd 
to buy somebody the DVD of Pasolini (1964), for example, if he or she wanted a 
translation of Matthew into Italian, but this film can be said to be a translation of the 
Gospel because it uses Matthew’s words in Italian translation and follows the highly-
planned structure of that Gospel. It can be said to play the same language-games as 
the ST that warns of the immorality of riches (Matthew, 19:23-24), because it shows 
the grinding poverty of the ordinary people and Jesus’s compassionate anger at what 
they suffer. The representation can also be related to Pasolini’s Marxism, to extend 
the cluster further. The DVD could therefore be given to somebody who was trying 
to understand the figure of Jesus as portrayed by Matthew. 
Wittgenstein himself encountered the Gospels as a living reality during the 
First World War in the form of the Gospel harmony by Tolstoy (1997). According to 
Monk (1990:116) it became ‘kind of talisman’ for him; he carried it everywhere he 
went and asserted that ‘you cannot imagine the effect it can have upon a person’. The 
effect on its readers is a measure of any translation, however defined. Wittgenstein 
read Tolstoy’s Russian text in German translation, therefore at least four steps away 
from the presumed Aramaic words of Jesus, but for him the Tolstoy was an original 
work, on account of the role that it played in his life, which returns us to where this 
argument began: that the NT is not used as a translation per se in how people read it 
and use it in their lives. 
 A task of the translation theorist after Wittgenstein will be to describe 
individual NT translations once they have been positioned within the cluster. I 
therefore offer a case study of one of the texts in Table 11: the NT translation by 
Barnstone (2009).  
  
4.5.2 A description of Barnstone’s The Restored New Testament 
 Barnstone’s translation was published in 2009 and is the practical working 
out of a project sketched in an endnote to his 1993 theoretical work The Poetics of 
Translation, given as (124) (Barnstone 1993:278). 
 
 
 (124) 
 
Yet it is time to read the magnificent literature of the Bible in renditions equal to 
modern versions of classical Greek and Latin authors. In contrast to serious classical 
scholars, however, biblical scholars relentlessly invent strange texts alien to English 
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language and literature. … Given the alien-to-art-and-intellect translations of sacred 
texts, the Bible awaits its English metafora. Waiting there, in the darkness of letters, 
is the great book. 
 
 
 
Barnstone’s translation is self-consciously literary. It is based on a reading of the HG 
ST as literature – in line with the reading of the NT as literature discussed in 2.5 – 
and aims to produce a TT that can be read as literature: Barnstone announces his 
intention as being to give ‘a chastely modern, literary version of a major world text’ 
(2010:14). The work is signalled as a translation in its full title: The Restored New 
Testament: A New Translation with Commentary, Including the Gnostic Gospels 
Thomas, Mary, and Judas. There are over three hundred pages of commentary, on 
matters theological, translational, linguistic and historical, and copious explanatory 
and linguistic notes throughout the text.  
 Why choose this text as a case study? Any text could have been chosen and 
Wittgensteinian tools applied, but I think that Barnstone can be read as 
Wittgensteinian, much as I read Weinberger as Wittgensteinian in 4.3, influenced by 
the reading of Stevens as Wittgensteinian by Cook and Read (2010:482). Barnstone 
sees Wittgenstein’s philosophy as important for what it can tell us about translation 
(1993:6) and provides, I shall argue, a surveyable representation of the NT. In 
addition, I respect Barnstone as a theorist, a poet and a translator. His NT is also of 
interest because it is a radical translation in a field marked by its conservatism, as 
Barnstone argues in (124), and may therefore illustrate new ways of translating of 
interest to the translation theorist and ultimately to the reflective practitioner. 
 I begin with an example from Mark 9:1. The ST is given as (125), a 
translation from the New Jerusalem Bible as (126) for purposes of comparison and 
Barnstone’s translation as (127). 
 
 
 (125) 
 
Καὶ ἔλεγεν          αὐτοῖς,   Ἀμὴν   λέγω  ὑμῖν     ὅτι    εἰσίν  τινες  ὧδε   τῶν  
Kai   elegen         autois,    Amên   legô   humin  hoti  eisin   tines  hôde  tôn    
and  was-saying  to-them  indeed  I-say  to-you  that   are     some here   of-those   
 
ἑστηκότων    οἵτινες   οὐ μὴ       γεύσωνται  θανάτου  ἕως   ἂν  ἴδωσιν   τὴν 
hestêkotôn     hoitines ou mê       geusôntai    thanatou  heôs an   idôsin     tên       
having-stood  who       not-at-all will-taste     of-death  until        they-see the     
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βασιλείαν τοῦ     θεοῦ  ἐληλυθυῖαν   ἐν δυνάμει. 
basileian   tou     theou  elêluthuian    en dunamei. 
kingdom   of-the  God   having-come in power 
 
(126) 
 
And he said to them, ‘In truth I tell you, there are some standing here who will not 
taste death before they see the kingdom of God come with power’. 
 
(127) 
 
And he said to them,  
 
 Amain, I say to you, 
There are some of you standing here 
Who will not taste death  
Until you see that the kingdom of God has come 
With power. 
 
 
 
Robinson (1993:62), commenting on the portrait of Jesus given in many English 
translations, asserts: ‘He feels familiar: he speaks our language just as we speak it, 
without liturgical adornment, without all the solemnities of ecclesiastical tradition, in 
flat prose, like any other ordinary person’. With Barnstone, this is not the case. 
Barnstone states that his ‘great discovery was the invisible poet hitherto hidden in 
unlineated Greek prose’ (2010:1291), so that his aim became to give us the ‘poems 
of Jesus’, which he describes as being ‘uniformly sonorous in their metaphysic and 
of-the-earth peasant, village, fisherman, and farmland settings’ (2010:40).55 
Translation as transference, translation ‘that slights poetic language’, is to be avoided 
(2010:24), in line with the post-Wittgensteinian refusal to see meaning as something 
that can be extracted and moved, as discussed in Chapter 2. Where the New 
Jerusalem Bible normalises what is a very dramatic statement about the imminent 
end of the world, Barnstone’s translation stresses the drama and can be seen as 
poetic because: it retains the Aramaic ‘Amain’, rather than making Jesus sound like 
an Enlightenment philosopher by using an adverb such as ‘truly’; it is set out as 
verse, so that certain expressions are foregrounded, such as ‘With power’ in line 6; 
the use of verse has the effect of slowing the speed at which the pronouncement is 
read, hence making it more solemn; Barnstone maintains the repetition of ‘you’ in 
                                                 
55
 See Cupitt & Armstrong (1977:53) on how back-translation of the sayings of Jesus shows an 
Aramaic verse form. Barnstone has gone on to publish the poetry in a single volume: The Poems of 
Jesus Christ (2012). 
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lines 2 and 3, which enhances the fact this is a warning to a crowd of spectators, and 
by implication to the reader or the listener; he also maintains the tense of 
‘ἐληλυθυῖαν’ [elêluthuian], which is third person singular feminine accusative 
perfect active indicative  of ἐρχομαι [erchomai], ‘to come’, so that the cosmic drama 
is intensified by the fact that Kingdom ‘has come’, i.e. its advent is realised in 
language even if not in time. Barnstone allows the Greek to speak. I therefore think 
that the translation in (127) works successfully as a poem. That Barnstone is an 
effective literary translator is shown in his discussion (1993:99-104) of his own 
translation of the lyrical fragment by Sappho ‘Φαίνεταί μοι κήνος ἴσος θέοισιν’, 
where he gives the ST and discusses translations by four other poets, so that there is 
a surveyable representation of the ST. His NT translation does not offer, in the 
paratextual material, any analogous examples of how he translates style; but the text, 
while it appears to be written in the language of giving information, is not about 
giving information, to paraphrase Wittgenstein (Z 160). Barnstone’s Jesus is not 
Robinson’s man in the street whom we might meet in downtown New York, but a 
mystical figure (an impression strengthened by the inclusion of three Gnostic 
Gospels, which present a more spiritualised Christ than the canonical Gospels). 
Barnstone is not the first to translate the poetry in the Bible, but what distinguishes 
this translation is its consistency: for example, the New Jerusalem Bible (1990) 
translates some speeches of Jesus as verse (e.g. Matthew 5:3-10), but most of them 
as prose. Barnstone’s work can therefore be said to be a surveyable representation, 
because it restores the style of the HG. 
 What is most striking about Barnstone’s translation, however, is the 
rendering of proper names. Barnstone avoids the standard translations found in other 
English renderings. Where translations, for example, refer to ‘Simon Peter’, (from 
the Greek Σίμων Πέτρος [Simôn Petros]), Barnstone has ‘Shimon Kefa’, a name that 
would, I think, cause comprehension difficulties even to somebody who knows the 
NT but who meets the name out of context. Barnstone’s translation of names, as part 
of his project of restoration, is based on the names that people and places had in the 
early first century. I illustrate this in Table 13, which gives examples of Hebrew-
Aramaic, HG and Latin names and how Barnstone translates them. The examples 
from the New Jerusalem Bible are included because they are typical of English 
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renderings in common use, and I give the rationale for Barnstone’s translation choice 
following his explanations in footnotes. 
 
TABLE 13: NOMENCLATURE IN BARNSTONE 
 
HG (Aland et al., 
1968) 
 
ENGLISH (New 
Jerusalem Bible, 
1990) 
 
BARNSTONE 
(2009) 
NOTE ON 
BARNSTONE 
Ἰησοῦς 
Iêsous 
 
Jesus Yeshua Based on the 
Hebrew-Aramaic 
form       [Yēšûă‘] 
 
Ἀνδρέας 
Andreas 
 
Andrew Andreas Based on the Greek 
form Ἀνδρέας 
[Andreas] 
  
Πιλᾶτος 
Pilatos 
 
Pilate Pilatus Based on Latin form 
Pilatus 
 
Barnstone looks to the form of life that lies behind the words in the HG text. He 
comments, for example, on how he does not want his readers ‘to watch Andrew … 
pausing in London and Chicago but Andreas … walking a Greek city’ (2010:14). 
For Barnstone, this strategy is also a tool for combating the anti-Semitism he 
discerns in the NT and its translations (2010:18). To name the figure known in 
English as Jesus ‘Yeshua’, for example, is to stress his Semitic origins. Here is also 
an example of why Wittgenstein is justified in attacking the correspondence theory 
of meaning he sees in Augustine (PI 1). It may seem that the name Ἰησοῦς [Iêsous] 
ought to be straightforward to translate on account of a direct correspondence to 
‘Jesus’, but this is not the case. Things are almost always more complicated than the 
Augustinian paradigm suggests. Even a transliteration of the HG form of Jesus’s 
name, ‘Iesous’ or ‘Jesous’, does not give the conventional English form, and, as 
Barnstone (2009:141) shows, Jesus would have been known by his contemporaries 
by what he transliterates as ‘Yeshua’, which could be transliterated differently (e.g. 
‘Yeshuah’). Casey (2010:143) comments that the traditional English rendering is 
‘Joshua’. Equivalence can only exist as something constructed, not as something 
assumed or essential, as argued in 4.4.1.2. 
 How successful is Barnstone’s translation as a surveyable representation? On 
the negative side: there is no discussion of the translation of style and no online 
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support specifically for this text (although there are vast internet resources available 
for NT translators and readers). On the positive side: it advertises itself as a 
translation; it extends the canon to give a surveyable representation of Christianity in 
the first century by including the non-canonical Gnostic Gospels of Thomas, Mary, 
and Judas (Barnstone, 2009: 537-612, with Marvin Meyer); it allows the reader an 
insight into the process of translation through its paratextual material and footnotes. 
Overall it seems to me to make a difficult situation clearer as well as functioning as 
literature.  
 Is it the great book for which Barnstone hoped? I think that a Wittgensteinian 
view militates against the existence of one great translation, but points towards the 
possibility of many great translations. To assume that one great book is waiting in 
the darkness, as Barnstone does, is still to be in thrall to the Platonic myth that is one 
of the targets of the PI. Other great translations into English are already available 
and more may be written as the consciousness of the NT as literature grows (Keefer, 
2008). The translation by King (2004), for example, makes radical decisions on 
translating the form of the HG that differ from those of Barnstone, but that seem to 
me to be successful. An example of this is his translation of Luke 6:20, given as 
(131), with (128) representing the HG, (129) the rendering of the New Jerusalem 
Bible (2009) and (130) the translation by Barnstone (2009). 
 
(128) 
Μακάριοι οἱ   πτωχοί,  ὅτι          ὑμετέρα  ἐστὶν  ἡ    βασιλεία  τοῦ      θεοῦ. 
Makarioi   hoi ptôchai,  hoti        humetera estin   hê  basileia     tou      theou. 
blessed      the poor       because  yours       is        the  kingdom  of- the God 
 
(129) 
 
Blessed are the poor 
For yours is the kingdom of God. 
 
(130) 
 
How blessed are you who are poor: 
 the kingdom of God is yours. 
 
 
(131) 
 
Congratulations to the poor – for yours is the Kingdom of Heaven. 
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It is to express no criticism of (129) or (130) to say I find the translation in (131) 
remarkable. King avoids the commonplace and archaic ‘blessed’ and offers an 
expression that makes the reader stop to ask why on earth the poor should be 
congratulated. It is to wrench language out of the ordinary and to change the way the 
world is seen. The same language-game is being played in ST and TT, which is the 
aim of any translator using Wittgenstein (Gledhill, 2007:5). Adopting a view of 
translation as not being about transference opens up many possibilities. I am 
personally interested in the possibility of a verse translation of the NT using rhyme 
and metre, as in my own rendering of (128), offered as (132), part of a sequence in 
iambic pentameter with rhymed couplets. 
 
 (132) 
 And the poor can be happy indeed, 
 for the Kingdom of the God has arrived. 
 
 
 
The NT lives in its translations, not its translation. 
In this case study I have made no reference to any of the major translation 
theories, apart from mentioning that the study could be seen as an example of DTS. 
This link with translation studies could be extended to other translation theories 
through Wittgensteinian methods, as shown in Table 14, which is based on Table 10 
and shows how theories and Wittgensteinian tools can be related to Barnstone’s TT. 
 
        TABLE 14: TRANSLATION THEORIES, WITTGENSTEIN AND BARNSTONE 
THEORY WITTGENSTEINIAN  
TOOL 
 
EXAMPLE IN 
BARNSTONE (2009) 
DTS (Toury, 1980) DTS is influenced by the 
Wittgensteinian contention 
that the task of philosophy is 
to describe (PI 40). 
 
The work contains 300 (out 
of 1485) pages of paratextual 
material describing function 
and context. 
 
Linguistic theories 
(Malmkjaer, 2005) 
The PI is a philosophical 
investigation of how 
language works (PI 1 ff). 
 
Stress is placed on the 
language-games played, e.g. 
that Mark’s voice is that of a 
spoken tale, not of a learned 
report in difficult syntax 
(2009:30). 
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Equivalence theories (Nida 
& Taber, 1969) 
Meaning is seen as use (PI 
43), so that equivalence can 
be seen as something that is 
constructed. 
 
Barnstone constructs one set 
of possible equivalences for 
the names of people and 
places (2009:14). 
Skopos theory (Reiss & 
Vermeer, 1984) 
The form of life (PI 19) in 
which a translation is used 
can be discussed. 
 
The translation is designed 
to give pleasure, information 
and awareness of 
background (2009:15). 
 
Polysystem theory (Evan-
Zohar, 1990) 
Family resemblance and the 
cluster-concept (PI 67) can 
be used to describe systems. 
 
The text can be related to 
others: like King (2004), it is 
translated from HG, for 
example. 
 
Feminist theory (Simon, 
1996) 
Wittgensteinian tools can 
facilitate feminist analysis 
(Scheman & O’Connor, 
2002) 
 
Barnstone’s surveyable 
representation of the NT 
world includes the Gnostic 
Gospel of Mary, the only 
early Christian text voiced 
by a woman (2009:575-588) 
 
Post-colonial theory 
(Bassnett & Trivedi, 1999) 
Wittgensteinian tools can 
facilitate political analysis 
(Holt, 1977). 
 
The use of Roman names 
alongside Aramaic ones in 
the TT foregrounds the 
colonial situation in which 
Jesus lived (e.g. Mark 15:1). 
 
Relevance theory (Gutt, 
2000) 
Communication (PI 1 ff.) is 
described as a practice. 
 
Barnstone stresses the need 
for a new translation because 
language and literary 
conventions change over 
time (2009:13). 
 
Stylistics (Boase-Beier, 
2006b) 
Meaning is seen as a 
physiognomy (PI 128). 
 
Barnstone stresses his 
translation of the poetry of 
the NT (2009:14). 
 
 
Each theory could be investigated in greater depth. With respect to skopos theory, for 
example, Barnstone’s translation could be compared in its function to the recent 
German translation of the NT and other early Christian writings by Klaus Berger and 
Nord (1999), which also attempts to present a broader view of early Christianity than 
is found in the canonical texts. The texts have the same skopos. Theories are always 
partial (Hermans, 1985:12). As Guy Deutscher (2005:285) puts it, our labels are not 
perfect at catching every aspect of language, which recalls Wittgenstein’s insistence 
that there are different philosophical methods and not a single one (PI 133). To 
divide people into sellers and buyers, for example, is useful at times but only 
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captures part of the whole situation, for buyers can be sellers as well (CV p.26). 
What remains is theory in the sense of a view of the text in question, as argued in 
1.3. This whole case study is my theory of the text. 
Barnstone’s strategy has been facilitated by his own theory of the NT, by the 
way in which he sees this cluster. We can describe what he has done by using tools 
from Wittgenstein, and then we can move on to other ways of theorising Barnstone. 
We therefore develop a theory of Barnstone. The process is dynamic. This case study 
aims to be a surveyable representation of a surveyable representation. It sees one 
particular translation as Wittgensteinian, which is to commend it as well worth 
reading and to offer it as an example of good practice to the reflective practitioner. 
To the translation theorist it offers an example of how to describe a text in dialogue 
with philosophy. To both practitioner and theorist it tells something about the 
surveyable representation that is literary translation. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
Bellos (2011:2) argues that the main issue in translation studies is not to 
understand what translation is, but to understand ‘what translation does’. The later 
work of Wittgenstein provides a set of tools for anybody engaged in this quest 
because it facilitates the description of any TT. It allows the various practices of 
translation to be juxtaposed in family resemblance, so that the beetle is taken out of 
the box (PI 293). The translation theorist can form his or her own theory of 
translation, in line with the advice given by Pym (2010:166), quoted as (133). 
 
 (133) 
 
When theorising translation, when developing your own translation theory, first 
identify a problem – a situation of doubt requiring action, or a question in need of an 
answer. Then go in search of ideas that can help you work on that problem. There is 
no need to start in any one paradigm, and certainly no need to belong to one. 
 
 
 
A study of the later Wittgenstein can be of benefit to the translation theorist because 
it matches Pym’s advice in three ways. Firstly, the phenomenon must precede any 
theorising about it, according to Wittgenstein, for whom description is crucial. 
Secondly, I have shown that certain of Wittgenstein’s ideas are very useful for the 
translation theorist, such as: the surveyable representation; family resemblance; the 
language-game; the form of life; meaning as use. Thirdly, the Wittgensteinian 
approach militates against commitment to any one paradigm, because it is anti-
doctrinal. This chapter has used work by three translation theorists – Chesterman 
(1997), Toury (1995, 1980) and Tymockzo (2007) – to show how Wittgenstein has 
influenced the field and to suggest ways in which his influence could be extended. 
 Another motto Wittgenstein (RPP I 889) considered for his work was from 
Goethe: ‘Don’t look for anything behind the phenomena: they themselves are the 
theory’ (1901:261). Wittgenstein, by destroying the Platonic paradigm, shows us that 
there is nothing metaphysical lurking behind phenomena. What we can do is to 
describe phenomena and how we approach them. We can show what translation 
does. I have written this chapter with the translation theorist in mind, but have shown 
that clarity about theory will affect practice, because how we view things inevitably 
influences how we do things (Toury, 1995:17-20). To translate means having a view 
of a text: the phenomenon is the theory, as Goethe states and as Wittgenstein shows. 
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In Chapter 5, I consider what overall conclusions can be drawn from reading 
Wittgenstein’s story in the context of the theory and practice of translation. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
     
 
 
 
The trouble about progress is that it always looks much greater than it really is. 
 
Nestroy (1926:216)
56
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
56
 Translation by Hacker & Schulte (PI p.2) 
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5.1 Wittgenstein’s story 
This thesis, as stressed in Chapter 1, has aimed to show that my reading of 
the later Wittgenstein can be of use to the reflective practitioner of translation, in the 
way Kerr (1988) aims to show that his reading of Wittgenstein can be of use in 
theology. I have examined the three ways in which translation operates: the reading 
for translation of the ST (Chapter 2); the writing of the TT (Chapter 3); the 
theorisation of the TT (Chapter 4). I have argued that my reading of Wittgenstein 
shows how translation is anthropic at all three stages and that Wittgensteinian tools 
can help the reflective practitioner deal with the issues that arise from the 
phenomenon of translation. This thesis is therefore not about Wittgenstein, but rather 
about translation, under Wittgensteinian investigation. In the Conclusion, I sum up 
the implications of translation after Wittgenstein, following Wittgenstein’s remark 
on how inquiry has to move beyond merely narrating what has taken place: ‘Why do 
I want to tell him about an intention too, over and above telling him what I did … 
because I want to tell him something about myself, which goes beyond what 
happened at the time’ (PI 659).  
 In his memoir of Wittgenstein, Malcolm (1958:53) gives the recollection 
quoted as (134). 
 
 (134) 
Wittgenstein related a riddle for the purpose of throwing some light on the nature of 
philosophy. It went as follows: Suppose that a cord was stretched around the earth at 
the equator. Now suppose that a piece one yard long was added to the cord. If the 
cord was kept taut and circular in form, how much above the surface of the earth 
would it be? Without stopping to work it out, everyone present was inclined to say 
that the distance from the earth would be so minute that it would be imperceptible. 
But this is wrong. The actual distance would be nearly six inches. Wittgenstein 
declared that it is this kind of mistake that occurs in philosophy. It consists in being 
misled by a picture. In the riddle the picture itself is correct enough: for a piece one 
yard long would be an insignificant fraction of the length of the whole cord. But we 
are misled by it to draw a wrong conclusion. A similar thing happens in philosophy: 
we are constantly deceived by mental pictures which are in themselves correct.  
 
 
 
The story can stand as a parable for the project of the later Wittgenstein. A new way 
of looking at the world is offered that brings clarity. In terms of applying this to 
translation, the last sentence of (134) could, I contend, be written as follows: ‘A 
similar thing happens in translation; we are constantly deceived by mental pictures 
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which are in themselves correct’. An example of this is the view that translation is 
transfer, as argued in 3.1. 
 It is significant that Wittgenstein uses a narrative to show others the nature of 
his later philosophy, rather than using more traditional tools of philosophical inquiry, 
such as syllogism or sustained argument. A story is told and, if accepted by his 
listeners as convincing, it can then be used as the basis of a new way of doing 
philosophy: here, a re-evaluation of the way that we can be deceived by geometry is 
called for, which involves a new way of seeing the world. Narratives are 
fundamental to the way that we live. In a study of what he terms the ‘literary mind’, 
Mark Turner (1998:168) argues that this is because narrative is basic to how the 
human mind functions, so that language results from story; his thesis reverses what 
Turner describes as the more usual view that sees story as a product of language. 
Jonathan Safran Foer, in an argument against eating animals, claims that the stories 
we tell each other are more important than reason in determining what we do 
(2009:8). It is possible to tell a story about human life that involves slaughtering 
animals and eating them, or else one in which this is not the case, and an individual 
may make up his or her mind on what to do depending on which story he or she 
wants to tell in his or her own life.  
 I correspondingly see the later Wittgenstein as telling a story about language 
that can change the way that the world is seen and, by implication, the way that 
translation is seen and conducted. The PI, significantly, contains many stories, some 
extended, about how people behave, in line with Wittgenstein’s stress on seeing 
things from different angles (CV p.9). In Table 15, I show those stories upon which I 
have drawn, indicating the source and the chapter in my thesis in which I use them.  
 
TABLE 15: WITTGENSTEIN’S STORIES 
STORY SOURCE 
 
CHAPTER 
 
DESCRIPTION 
Augustine’s 
account of 
language 
PI 1 2 Augustine describes how he 
learned language as a child as 
a process of ostensive 
definition. 
 
The shopping trip PI 1 3 The purchase of five red 
apples shows that language is 
transactional. 
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The builders PI 2 ff. 2, 4 The activity of building 
proceeds using a limited 
number of expressions. 
 
The beetle in the 
box 
PI 293 4 You cannot know what a 
beetle is, if it is kept in a box. 
 
The cord round 
the earth. 
 
Malcolm 
(1984:53) 
5 Appearances can deceive. 
The strange wood 
sellers 
 
RFM I-143ff. 5 (below) Wood sellers are described 
who reckon the price of wood 
unconventionally. 
 
The PI can be seen as narrative in nature. Wittgenstein (PI p.4) describes it as an 
album. The description is fitting, for a reading of the PI is similar to being with 
somebody taking you through a selection of photographs, showing picture after 
picture and describing them, whilst drawing you into dialogue about the pictures. I 
do not want to suggest that the whole book tells one story, only that a vision of being 
human does emerge. The cumulative effect of the parables, the questions, the 
dialogues, the discussions and the examples is formidable. Cook and Read 
(2010:484), writing about the poem ‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’ by 
Stevens, imagine a series of short stories, ‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at Language’, 
which would be a series of scenarios designed to make the reader re-examine his or 
her language. They conclude: ‘But actually, one doesn’t have to imagine that series: 
Wittgenstein did actually write it.’ A Wittgensteinian book on translation might 
similarly be written using a series of (surveyably represented) translations. This 
approach, suggested by that of Weinberger and Paz (1987) (as described in 4.3), has 
been followed in this thesis: I offered case studies (in 3.5 and 4.5, of my translations 
of Mörike and of Barnstone’s translation of the NT respectively) to show how 
translation after Wittgenstein could function. Other translations, such as Adair 
(1995) or Whitinger (2005) have been referred to in passing, using Adair in 3.4 as an 
example of a translation that plays the same language-games as its ST and Whitinger 
in 3.5 as an example of a translation that does not. 
 If the story of the PI offers a story of language that is of use to the reflective 
practitioner of translation, it is important to set this against another story that offers a 
different picture, the picture from which Wittgenstein would liberate his readers in a 
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process analogous to therapy (PI 133), just as the correct answer to Wittgenstein’s 
riddle of the rope in text (133) is set up against the false picture of an extended rope 
round the world on which we intuitively rely. The PI begins with a quotation from 
Augustine, an autobiographical narrative on how he as a child learned to speak by 
being offered ostensive definitions by his parents (PI 1). Wittgenstein undermines 
Augustine’s account by offering other narratives (such as the story of the trip to the 
shops to buy red apples in PI 1), which are intended to come across as more 
convincing. But it is important to note that this is not a clash of theories. As Monk 
(2007:285) notes: Augustine ‘is not articulating a theory about language and what 
follows that passage is not an attempt by Wittgenstein to refute a theory. The point 
of opening the book with that quotation, rather, is that it gives a perfect example of 
the kind of pre-philosophical picture of the relation between words and objects that 
Wittgenstein believes gives rise to philosophical ideas and theories and, therefore to 
confusion. Wittgenstein’s task … is to locate the source of the Augustinian picture 
and to try to replace it with another picture, one which does not give rise to the 
relevant philosophical confusions.’ And the Augustinian paradigm does not go away 
but remains constantly in the background of the PI, representing a tendency against 
which it is always necessary to struggle. 
Just as there is talk of folk psychology, common-sense accounts of human 
behaviour that seem to make sense but that are misleading when analysed (Stich & 
Ravenscroft, 1994), so the Augustinian picture, according to Wittgenstein, is one that 
is widely and deeply but unconsciously held. It can be categorised as a folk 
linguistics that is profoundly dualist. Given the sort of beings we are, it is not 
surprising that we do interpret the world in a dualist way. Steiner (1997:135), for 
example, makes the assertion quoted as (135). 
 
(135) 
… the hybrid nature of the language-experience, its material-immaterial, abstract-
concrete, physical-mental dualism is a central donnée
57
 of consciousness. We cannot 
escape from the inherent coincidentia oppositorum
58
.  
 
 
                                                 
57
 French: ‘given fact’. 
58
 Latin: ‘coincidence of opposites’. 
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As Wittgenstein (PI 340) asserts, the prejudice to which we are in thrall is not a 
stupid one. The dualist tendency is manifest in many important figures in western 
intellectual history, as noted in 3.1, such as Eckhart or Kafka. To note that an author 
is dualist is not to imply anything about the quality of his or her work, of course. 
From a translation point of view, however, the dualist story is pernicious when it 
influences our approach to rendering the literary in another language. In Chapter 3, I 
showed, through an analysis of Berman (2004), that literary translation has often 
been deformed by being approached as if it were non-literary translation in the belief 
that it is possible to separate form and content. Translation becomes a transfer of 
information, which is not what literature is about, a point made by Benjamin 
(2004:75). 
At the very least, Wittgenstein’s story shows that translation is possible. As 
Steiner (1998:97) notes, it is an operational model of the linguistic process and as 
such refutes any deterministic parallelism of thought and speech (such as that 
associated with the work of Whorf), through its proposal that the meaning of a word 
is its use in the language (PI 43). If the meaning of a word is not its use in the 
language, then Benjamin’s proposal (2004:83) that the best translation is an 
interlinear gloss would seem reasonable, the best we might hope for. But why stop 
there? What about the word-for-word literal translation into the same language, as 
depicted by Jorge Luis Borges (2000) as a literary reductio ad absurdum? In his 
story, the translation into Spanish by Pierre Menard of the Spanish novel Don 
Quixote by Miguel de Cervantes intends to produce work that would coincide – word 
for word and line for line – with the work of Cervantes. The product is seen as a 
supreme act of translation because it replicates the prose of the earlier author 
(Cervantes) in the modern world of the translator (Menard). As the narrator 
comments: ‘The Cervantes text and the Menard text are verbally identical, but the 
second is almost infinitely richer’ (2000:40). The inherent absurdity of the strategy – 
even though a changed context may make words richer than when they were written, 
it is hardly practical to recommend translating SL into SL to aspiring translators – 
shows the need for an operational model.  
 Wittgenstein tells a story about language and how it is used. The PI gives a 
rich picture of this use: words are seen in context, as part of the flow of human life, 
in accordance with what he writes in LWPP II 118: ‘An expression has meaning only 
in the stream of life’. The stream of life is presented in many different ways in the 
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PI. Language is shown to be constituted by its activities, so that we can speak of 
language-games, such as reporting an event, telling a joke or translating a text (PI 
23); a language-game only makes sense against a form of life (PI 19); concepts are 
seen as blurred and linked by family resemblance, rather than as essential (PI 67); 
grammar can be both surface and deep (PI 664); meaning is a physiognomy because 
the meaning of an utterance depends on its style (PI 568); it becomes more important 
to look than to think (PI 66); it is possible to make a surveyable representation, a 
description of what has been seen (PI 122) etc. Such a story is of immense value to 
the reflective practitioner of translation because it is a story about language that 
offers practical tools. The translator who is brought to see how language works is in 
a better position to read the ST, to translate the ST and to theorise the TT. Here is the 
ultimate value of reading Wittgenstein, who was recorded by Rhees (1970:43) as 
claiming: ‘I don’t try to make you believe something you don’t believe, but to make 
you do something you won’t do’. 
 Hacker (2007b:116-117) sums up Wittgenstein’s contribution to philosophy 
in the text given as (136). 
  
 (136) 
 
[Wittgenstein] resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for 
centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature 
of linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and language, 
about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and 
about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed 
up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and 
immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to 
overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. 
He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of 
philosophy as a contribution to human understanding – understanding of the forms 
of our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.  
 
 
Fundamental to this reading of Wittgenstein is that what is offered is a contribution 
to human understanding, not to human knowledge, which implies that Wittgenstein 
can be applied wherever we attempt to make sense of the human condition, a 
condition that involves translation. Given that translation is a language-game (PI 23), 
it is a practice particularly suited for the application of Wittgenstein’s account, which 
begins and ends with language. Whilst it is difficult to see how the work of certain 
philosophers, such as Hume, could be regarded as essential reading for translators 
234 
 
anxious to master their craft, to read Wittgenstein can bring practical benefits 
because it transforms our understanding about language. Having read Wittgenstein, 
even the standard generic opposition between the literary text and the non-literary 
text can fall away. A text is literary not because of its genre but because of the way 
that it can be used. An advertisement, for example, can display literary language, 
through use of alliteration etc., and can be said to have a literary function if this is 
the case. A poem can fail to display literary language by not making any demands on 
its reader, for example, and can be said to fail to have a literary function. 
Wittgenstein enables us to see things as three-dimensional, much as the colour 
octahedron (referred to by Wittgenstein as a surveyable representation, PR 51-52) 
enables us to see the spectrum in a way that is three-dimensional as opposed to two-
dimensional. Literature is shown to be about the creative use of language, as is the 
translation of literature, and tools are offered to enable the translator to move on 
from this insight. At the very least we are delivered from false paradigms. We are 
able to free ourselves from misleading pictures and to fly out of the fly-bottle (cf. PI 
309). But there is more than this. A whole world of possibilities is opened up as 
Wittgenstein’s work in turn opens up new ways of translating once the false 
paradigms have been shattered, once we realise that there is no paradigm to which 
we must conform. Wittgenstein offers tools, not a blueprint of how to translate. As 
Winch (2008:82) asserts: ‘a historian or sociologist of religion must have some 
religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying and 
understand the considerations which govern the lives of its participants’. The 
translator similarly needs to develop literary feeling, and the Wittgensteinian 
approach can facilitate its development, whether he or she is reading the ST, writing 
the TT or theorising the TT. Philosophy is a practical activity, not a working-out of 
some doctrine. Wittgenstein is to be seen not as a linguistic policeman but as a 
therapist and as a coach. After that it is down to the translator. As Giles Foden 
(2012:16), discussing creative writing, puts it: ‘now you’re on your own mate, it’s 
your skin in the game’. 
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5.2 Practice and theory 
Gary Hagberg (1995:1) notes how, following Wittgenstein, it is ‘now widely 
understood that any particular concept of linguistic meaning to which one subscribes 
can shape one’s beliefs in related fields of philosophy such as the philosophy of 
mind, metaphysics and the philosophy of perception, and of course aesthetics’. How 
we see language determines how we see the world. If translation is viewed as an 
aesthetic undertaking, as in the translation of literary texts, then it follows that to 
subscribe to the concept of linguistic meaning associated with the later Wittgenstein 
is to shape one’s beliefs about translation and therefore one’s practice of translation 
in line with that philosophy. Here is the major effect of applying Wittgenstein to 
translation studies: that it will change the way we see things and therefore the way 
we do things.  
Wittgenstein, as argued in 1.3, was not a theorist, though many have taken 
him to be a guru. What he was offering was not a theory in the sense of a doctrine, 
but what Baker and Hacker (1986:35) call ‘a single penetrating vision’. His work 
remains opposed to any attempt to build a theory of language, despite this being the 
tendency in contemporary analytical philosophy (Baker & Hacker, 1986:29) and it 
therefore cannot form the basis of any theory of translation or any philosophy of 
translation, not even a Wittgensteinian one. Wittgenstein ‘in effect reverses the 
traditional direction of fit between meaning and understanding, completely 
reorienting the role of explanation in an account of the nature of language and 
linguistic competence’ (Baker & Hacker, 1986:29). 
It might therefore be thought that the Wittgensteinian position should be a 
resolute ‘no theory’ approach, which is what some of his followers have advocated 
(Read, 2007a). What would this actually mean? Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey 
argue that if the later Wittgenstein is right then ‘theory itself is in most cases a 
logically inappropriate form of explanation for humanistic subject matter’ (2001:2). 
Their argument rests on a view of theory as an attempt to see unity in diverse 
phenomena and hence to reveal a hidden link between the phenomena under 
investigation. Wittgenstein’s work would resist theory conceived thus because it sees 
phenomena linked by family resemblance rather than by unity (PI 67 ff.) and also 
sees nothing as being hidden, because everything lies open to view (PI 126). The 
project of the PI is descriptive, so that we ‘may not advance any sort of theory. There 
must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations’ (PI 109). Wittgenstein 
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compares a rule to a signpost: ‘Does the signpost leave no doubt about the way I 
have to go? Does it show which direction I am to take when I have passed it, whether 
along the road or the footpath or cross-country?’ (PI 85). As Allen and Turvey 
(2001:9) comment, doubt does not arise in how we interpret a signpost, because a 
signpost is traditionally used in a certain way: ‘It is embedded in a practice in which 
the accepted thing is to follow the pointing finger, rather than going the opposite 
way’. We do not have a theory of the signpost but rather a practice of the signpost.  
However, it all depends on what you mean by theory, as they say in 
philosophy. The term ‘theory’ can be shown to exist in a network of family 
resemblance. As Dwight Furrow (1995:1) argues, it has so many uses and applies in 
so many different contexts ‘that it probably cannot be given a very precise definition 
capturing all of its instances’. A theory can be any of the following: a hypothesis; an 
explanation; a finished piece of work; a view; a doctrine; a stance taken towards 
practice; soft (as in the humanities); hardcore (as in the sciences). The final two 
items in the list are of key importance here. In 1.3, I cited Iser’s assertion (2006:5) 
that predictive hardcore theory is proper to the sciences and descriptive soft theory is 
proper to the humanities. Wittgenstein can be used to support Iser’s assertion. As 
Allen and Turvey (2001:24) maintain, the rejection in the humanities of what Iser 
would call hardcore theory ‘by no means rules out descriptive or explanatory 
generalisations about human behaviour from the realm of humanistic scholarship. … 
The key point is, however, that such generalisations should not be confused with 
theoretical generalisations, such as those found in the natural sciences, even though 
generalisations about human beings may sometimes seem like “discoveries” of 
hidden “laws” governing human behaviour’. Hence Allen and Turvey would rule out 
the application of a theory such as structuralism within the humanities (2001:26 ff.). 
We are not looking for laws in subjects such as history or literary studies, in the 
sense of something that both describes and predicts behaviour. A barrister who 
speaks of law, for example, means something very different from what a physicist 
means by the term. In the humanistic investigation of translation, we can follow 
Wittgenstein and not advance any theory if we put first the text, its translation and its 
examination, rather than beginning by advancing a doctrine. Such an approach is in 
line with good practice in translation, as Steiner (1998:311) notes: ‘Like mutations in 
the improvement of the species, major acts of translation seem to have a chance 
necessity. The logic comes after the fact. What we are dealing with is not a science, 
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but an exact art’. To see translation as an exact art opens the door on how theory – 
understood as soft theory, as something appropriate to an art not to a science – may 
be used in translation after Wittgenstein.  
There is an analogy with how we describe human behaviour. As Hacker 
(2001:70) argues in a discussion of how a reading of Wittgenstein can be of benefit 
to those involved in the humanities, there is not a single form of explanation 
appropriate to understanding human behaviour. To account for why Anna did 
something, it might be necessary to look at: her motives (including her desires and 
wants); the reasons why she acted; the tendencies observed in her (including her 
customs, habits and dispositions of character); the physical and normative constraints 
to which she is subject etc. It is similarly the case that to understand a text, more than 
one soft theory is necessary. The translation theories reviewed in 4.5, for example, 
can in many cases be used in parallel to describe the TT: I can examine its function 
with reference to skopos theory; its style by reference to stylistics; its place in the 
canon by reference to polysystems theory etc. In that these are soft theories, they do 
not cancel each other out, just as it would make no sense to say to someone that 
because we have explained Anna’s motives, it is pointless to look at her habits. Such 
an investigation from multiple perspectives is in line with the way the PI is written.  
Robinson (1991:xvi) makes the point that it is time ‘to offer translators tools, 
not rules’, because rules tend to suggest that a translation can be done according to a 
formulaic view of equivalence. As Boase-Beier (2010c:36) asserts, theories about 
how to translate ‘are not meant to be sets of instructions and they serve translators … 
badly when so used’. Wittgenstein’s ideas in the PI can be used as tools by the 
reflective practitioner of translation, as in Table 16, which shows nine 
Wittgensteinian tools. 
 
TABLE 16: WITTGENSTEINIAN TOOLS FOR TRANSLATION STUDIES 
WITTGENSTEINIAN TOOL EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION 
 
The language-game (PI 23 ff.) The language-game of the ST can be 
identified and played in the TT. 
 
The form of life (PI 19) The form of life of the ST can be identified 
and related to the form of life of the 
projected readership of the TT. 
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Following a rule (PI 185 ff.) Rules are descriptive of practice not 
prescriptive. It is practice that is fundamental 
to inquiry. 
 
Grammatical investigation (PI 90) Terms can be investigated to ensure clarity 
and consistency in describing a translation. 
 
Deep and surface grammar (PI 664) The deep grammar of a sentence can be 
investigated to show how surface grammar 
may be misleading. 
 
Meaning as use (PI 43) To see meaning as use can emancipate the 
translator from a naïve view of equivalence 
as dictionary meaning. 
 
The surveyable representation (PI 122) The TT can be seen as an attempt to give a 
surveyable representation of the ST, both in 
how it is translated and how it is presented. 
 
Private language (PI 269 ff.) Wittgenstein’s argument against a private 
language shows the translator that it is a 
mistake to see a perfect language lying 
behind a text. 
 
Meaning blindness (PP 118 ff.) The literariness of the ST can be taken into 
account so that translation is not seen as 
transferring information. 
 
 
These are both practical tools and theoretical tools. They can be used when 
translating a text and also to support the translational strategies chosen. What a 
translator says about his or her rendering or about a particular view of the ST or TT 
may carry more force for a reader if it is related to the work of Wittgenstein. This is 
how Steiner (1998) uses Wittgenstein, for example, to support his own 
argumentation. Is this to fall into the informal fallacy of argumentum ad 
verecundiam
59
, i.e. the assumption that because an authority is quoted in support of a 
premise, then that premise must be true? I think that one must be aware of this 
danger, just as Searle (1987:342) comments that references to Wittgenstein outside 
philosophy are often ‘a kind of name-dropping’.60 The referencing of Wittgenstein 
must be done in the spirit of Wittgenstein. Steiner does not merely appeal to 
Wittgenstein but presents Wittgenstein’s views and works through them (Steiner, 
1998:169 ff.), which has been the procedure of this thesis.  
                                                 
59
 Latin: ‘appeal to reverence’. 
60
 See the discussion of Perloff in 1.5.3. 
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There is a significant example of how Wittgenstein’s work can be used in 
translation in Robinson’s guide to becoming a translator (2003), where he tries to 
undermine the picture of the translator sitting opposite a text, magisterially rendering 
it like Jerome in his isolated cave. Robinson aims to show that translation is as much 
about people as texts, and uses Wittgenstein for support, as in the quotation given as 
(137) (Robinson 2003:112). 
 
(137) 
 
While words and meanings are unquestionably important … they are really only 
important for the translator (as for most people) in the context of someone actually 
using them, speaking or writing them to someone else. When the Austrian 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein quipped … that ‘the meaning of a word is its use 
in the language’, he meant that people using language always take precedence – or 
at least should take precedence – over meanings in the dictionary, semantic fields in 
the abstract. 
 
 
 
Robinson (2003:112-113) illustrates this by telling a story of Jim and Maria who co-
habit and speak English, although this is not Maria’s first language. At times they 
have a misunderstanding over the word ‘silly’, which Jim uses as a term of 
endearment but which Maria takes to be offensive. She learns eventually that the 
way the word is used means that Jim is not trying to hurt her, and she is then able to 
notice the occasions when he does use it to mean ‘stupid’. Therefore translators 
typically translate into languages in which they are fluent. Robinson (2003:101) 
gives examples of translations that have been produced because this practice was 
ignored, for example, the sign found in English in a Moscow hotel room: ‘If this is 
your first visit to Russia, you are welcome to it.’ He describes this as an instance of 
‘the “bad” translation done by someone who doesn’t speak the target language 
fluently, and has painstakingly found all the words in the dictionary’. In this example 
from Moscow, the problem is that it is difficult for a native speaker of English not to 
read this as expressing sarcasm, because of the way that the expression ‘you are 
welcome to it’ is commonly used to indicate contemptuous dismissal, in contrast to 
the phrase ‘you’re welcome’, which is a polite expression of recognition. (The point 
also holds, though Robinson does not make it, that the translator needs to be able to 
use the SL properly also.) 
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Robinson’s referencing of Wittgenstein is then linked to a practical 
application (2003:124-126). Robinson asks the question: ‘If, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
says, “the meaning of a word is its use in the language”, and that use varies from 
person to person and from situation to situation, how is it ever possible to know what 
someone else means?’ Robinson gives a series of exercises – such as considering the 
multiple meanings of common words, repeating taboo words or deliberately 
speaking in bad grammar – in order to encourage the reader to explore 
Wittgenstein’s concept, an approach in line with the method of the PI and 
Robinson’s anthropic view of translation. A false picture of the practice of 
translation is destroyed and the way is open for clarity in practice, though no 
prescriptions are given for practice. Authority is not so much appealed to as 
demonstrated and it seems to me that this is a reasonable way to represent a 
philosopher who struggled against dogmatism and for the achievement of flexibility 
without loss of rigour (Kuusela, 2008:3). 
If Wittgenstein is correct in his approach to language, then what he wrote will 
in turn influence the practice of the translator, just as Robinson aims to change the 
practice of those who read his book through his appeal to Wittgenstein. Here is an 
example of how theory can influence practice. Boase-Beier (2010b:27) asserts that 
because soft theories are explanatory ‘they become part of the way we approach the 
world in a very practical sense. They may not dictate practice, but they will certainly 
influence it’. Wittgenstein is of use to the reflective practitioner of translation 
because he can free him or her from false paradigms. Fawcett and Guadarrama 
García (2010:10) explain the typically apologetic western translator’s note found in 
the paratext to many literary translations by the fact that behind it ‘probably lies, for 
example, the Augustinian, the Lutheran, or the Romantic paradigm, all of them 
models upon which, according to Robinson (1991:3-123), the edifice of mainstream 
western translation theory can be seen to rest’. As argued in 5.1, these dualistic 
paradigms are destroyed by Wittgenstein in a process analogous to therapy (PI 133), 
whilst the vision of the later work can enable the translator to move forward with 
clarity. As Janik & Toulmin (1973:261) assert, Wittgenstein must be seen ‘not 
merely as a terminus ad quem, but also a possible terminus a quo’61. 
                                                 
61
 The Latin terms signify ‘finishing point’ and ‘starting point’ respectively. 
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To read the later Wittgenstein is, I think, to be offered a short-cut to being 
enabled to view clearly the issues at the heart of translation. As Kerr (1988:170) 
notes: ‘After working through Wittgenstein’s writings we simply have a different 
way of expressing ourselves … we have simply changed the subject’. Philosophy 
does, as Wittgenstein remarks (PI 124), indeed leave everything as it is: it can only 
describe language and cannot give any foundation. What can happen, though, is that 
the user of language (i.e. Wittgenstein’s reader) can be changed and can act 
differently. It is the conviction of this thesis that such change is desirable. 
Translation studies must look outside its field, to philosophy, if it wants to 
understand itself. In Chapter 1, I discussed the link between translation studies and 
philosophy and have shown throughout this thesis how Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
can offer support to translation studies. I do not see Wittgenstein’s work being used 
to provide a philosophy of translation. I doubt whether any such thing is possible, 
but to investigate the question fully would lie outside the scope of this thesis. In the 
Introduction, I cited Read (2007:4) that what matters is whether Wittgenstein’s 
chosen methods work and whether we can learn to go on. I have shown, by reference 
to translation, that the methods do work and that we can go on. There is a twofold 
movement. The ideas of Wittgenstein illuminate the phenomenon of translation. The 
phenomenon of translation illuminates the work of Wittgenstein. (The second point 
is incidental to this thesis, but important in itself.) 
Wittgenstein can be used as a way of identifying and reading other works that 
might be useful to the reflective practitioner of translation, just as many 
Wittgensteinian philosophers have used Wittgenstein as a way of elucidating and 
applying other philosophers in the canon: Anscombe, for example, returned to 
Aristotle after her reading of Wittgenstein (Teichmann, 2008). An example of how 
this might be done in translation studies is to read Goethe’s comments on translation 
(2004), through Wittgenstein. Goethe sees three kinds of translation of the ST: the 
prose version (translation); the parody (adaptation); the translation of perfect identity 
(transmutation). It could be shown how his three kinds of translation exist in a family 
resemblance of translated texts and how his work is a description of phenomena 
rather than a theoretical stipulation, both of which are Wittgensteinian goals. 
Wittgenstein offers tools to test where other authors have been right about 
translation. Following Cook and Read (2010), who see Stevens as Wittgensteinian, I 
similarly view Weinberger as Wittgensteinian in 4.3.  
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It would be possible to compile a Wittgensteinian reading list for translators, 
as a tool for translator training. Figure 2 is one such list. Many others are possible. 
This is a project that can only be sketched here. Barnstone and Steiner acknowledge 
the influence of Wittgenstein. Berman, Goethe and Weinberger are in parallel with 
his thinking. Klee addresses art, not language, but offers a primer that is truly 
Wittgensteinian in showing its reader how to look at the world. Tymockzo applies 
Wittgenstein in order to extend the western model of translation and to enhance the 
translator’s form of life. Finally there is the PI itself. The purpose of any book on 
Wittgenstein for translators must be to direct them to the text that Wittgenstein 
wrote. The books in the list point towards the PI and my thesis is similarly a signpost 
to the work of the later Wittgenstein.  
 
FIGURE 2: A WITTGENSTEINIAN READING LIST FOR TRANSLATION 
 
Barnstone, W. (1993) The Poetics of Translation 
Berman, A. (2004) ‘Translation and the Trials of the Foreign’ 
Goethe (2004) ‘Translation’ 
Klee, P. (1989) Pedagogical Sketchbook 
Robinson, D. (2003) Becoming a Translator 
Steiner, G. (1998) After Babel 
Tymoczko, M. (2007) Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators 
Weinberger, E. & O. Paz (1987) 19 Ways of Looking at Wang Wei 
Wittgenstein, L. (2009) Philosophical Investigations 
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5.3 Why Wittgenstein 
In 1941, Wittgenstein (McGuinness, 2008:341) wrote to G.E. Moore and 
recommended the German poem ‘Das heilige Feuer’ (‘The Holy Fire’) by C.F. 
Meyer, stressing that if Moore were to read it then it would tell him exactly what 
Wittgenstein wanted to say. McGuinness gives the German text together with his 
own translation (McGuinness, 2008:341-342), which I quote here as (138) and (139) 
respectively. 
 
 
(138) 
 
Auf  das Feuer mit   dem goldnen Strahle 
onto the  fire    with the   golden   beam 
Heftet sich  in  tiefer Mitternacht 
fixes   itself  in deep   midnight 
Schlummerlos das Auge der    Vestale, 
sleepless          the eye    of-the vestal 
Die  der     Göttin     ewig    Licht bewacht. 
who of-the Goddess eternal light  watches 
 
Wenn sie schlummerte, wenn sie entschliefe,  
if        she slumbered     if        she fell-asleep 
Wenn erstürbe die  versäumte Glut,  
if        died       the  neglected  glow 
Eingesargt in Gruft und Grabestiefe  
entombed   in crypt and grave’s-depth 
Würde     sie, wo      Staub und Moder ruht! 
would-be she where dust    and mould rests 
 
Eine Flamme zittert    mir     im      Busen, 
a      flame    trembles to-me in-the breast 
Lodert warm zu jeder Zeit und Frist, 
blazes warm  to every time and span 
Die    entzündet durch den Hauch der     Musen 
which kindled   by       the  breath of-the muses 
Ihnen    ein beständig Opfer     ist. 
to-them a   constant   sacrifice is 
 
Und ich hüte sie mit   heil’ger Scheue, 
and  I    tend  it   with holy       awe 
Daß sie brenne      rein  und ungekränkt; 
that  it   may-burn pure and untroubled 
Denn ich weiß, es wird der ungetreue 
for     I    know  it  is      the untrue  
Wächter  lebend in    die Gruft versenkt.  
watcher  living   into the crypt lowered 
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(139) 
 
On the fire with its golden rays 
In the deepest hours of the night 
Unsleepingly the Vestal bends her gaze 
To guard the goddess’s eternal light. 
 
Should she slumber, should she drop to sleep,  
Should the neglected embers fade and die,  
In coffin-vault must she be buried deep,  
Alone with dust and foul decay to lie. 
 
Within my breast another flame does shine,  
It leaps up warm at every tide and turn,   
A standing offering at the Muses’ shrine: 
By their breath kindled, for them does it burn. 
 
And close I tend it, with a holy dread, 
Pure and unsullied seek its light to save,  
Knowing, that, who this wardship has betrayed,  
Will be sent down to a living grave. 
 
 
 
Wittgenstein stresses: ‘My whole object in writing to you was to say: may a good 
spirit be with you and keep you from getting dizzy and falling down’. 
 Recent commentators have stressed the importance when reading 
Wittgenstein of being aware of the spirit in which he wrote (Monk 2002:14) and 
Meyer’s poem does, I think, illustrate this: the deep ethical seriousness of the 
philosophical enterprise; the high price to be paid for failure; the need to be 
absolutely attentive to phenomena. The poem reflects this ethic in the stateliness of 
its verse and the beauty of its imagery. It is therefore ironic that the translation in 
(139) undermines Meyer’s poetic achievement through failing to echo the style of 
the ST in (138). The translation on the surface conveys the information of the ST but 
the English reads awkwardly. May (1994:1) states that a translation should rebuild a 
work at all levels and asks her reader to imagine trying to rebuild an onion: 
‘translation repacks all the strata of a text, sometimes arranging them loosely, 
sometimes fitting them well, sometimes striving to reproduce one stratum exactly at 
the expense of all the others, but inevitably affecting each layer by changes in the 
others’. Text (139) has the same rhyme scheme as the Meyer (though McGuinness 
does not replicate the alternating feminine and masculine rhymes of the ST) but pays 
a high price for it. It is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s assertion that trying to draw a 
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single chart of a nurse’s perambulations on various floors of a hospital would be of 
no use to anybody (Pascal, 1984:13). 
Examples of how the translation fails are: neither the ST nor the TT is given 
a title by McGuinness, though Meyer’s title is mentioned in a note; lines 1 and 2 set 
up a trochaic pattern that is broken clumsily in line 3; the adverb ‘unsleepingly’ in 
line 2 is clumsy and the image of the Vestal Virgin bending her gaze unsleepingly is 
ridiculous; in line 4 the iambic pattern clashes with a natural reading of ‘goddess’s’; 
the repetition of /sh/ in lines 5 and 6 makes the poem difficult to recite with dignity; 
‘embers’ in line 6 is an unfortunate choice because it confuses the order of events, 
because embers have already undergone a process of fading; the image of the 
‘coffin-vault’ in line 7, whilst interesting in itself, is unsatisfactory in context 
because people are not buried in vaults, whilst a Roman Vestal Virgin would not 
have been placed in a coffin-vault; the ‘living grave’ of line 16 is an oxymoron 
which does not represent the German image of being sent living to the grave where 
the Vestal will die; the syntax of the final two lines is confusing. The rendering is 
hardly a surveyable representation of the masterful prosody of Meyer and it shows 
how the work of Wittgenstein has not been applied to translation. The ST is a great 
poem in the German canon. Whilst I do not expect McGuinness to produce a great 
poem for the English canon, I am disappointed that he offers his readers what 
amounts to a clumsy parody, and it is difficult to imagine anybody, let alone 
Wittgenstein, recommending this translation as summing up exactly what he or she 
wanted to say. That this translation should appear in an important edition of 
Wittgenstein’s letters is nothing short of disastrous. (The translation by Winch of a 
poem by Wittgenstein (CV p.100) is successful precisely because, as Winch (ibid.) 
states, the rhythms of the German are suggested ‘only roughly’ and there is no 
attempt to render rhyme.) 
There has been a failure here to apply Wittgenstein. As Crary (2000b:140) 
asserts, Wittgenstein stresses the role of human agency in language, so that his view 
of meaning ‘calls on us … to use – and perhaps stretch – our imagination’, given that 
language cannot be assessed from an external perspective. If his philosophy demands 
the use of the imagination, then the application of his philosophy to translation will 
likewise demand the use of the imagination. McGuinness has failed to see the poem 
as an onion and has concentrated on rebuilding rhymed meaning, which is more like 
trying to rebuild a potato. In any case, as I indicated above, much of the meaning is 
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lost. Wittgenstein offers a vision for rebuilding the onion, and the tools to undertake 
the task. In 1.3 I asked, ‘Why Wittgenstein?’ The answer is that he can be of use in 
showing the translator possible ways of proceeding, for example: by playing the 
language-games of the ST rather than looking for equivalent effects; by considering 
the form of life represented in the ST; by aiming to produce a surveyable 
representation in the TT, both in how the ST has been rendered and how the text is 
presented to the reader. 
Wittgenstein used to say that a philosopher who did not take part in 
discussions was like a boxer who never went into the ring (Drury, 1973:vii). I think 
something similar applies to translation. Translation is a practice. It is easy to 
criticise McGuinness’s work, but it is important to be able to show that one’s views 
can have a practical application and that it is possible – here – to translate (138) so 
that it shows the spirit in which Wittgenstein wrote. Having criticised McGuinness’s 
translation, I therefore offer my own. In line with what I wrote in Chapter 4 about the 
organisation of translation after Wittgenstein, I set my three translations out in (140) 
on page 247 as a surveyable representation. Other forms of representation are 
possible, just as other translations are possible. A problem has been solved, though 
there was no systematic way of solving it: one poem has simply been replaced by 
another (cf. Z 698). The representation is explained in Table 17, which maps the ST 
and its three translations.  
 
TABLE 17: A SURVEYABLE REPRESENTATION OF (140) 
 
The ST by C.F. Meyer: this has not been 
glossed, as glossing makes the German 
harder to follow and I am assuming a context 
outside translation studies where the reader 
is reading for pleasure rather than 
scholarship. 
 
My first poetic translation of the ST, which 
aims to rebuild the form. The formal rhyme 
scheme of the ST is echoed in the use of half 
rhyme but rhyme is not allowed to lead the 
translation. 
A plain prose but lineated translation of the 
ST that enables the reader to see what is 
going on in the German and that follows the 
rules of English grammar. 
 
My second poetic translation of the ST, a 
relocation where the voice is more self-
conscious, more contemporary (instead of 
Muses, the narrator is ‘amused’ in line 8). 
There are intertextual references, like the 
title’s links to Hopkins’s ‘sweet fire’ of 
inspiration (1985:68). The rhyme scheme is 
abba etc. rather than abab etc. 
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(140)  
 
DAS HEILIGE FEUER  
 
Auf das Feuer mit dem goldnen Strahle 
Heftet sich in tiefer Mitternacht 
Schlummerlos das Auge der Vestale, 
Die der Göttin ewig Licht bewacht. 
 
Wenn sie schlummerte, wenn sie entschliefe,  
Wenn erstürbe die versäumte Glut,  
Eingesargt in Gruft und Grabestiefe  
Würde sie, wo Staub und Moder ruht! 
 
Eine Flamme zittert mir im Busen, 
Lodert warm zu jeder Zeit und Frist, 
Die entzündet durch den Hauch der Musen 
Ihnen ein beständig Opfer ist. 
 
Und ich hüte sie mit heil’ger Scheue, 
Daß sie brenne rein und ungekränkt; 
Denn ich weiß, es wird der ungetreue 
Wächter lebend in die Gruft versenkt.  
 
 
THE HOLY FIRE 
 
Onto the fire with the golden beam 
fixes itself in deep midnight  
the sleepless eye of the virgin 
who guards the Goddess’s eternal flame. 
 
If she slumbered or fell asleep, 
if the flame, neglected, were to die, 
she would be entombed in the crypt, 
with dust and mould, in the depths! 
 
A flame trembles in my own breast, 
it blazes warm at every time, 
kindled by the breath of the Muses, 
to them a constant sacrifice. 
 
And I tend it with a holy awe, 
that it may burn pure and without harm; 
for I know, that the untrue 
watcher is sent living to the crypt. 
  
 
THE HOLY FIRE 
 
To the fire with its golden beam  
fixes in deep midnight  
unsleeping the eye of the Vestal 
who guards the Goddess’s eternal light. 
 
If she slumbered, if she fell asleep,  
if the neglected glow were to die,  
entombed in crypt and depths of grave  
she would be, where lie dust and mould! 
 
A flame burns in my breast,  
blazes warm at every time and span,  
which, kindled by the breath of the Muses, 
is a constant sacrifice to them. 
 
And I tend it with holy awe,  
that it may burn pure and untroubled,  
for I know that the untrue  
watcher is sent living into the crypt. 
 
 
SWEET FIRE 
 
She must keep her eye, as Vestal, 
on the thing in the corner, the sacred flame, 
and must not close her eye. Midnight’s the time,  
but the Goddess’s light is eternal.  
 
She knows that if she falls and if she sleeps 
on the job then things are looking grave: 
her grave, in fact, with the sort of rave 
you tend to get with the mould and the dust. 
 
And strangely, when I try to make a poem, 
amused by what I write, I think my heart 
is burning with what some describe as art. 
I can be Vestal, any place, any time. 
 
I’m awake. I keep the flame alight, 
I want it to burn, pure as diamond, 
and I know that this isn’t just some errand: 
to fall asleep involves an endless night. 
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Can we then take Wittgenstein as an oracle, who will provide for our every 
translating need? Laurence Goldstein (1999:ix) warns against this move: ‘Much of 
Wittgenstein scholarship is sycophantic: many writers … think that Wittgenstein, in 
his late writings, was right about just everything’. Such has not been the point of 
view of this thesis, for I have not assumed that Wittgenstein is right about matters 
but have given extended examples from the PI and have worked through them to 
show why I hold Wittgenstein to be right in his vision of language. Anscombe 
(Monk 1990:497) recalls how reading Wittgenstein for the first time functioned as 
medicine that effectively attacked the throbbing nerve of her philosophical worries. 
There is more to the human person than a throbbing nerve, but it makes a great 
difference to one’s life to have the throbbing nerve soothed. I think Wittgenstein in 
his later writings on language has a vision that is immensely important, but he did 
not address all the philosophical issues that face a translator, nor can answers be read 
from his work, as if from an almanac. If I were faced with a question of ethics in 
translation – whether to translate a text that I found offensive, for example – and 
wanted support for my course of action, then Wittgenstein might be of use to clarify 
the terms in which I put things, but I should be wise to look also at philosophers who 
have written on morals, such as Aristotle or Kant. To think that Wittgenstein is 
sufficient is to fail to read the PI carefully. It begins, for example, with a motto from 
Nestroy (1926:216), which was, strangely, left untranslated until the 2009 English 
edition: ‘The trouble about progress is that it always looks much greater than it really 
is’ (PI p.2). The motto is a clue to how Wittgenstein cannot be approached as 
offering the final truth about all matters. The reflective practitioner of translation 
cannot open the PI to find a theory of translation or a philosophy of translation; nor 
can these be adduced from what Wittgenstein writes in that book. Philosophy has 
taken note of his work and moved on, with Wittgenstein becoming a point of 
reference for many philosophers rather than an oracle. It would be absurd to claim 
that a reading of Wittgenstein absolves the linguist from reading Chomsky, for 
example. It is necessary to see on which level something is being addressed (cf. 
Schiffer, 2006). If somebody wanted to know how language is acquired by children, 
I should recommend that he or she reads Chomsky or his followers. If somebody 
wanted to know how language is used, I should recommend reading Wittgenstein. 
To limit oneself to Wittgenstein is to make a category error. As Kerr (1998:187) 
notes at the end of his discussion of theology after Wittgenstein: ‘There must be 
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other methods besides Wittgenstein’s; but … it would be perverse … to avoid his 
studies of what we may properly say’. 
Moreover, as Adrian Moore (1997:244) notes, to toe the Wittgensteinian line 
too willingly will often mean failing to feel the allure, which Wittgenstein himself 
felt, for the views he was opposing. The PI opens with a long quotation (PI 1) from 
Augustine precisely because the story told by Augustine is a compelling one. Within 
the field of translation, for example, the allure can be seen – by analogy with folk 
psychology – of what I referred to in 5.1 as folk translation, the way we naturally 
assume that translation is a process of transference. An example of the allure of folk 
translation is in Ronald Knox (1957:4) who reduces the field of translation to two 
questions: should the literal or the literary come first and is the translator free to 
render the ST as he or she chooses? Steiner (1998:251) notes, with reference to 
Knox, that this is to oversimplify, but that ‘over some two thousand years of 
argument and precept, the beliefs and disagreements voiced about the nature of 
translation have been almost the same’. These are the issues that inevitably arise 
when approaching the task of translation. In a recent study of Indian philosophy, for 
example, Sue Hamilton (2001:ii), when discussing her own translations from the 
Sanskrit, wonders ‘how literally’ to translate and whether it is permissible to 
paraphrase in order to ‘convey the point of what was being said’. Here are the same 
questions asked by Knox over forty years previously. It is important to recognise the 
natural tendency to ask these questions. To Knox and to Hamilton I might imagine 
Wittgenstein saying what I represent in (141). 
 
(141) 
 
‘Does the literal or the literary come first?’ 
 
– Translation is a language-game. Look at the games being played in the ST and 
play similar games in what you write. 
 
‘Is the translator free to render the ST as he or she wishes?’  
 
–    Say what you please, as long as it does not prevent you from seeing how things           
      are. 
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It is a dialogue, which is fitting, because the PI is a dialogical book. Wittgenstein’s 
two imagined responses are based on PI 23 and PI 79 respectively. Why 
Wittgenstein? Because this is a dialogue in which it is profitable to participate, one 
which can facilitate the philosophical turn for which I argued in 1.1. 
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5.4 Translation after Wittgenstein 
Alexander Gavin (2006) argues that the death of the poet Philip Sidney in 
1586 changed the face of English Literature by giving other poets a standard against 
which they could measure themselves, so that writing English verse became a matter 
of ‘writing after Sidney’, i.e. with Sidney in mind, as opposed to the trivial truth that 
any work produced after Sidney’s death was ‘writing after Sidney’. Similarly the 
work of Wittgenstein has had an incalculable influence inside and outside 
philosophy since his death at Storey’s End in Cambridge in 1951. Hagberg (1995:1) 
refers to ‘the post-Wittgensteinian climate’ in the humanities in general. All 
translation now is translation after Wittgenstein: trivially, in that it comes after his 
death; actually, in that Wittgenstein has changed the intellectual landscape; 
potentially, in that translators may choose to learn from his methods and to apply 
them. 
The PI contains in its Preface Wittgenstein’s statement of intent that is given 
as (142) (PI, p.4). 
 
(142) 
 
I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if 
possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own. 
 
 
 
It is thinking things out for oneself that matters. Anscombe, for example, whilst a 
follower of Wittgenstein, battled against being known as his disciple, as Teichmann 
(2008:4) describes: ‘Some followers of Wittgenstein have been content to repeat 
what he said in different ways, but Anscombe’s philosophy is truer to the spirit of 
Wittgenstein’s precisely in its not doing that’. The point of translation after 
Wittgenstein would be to use the concerns of the later Wittgenstein to explore ways 
of translating and of describing ST and TT. While writing this thesis, I have at times 
had Wittgensteinian philosophers expressing astonishment at my project, because 
Wittgenstein did not address the issue of translation directly at any length, so that 
there would be little material available for me to comment on. My interlocutors had 
made the assumption that the point of the thesis would be exegetical, in line with 
how Daniel Whiting (2010:vi) notes that the current boom industry in textual 
analysis of Wittgenstein is largely a matter of exegesis with little attention paid to the 
252 
 
application of his philosophy. That Wittgenstein mentions translation rarely does not 
mean that he is of no interest to translators. He offers tools, an approach and a vision 
that can be applied outside philosophy and that point beyond exegesis. Wittgenstein 
maintained that the correct response to the reading of any philosophical text is to 
throw it across the room and to begin to work out one’s own ideas (Schroeder, 
2006:119). This attitude applies to writing about translation after Wittgenstein, 
following what Wittgenstein himself wrote about his work: ‘I am by no means sure 
that I should prefer a continuation of my work by others to a change in the way 
people live which would make all these questions superfluous’ (CV p.61). For ‘live’, 
we might read ‘translate’. One consequence of translation after Wittgenstein would 
be that of translations after Wittgenstein. Whilst I do not think that it is possible to 
use Wittgenstein to come up with a theoretical philosophy of translation, translations 
after Wittgenstein might be said to be a practical philosophising of translation. To 
return to the image of the early Wittgenstein (T-LP 6.54): the translator must throw 
away the ladder after climbing it, and get down to the task of rendering texts. 
There are indications that the time is propitious for a discovery of 
Wittgenstein in the world of literary translation, and I give three such indications. 
Firstly, Hoffman and Lasdun, writing in 1994, note a boom in the notion of poetic 
translation (1994:ix) and this boom has continued with the trend of established poets 
producing translations of classic work, such as Simon Armitage’s rendering of the 
Middle English poem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (2008). Armitage writes in 
his introduction that his translation was based on a reading of the ST that discerns 
that ‘poetry is at work’ there that ‘seems to demand a poetic response’ (2008:x). By 
‘poetry’, Armitage is not referring to the form of his ST, but to its expressive 
function. It is in the notion of poetic translation where Wittgenstein can be of use, 
because instead of writing about something that ‘seems’ to demand a certain type of 
response, the translator can view ST and TT in terms of language-games. Secondly, 
the volume of essays edited by Gibson and Huemer on the literary Wittgenstein 
(2004) contains an essay by Perloff (2004) on this notion of poetic translatability. I 
argued in 1.5.3 that this essay is unsatisfactory, but it brings translation after 
Wittgenstein to the marketplace of ideas. Thirdly, the University of Vienna in 2010 
hosted a conference on Wittgenstein and translation (papers in Kross and Ramharter, 
forthcoming). The papers concentrated on how to translate Wittgenstein, with only 
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Martin Kusch
62
 (2012) discussing Wittgenstein on translation from within 
philosophy. These tendencies must be brought together: the interest in poetic 
translation, the philosophical notion of poetic translatability and a Wittgensteinian 
approach to translation. Wittgensteinian scholarship now seems more open to 
applying his work outside philosophy. The mission statement of the British 
Wittgenstein Society (2010:np), for example, stresses that it exists to ensure that 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy ‘continues to play a fertile and creative role in 
21st century thought’ by addressing ‘the many other disciplines (psychology, 
anthropology, sociology, education, sciences, aesthetics etc.) that Wittgenstein’s 
work has impacted and will continue to impact’. Translation, whilst not mentioned 
as such, can be one of these disciplines. My thesis is also a signpost to future use of 
Wittgenstein in that it will, I intend, become a published book on translation after 
Wittgenstein that will address Wittgenstein on translation from the point of view of 
translation studies.  
A question facing the literary translator at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century is that of machine translation. Chesterman (Chesterman & Wagner, 
2002:115) asks if, in a world where a computer has defeated a world champion at 
chess, the only hope for translators is to specialise as literary translators, ‘since 
literature is surely beyond a machine’s capability’. To investigate whether this is the 
case or not goes beyond the scope of my thesis, but I think that two points can be 
made with reference to Wittgenstein. Firstly, the Wittgensteinian stress on the way 
that language-games are linked to human forms of life does offer grounds for 
supposing that only those who have known what it is to lead a form of life could 
translate a literary work that embodies a form of life: ‘Shared human behaviour is the 
system of reference by which we interpret an unknown language’ (PI 206). 
Secondly, even if a computer were to translate Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 
there would be grounds for believing that this would be unsatisfactory for us. As 
Scott (2000:4) asserts, ‘were such a perfect version achievable, it would make 
translation a process of absolutely no interest to any audience other than machine 
translators’. What is of interest to readers of Armitage (2008) is that the rendering is 
by Armitage: rendering a literary text is not an area which admits of definitive 
solution. As Chomsky argues, the construal of knowledge as ability ‘seems to be a 
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 Kusch’s paper is available in an online version at the time of writing. 
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paradigm example of the practice that Wittgenstein held to be a fundamental source 
of philosophical error’ (2000:51). The issue of machine translation after Wittgenstein 
is, however, a topic for further research and one that will no doubt have to respond to 
developments in artificial intelligence and natural language processing. 
Wagner (Chesterman & Wagner, 2002:133) concludes with respect to theory 
and practice that ‘narrowly prescriptive theory wouldn’t work’ for the translator and 
that ‘perhaps what we need instead is a different kind of theory, that we could help 
create: practice-oriented theory – a theory rooted in best practice, directed at 
improved practice, and attentive to practitioners throughout the profession’. 
Wittgenstein is not mentioned by Wagner or by Chesterman in their dialogue, but 
Wagner’s stress on practice-based theory does demand a Wittgensteinian response. 
To bring Wittgenstein’s later work into translation studies discourse is the basic 
recommendation of this thesis. In my own case, I carry out the project of applying 
Wittgenstein in my own translation work and in my analysis of translation, using his 
methods in my own professional practice as well as writing a book outside the 
confines of an academic thesis, aimed at a professional audience.  
In his crime novel A Philosophical Investigation, Philip Kerr (1993) depicts a 
twenty-first century serial killer known as Wittgenstein, code-named as such by a 
secret government project, who consciously imitates aspects of the life and thought 
of his namesake. He engages the investigating detective, Jake, in a battle of wills, so 
that Jake finds herself reading the life and works of the philosopher Wittgenstein in 
an attempt to find the killer. One evening she curls up with the PI instead of her 
usual thriller and concludes that the philosopher and the detective are engaged on a 
similar forensic task (Kerr, 1993:247). She sees a message for every detective in the 
historical Wittgenstein’s description of his method in philosophy as showing the way 
out of the fly-bottle (PI 309). Similarly, the Wittgensteinian approach can offer the 
reflective practitioner of translation a new way of viewing his or her discipline. In 
detective work, what is crucial can be just such a new way of seeing. It is when Jake 
realises that there might be an intellectual aspect to the series of murders, when she 
is prepared to engage on a philosophical rather than a criminal investigation, that she 
is at last able to make progress and eventually apprehend the killer. The investigation 
we need is philosophical. 
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5.5 Story’s end 
 All stories come to an end. The consequences of reading Wittgenstein in 
order to transform translation studies can be summed up as follows: a false paradigm 
of translation (as transference) is destroyed; the concept of translation is broadened; 
tools are offered with which to read, to translate and to theorise. 
In RFM I-143 ff., Wittgenstein tells the story of the wood sellers, which is 
given as (143). 
 
 
(143) 
  
People pile up logs and sell them, the piles are measured with a ruler, the 
measurements of length, breadth, and height multiplied together, and what comes 
out is the number of pence which have to be asked and given. They do not know 
‘why’ it happens like this; they simply do it like this: that is how it is done. … Very 
well; but what if they piled the timber in heaps of arbitrary, varying height and then 
sold it at a price proportionate to the area covered by the piles? And what if they 
even justified this with the words: ‘Of course, if you buy more timber you must pay 
more’? … How could I show them that – as I should say – you don’t really buy 
more wood if you buy a pile covering a bigger area? – I should, for instance, take a 
pile which was small by their ideas and, by laying the logs around, change it into a 
‘big’ one. This might convince them – but perhaps they would say: ‘Yes, now it’s a 
lot of wood and costs more’ – and that would be the end of the matter. – We should 
presumably say in this case: they simply do not mean the same by ‘a lot of wood’ 
and ‘a little wood’ as we do; and they have a different system of payment from us. 
 
 
As David Cerbone (2000:300) asserts, given the failure of the proposed 
demonstration, communication with these wood sellers has broken down. Could we 
translate what they have to say, assuming their language were not ours? Kusch 
(2012:9) imagines the wood sellers using the word ‘myynti’63, and argues (against 
Glock, 2008:28) that translation would be possible: ‘What justifies translating 
“myynti” as “measuring and selling wood” is nothing to do with charity and 
rationality; it is simply the similarity between the tribe’s behaviour and our 
behaviour when we measure and sell wood’. There is in essence nothing more 
unfathomable about their practice than about the medieval practice of selling wood 
by the ell (Glock, 2008:38), or such contemporary practices as charging more for a 
first edition of a book if it is signed by the author: ‘The problem we confront in 
thinking about this community is not a problem in their practices, but rather a 
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problem for us in interpreting just what it is that they are doing’ (Cerbone, 
2000:301). The context has to be taken into account and the imagination used, in 
accordance with what Wittgenstein (PI 583) has to say about significance: ‘What is 
happening now has significance – in these surroundings. The surroundings “give it 
its importance”’. And were the wood sellers to write poems, novels or plays, then we 
could translate those too. Whether we would translate well is, of course, another 
question.  
 In PI 65, given as (144), Wittgenstein imagines a dialogue with an 
interlocutor who seems to represent the author of the T-LP. 
 
(144) 
Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations.   
– For someone might object against me: ‘You make things easy for yourself! You 
talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what is essential to a 
language-game, and so to language: what is common to all these activities, and 
makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part 
of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the part about the general 
form of the proposition and of language.’ 
 
And this is true. – Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call 
language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue 
of which we use the same word for all – but there are many kinds of affinity between 
them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all 
‘languages’. 
  
 
The search for the general form of the proposition that motivates the T-LP (and for 
which the picture theory of language accounts) is over. The later Wittgenstein 
examines languages as we find them, not a hidden language or a perfect language. 
Forms of life do not even coincide with languages: a German Lutheran may – in 
certain respects – have more in common with an American Lutheran than he or she 
has in common with a German Catholic. What is necessary, according to 
Wittgenstein, is to understand different kinds of people, not different kinds of words; 
to understand different practices, not different conceptual schemes (Kusch, 2012). 
Perhaps this is why Wittgenstein expressed himself hostile to the invented language 
of Esperanto: ‘Esperanto. Our feeling of disgust, when we utter an invented word 
with invented derivative syllables. The word is cold, has no associations & yet plays 
at “language”’ (CV p.60). (Wittgenstein’s judgement ignores that invented languages 
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such as Esperanto or Klingon can become forms of life as people form language 
communities.
64
) 
 Where language is not cold but full of associations is the literary. As Pound 
puts it, literature is ‘language charged with meaning’ and great literature is ‘language 
charged with meaning to the utmost possible degree’ (1934:28); literature is ‘news 
that stays news’ (1934:29). Literary translation begins with recognising this 
strangeness. In Chapter 2, I showed how Wittgensteinian can allow this recognition 
to take place. In Chapter 3, I stressed that Wittgenstein can help the translator in his 
or her task of translation, of replacing a literary work by another literary work, where 
there is no necessary correlation but where affinities can be found. In Chapter 4, I 
showed how Wittgenstein can enable the TT to be theorised. The three chapters form 
a full programme for the training of the literary translator. The PI can be added to 
reading lists. Methods derived from the PI can be applied. The philosophy of the 
later Wittgenstein offers a toolkit of models and narratives to help translators and 
translation theorists make decisions (Kay, 2011:176), which is the answer to the 
research question asked in 1.6. 
 The story comes to a close. In that it is about the rendering of literature, it is 
a literary story. In 4.4.1.6, I argued that such terms as ‘equivalence’ are interpretative 
fictions, following Robinson (1991:259). At the end of my thesis I state that literary 
translation itself is a fiction, following Boase-Beier’s description of it as a pretence 
(2006:108-110). Scott (2008:16) is wrong to see literary translation as a forgery, 
because most literary translators do not set out to deceive their readers, excepting 
cases of pseudo-translation. But it is correct to see literary translation as a fiction, 
perhaps the oldest in existence (Bellos, 2011:121). It is a language-game, and its 
glory is that surveyable representations of texts have been shown to be possible. 
Wittgenstein can facilitate future attempts to understand and to practise the game, 
what Bell (2011:215) calls ‘walking the tightrope of illusion’. 
I began this thesis in 1.1 by citing a poem by Lomas as text (1), as an 
example of how Wittgenstein has claimed the attention of creative writers and by 
referring to the assertion by Eagleton (1994:153) that ‘Frege is a philosopher’s 
philosopher, Sartre the media’s idea of an intellectual, and Bertrand Russell every 
shopkeeper’s image of the sage. … But Wittgenstein is the philosopher of poets and 
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composers, playwrights and novelists …’. Wittgenstein’s story has its roots not in 
the Jena of Frege or in the Paris of Sartre and not, ultimately, in the Cambridge of 
Russell, but in the literary Vienna of Kraus and Nestroy. This understanding of 
Wittgenstein is both terminus ad quem and teminus a quo (Janik & Toulmin, 
1973:261) for applying Wittgenstein in literary studies and for explaining why he 
ought to be of interest to those engaged with the translation of poems, plays and 
novels.  
I choose to end with a poem of my own, a literary production, which I give as 
(145) and which addresses literary translation after Wittgenstein. It is in dialogue 
with the poem by Meyer given as (138), the poem Wittgenstein saw as expressing 
exactly what he wished to say (McGuinness, 2008:341), and it may therefore be 
regarded as another translation of that poem. In a sense, this poem says everything 
that I want to say. Translation is a language-game. The story comes to an end. The 
story carries on. 
 
(145) 
PLAY 
 
An Austrian with no tie asked me to translate 
a German joke: an English but different joke 
got an English laugh in the final act. 
I look at the flame and I stay awake. 
 
He told me a story about those who sell 
their wood for a price given how it is spread 
and asked if I thought them illogical. 
I look at the text and I stay awake. 
 
He asked if I would join him in a game 
of tennis, and he told me to start 
but not how hard to hit or where to run. 
I look at my words and I stay awake. 
 
He showed me a bottle and released the fly 
which flew away and did not come back 
and life seemed full with the bottle empty. 
 To read a translation, stay awake. 
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